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For it was the voice of one
who had never been dirty or hungry,
and had not guessed successfully
what dirt and hunger are.

E. M. Forster, Howards End, 1910
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The crisis of Fordism rapidly or simultaneously became the crisis of the Fordist city.
W.F. Fever1
There have been many Detroits over the past one hundred years. There has been the city of
Henry Ford, of the assembly line, and of five dollar days. There was the Motor City, the world
capital of automobiles, suburbanization, highways, and a working class with middle class
remuneration. Or there was Motown, where glamor, music, and fame ruled supreme, regardless of
the color of one’s skin. There was, too, the model city of race relations in the United States. With
1967 came the Detroit of civil unrest that may be, depending on the beholder, a riot, an uprising,
or a rebellion. Then there is the city of industrial ruins, the way paved by decades of
deindustrialization and disinvestment, followed by the murder capital of crisis, crime, and
violence. Finally, there is the empty city, an urban space perceived to be devoid of residents. A
place of fear, of abandonment, which all-to-easily elides with the revitalization fantasies which
paint the city as a blank slate, free for the taking.
During World War II, Detroit, the Motor City, claimed the mantle of the “Arsenal of
Democracy,” even as it began to encounter the costs of rapid growth and mass industrial
production. By 1950, with the Second World War receding into memory, many began to image
the future of Detroit in different ways. Some had visions of broad and stable homeownership and
employment; others styled futuristic renderings of driverless cars and manufacturing facilities
contained within mountains. Very few people in 1950, however, imagined Detroit as an urban
space riven by racial and class divisions, plagued by unemployment poverty, and housing crises.
By and large, Detroiters all wished and imagined a better future, although what they understood to

Fever, “The Post-Fordist City,” in Ronan Paddison, ed., Handbook of Urban Studies (London: SAGE Publications,
2009), 276.
1
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constitute a better future was wide-ranging and occasionally conflicting. Central to the varying
visions of the future of Detroit were different conceptions of what contemporary problems in urban
spaces were and what future shape Detroit might take.
At the end of the 1940s and into the early 1950s, some automobile workers and their local
governments railed against industrial decentralization, warning of “ghost towns” if industrial
employment moved away. At the River Rouge industrial complex, in Dearborn, workers brought
their concerns to the attention of the Ford Motor Company. Union officials and automobile
companies disagreed with this prognosis, as did a federal judge. Across town in Grosse Pointe, a
suburban community just over the city lines practiced a systematic and codified form of housing
segregation, later subject to a state investigation. Defenders of the segregation system acted as they
did out of a fear of the future might bring otherwise for their community. They saw themselves as
guardians and protectors. But not all of members of their community agreed with this vision of a
lily-white future. Instead, the dissenters organized to bring integration to their community.
By the late 1960s, local elites foresaw the need to plan for infrastructure needs up to the
end of the millennium. An internationally prominent urban planner and theorist was engaged to
plan the future of the Detroit region in the year 2000. Brilliant, imaginative, comprehensive yet
human-centered, the planner and his team nonetheless argued that class and racial divisions were
outside the project’s purview. The city they imagined called upon technology and a planned
physical environment to create a different future for Detroit.
Around the same time, the Lyndon Johnson administration, prompted by Walter Reuther,
moved to address the urban crisis across the country. Legislators responded with criticism and then
a defense of what came to be known as the Model Cities program, revealing a spectrum of views
with regard to race, class, federal intervention, and urban spaces. Similarly, the public statements
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and internal communications of the LBJ administration on Model Cities revealed that, while the
intention was good, an understanding of the class and racial divisions in urban America, as will be
shown in the first two chapters, and the experiences of working-class and non-white city residents,
was missing from these high-level conversations and plans.
The urban crisis is the conceptual heart of this study. Here, urban crisis is used as it was in
the 1950s. That is to say, as a structural interpretation of the existence and causes of low-quality
housing, industrial decentralization, the decreasing capacity of cities to provide services to their
residents, and segregation.2 It asks questions about whether residents in Detroit imagined these
changes and how they attempted to get beyond them. In addition, this study draws form the work
of Manuel Castells, Henri Lefebvre, and David Harvey.3 It does not concern itself with the “culture
of poverty” or underclass interpretations of urban concerns, which blame cultural conditions rather
than material ones for poverty and segregation in urban spaces.4 Instead, this study focuses on the
on-the-ground effort to assess Detroit’s problems and imagine a way out of them, toward a
different urban future. For local residents, the future included stable, unionized, employment and,
while opinions were split on the merits of integration, the role of racial inclusion or exclusion was
a large part of the conversation. The further from local communities one goes, the less
understanding there is of the importance of industrial employment, and racial questions are more
likely to be avoided than met head-on.
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Timothy Weaver, "Urban Crisis: The Genealogy of a Concept," Urban Studies 54, no. 9 (2017); Thomas Sugrue,
The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005; originally 1996).
3
Manuel Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977); David Harvey, Social
Justice and the City (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); David Harvey, "The Right to the City,"
New Left Review, no. 53 (2008); Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
4
For an overview of these arguments, see Weaver, "Urban Crisis: The Genealogy of a Concept."; and Mitchell
Duneier, Ghetto: The Invention of a Place, the History of an Idea (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2016).
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Regarding Detroit
The beginning, but certainly not the end, of the puzzle of Detroit and its fate is the
intersection of class with race in the United States. Scholars have argued that white supremacy in
the colonies, and then in the States, was rooted in the control of labor, and thus the control of the
working class.5 Given the divisions among workers by gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and other
identities, we should speak of different working classes, which together comprise the overarching
working class. By the 20th century, and the spread of mas industrial production, further refined into
Fordist production, exploiting racial and gendered divisions among laborers continued to be a key
strategy among managers and the owners of capital.6 This is not to argue that discrimination based
on race or gender are by-products of class relations, but rather that they are intertwined tightly and
intimately with class structure. Thus, even as white Detroit auto workers staged wildcat strikes to
protest integrated work spaces, key union wins – such as the unionization of Ford – only occurred
when class solidarity held against racial divisions.7
Similarly, racial segregation has formed an integral component of US urban history. Just
as DuBois wrote that the problem of the United States in the 20th century was the problem of the
color line, cities in the 20th century United States were marked with the history and legacy of racial
and ethnic inequalities. Detroit was and is no exception. A number of scholars already have tilled
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Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: the Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: W.W.
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Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA's Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (New York: New Press, 2001);
Stephen Meyer, Manhood on the Line: Working-Class Masculinities in the American Heartland (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 2016); Elizabeth Faue, Rethinking the American Labor Movement (New York: Routledge, 2017).
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Beth Tompkins Bates, The Making of Black Detroit in the Age of Henry Ford (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 2012); Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the
Fate of American Labor (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1995).
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this soil. Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin’s Detroit: I Do Mind Dying (1975), covering Detroit
in the late 60s through the early 70s, is one vital example.8 Another contemporaneous account, by
radical geographer William Bunge, who taught at Wayne State University, studied one square mile
in Detroit before, during, and after the events of the summer of 1967.9 Slightly earlier, in 1972, B.
J. Widick, who came out of the union movement and the United Auto Workers (UAW) to teach
economics at Wayne State University and then Columbia University, wrote Detroit: City of Race
and Class Violence.10 More recently, historian Beth Bates addressed the racial politics of the city
in The Making of Black Detroit in the Age of Henry Ford, which ended with the unionization of
Ford in 1941.11 All of these works are attentive to the interplay of race and class in the Motor City
in the 20th century.
The two works of history that correspond the closest to this study are Thomas Sugrue’s
The Origins of the Urban Crisis and Heather Ann Thompson’s Whose Detroit?, both of which
examine the dynamics of race and class in Detroit in the decades following the Second World
War.12 Set in the 60s and 70s, Thompson’s Whose Detroit? locates the labor movement in the
context of 1960s social movements, including, most importantly civil rights. She demonstrates
how interwoven the experiences of racism and classism were in the city. In tune with Thompson’s
interest in the carceral state, Whose Detroit? addresses issues of policing and law enforcement in
an urban space, showing the power of courts, jails, and police as realms of racial oppression and
class exploitation.13 Sugrue’s Origins of the Urban Crisis is the launching point for study. My first
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Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban Revolution (Chicago: Haymarket
Books, 2012; originally 1975).
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William Bunge, Fitzgerald: Geography of a Revolution (University of Georgia, 2011).
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B.J. Widick, Detroit: City of Race and Class Violence, revised ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989).
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Bates, Making of Black Detroit.
12
Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis; Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit?: Politics, Labor, and Race in a
Modern American City (Cornell University Press, 2004).
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Heather Ann Thompson, "Rethinking Working-Class Struggle through the Lens of the Carceral State: Toward a
Labor History of Inmates and Guards," Labor 8, no. 3 (2011); Heather Ann Thompson and Donna Murch,
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two chapters, on Local 600 and on segregation in Grosse Pointe, came from much more
abbreviated discussions in Sugrue’s study. As his title indicates, Sugrue examines the cause of the
urban crisis in Detroit and identifies it as the interaction of housing segregation, job discrimination,
and deindustrialization. This dissertation builds on Thompson’s and Sugrue’s work, asking how
Detroiters understood these processes at the time and what their responses were. Thus, while
Sugrue asks what happened in postwar Detroit to bring about its urban crisis, this study asks what
Detroiters thought would or could happen as the city confronted challenges in the changing
economic environment and encountered the political opportunities and limitations of the emerging
liberal state.
Defining Deindustrialization
As the process of deindustrialization creates the background of much of this history, a brief
discussion of the scholarly literature provides a useful background for the rest of this study. As
Barry Bluestone has explained in his foreword to the collected volume Beyond the Ruins: The
Meanings of Deindustrialization, industrial productivity has risen in the United States even as
industrial employment has gone down. Despite the dominant narrative of deindustrializing cities
in the US, the amount of manufacturing has gone up. In 1959, 16.7 million American workers
were in the manufacturing sector, comprising a little over a third of all US workers outside of the
agricultural sector (31.3%). In 1979 the actual number of workers had risen to 21 million even as
the percentage dropped to 23.4%. By 1999, the actual number began to decline, to 18.6 million,
and the percentage dropped as well, to 14.4%. After 2001, the number was down to 16.5 million,
lower than in 1959, and the percentage was 12.6%, or around an eighth of all workers who were

"Rethinking Urban America through the Lens of the Carceral State," Journal of Urban History 41, no. 5 (2015);
Heather Ann Thompson, Blood in the Water: The Attica Prison Uprising of 1971 and Its Legacy (New York:
Vintage Books, 2017).
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employed outside of agriculture. “Millions of workers are losing their jobs,” Bluestone concludes,
“in industries in which productivity

is growing faster than sales. This cannot be termed

‘deindustrialization,’ but for the workers affected it feels the same.”14 While perhaps this does not
describe the deindustrialization of the United States, it does describe the deindustrialization of the
American workforce.
Additionally, Bluestone highlights a key aspect of attention to deindustrialization in the
United States: that it is chronologically situated in the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, Bluestone
pinpoints the 1973 oil embargo as the beginning of the economic woes that would come to be
associated with deindustrialization. It set the stage for Bluestone’s own influential analysis, with
co-author Bennett Harrison, published in 1982.15 Beginning with a 1980 Business Insider editorial
calling for “the reindustrialization of America,” Bluestone and Harrison trace the “trouble” back
to the early 1970s. In this telling, the 1960s were a time of growth and prosperity, a decade during
which economic growth averaged 4.1% a year and the GNP grew by 50% over ten years. The
United States was, as Kenneth Galbraith described it, “the affluent society” (with, as Bluestone
and Harrison put it, “the notable exception of millions of black, brown, and teenaged workers.”).16
By the 1980s the tide had seemed to turn, as domestic economic concerns joined together with
“America’s apparent inability to compete in the global marketplace.”17 In Detroit, the tendency to

Barry Bluestone, “Foreword,” in Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of
Deindustrialization (Ithaca: ILR Press, 2003), xii-xiii.
15
Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community
Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York City: Basic Books, 1982). Jefferson Cowie and
Joseph Heathcott credit this book with introducing the term to “the popular and scholarly lexicon.” However, they
also state that the first public use of the term deindustrialization was to describe the Allied policy towards Germany
following World War II. The Oxford English Dictionary gives that honor to the Economist in 1940, describing the
Third Reich’s policy towards Vichy France. This quibble does not alter Heathcott and Cowie’s main point, although
it is worth noting that the first use of the verb to deindustrialize occurred nearly six decades earlier, in 1882.
16
Bluestone and Harrison, Deindustrialization of America, 4; John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 2009).
17
This timeline is used elsewhere, including in W.F. Lever’s entry on “The Post-Fordist City” and that of Douglas
V. Shaw on “The Post-Industrial City” in Paddison, ed. Handbook of Urban Studies, 276 and 286, respectively.
14
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blame non-Americans, or those seen as non-American, for the downturn in the metropolis’s
industrial employment has a troubling and chilling history. At the most benign, it involves defiant
gestures like the UAW refusing to allow foreign-made automobiles to park in the lot at their
headquarters, Solidarity House, on Jefferson Avenue or bumper stickers that read “Out of a job
yet? Keep buying foreign.” At its worst, opposition to foreign goods and workers fueled racial and
ethnic hatred that led to brutal incidents such as the race-based murder of Vincent Chen in 1982.18
Putting temporal matters to the side, Bluestone and Harrison usefully delineate the different
forms deindustrialization took. In one form, called “milking,” a profitable plant could see its
profits redirected elsewhere in the operation, leading to financial difficulties and problems with
the physical plant. In a more aggressive form, management makes a conscious decision to allow
the factory to deteriorate, with profits directed elsewhere and physical assets not maintained,
leading to inevitably to inefficiencies and breakdowns. A third form involves shifting physical
assets, like machinery or other equipment, to other locations. While the plant stays open,
productivity declines. In a fourth form of deindustrialization, the one most closely associated with
the process in the popular imagination, the plant – and possibly even the business – is closed. In a
variant, operations are relocated elsewhere, a process which became known as the “runaway shop”
in the 1930s and again in the 1950s. In the latter case, Bluestone and Harrison refer to the use of
the term in “industries such as shoes, textiles, and apparel [which] left New England for the lowerwage, non-unionized South,” but autoworkers in Detroit also used the term, “runaway shop,” at
the beginning of the 1950s, as the first chapter details.19

18

Bluestone and Harrison, Deindustrialization of America, 5; Dana Frank, Buy American: The Untold Story of
Economic Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000); Frances Kai-Hwa Wang, "Vincent Chin: A Catalyst for the
Asian-American Civil Rights Movement," Michigan History Magazine, 2017 March-April 2017.
19
Bluestone and Harrison, Deindustrialization of America, 7-8.
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While pushing back against this popular narrative, Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott
repeat the common misconceptions about the chronology in their introduction to Meanings of
Deindustrialization. They write that while the late 1970s and early 1980s was the time during
which deindustrialization became part of the political lexicon, its roots were longer than supposed.
In 2003, the scholarly literature continued to have to argue against the dominant narrative that tied
the period of deindustrialization to the late 1970s and the 1980s. Similarly, scholars have often
argued that deindustrialization itself is not the most useful term, as the total number of
manufacturing employment in the US did not change much, let alone shrink – from 18 million in
1965 to 18.5 million in 2000. Instead, what changed was the quality of jobs available and their
compensation, the unionization rate (down 40% from 1985 to 2000), power relations in the
workplace, and the location of manufacturing.20
For these reasons, together with growing concerns about globalization and uneven
development, many scholars have chosen to refer to industrial restructuring rather than
deindustrialization.21 This is an important aspect to keep in mind in discussing a site of production
such as Detroit, where the city proper lost manufacturing while production merely left the city for
the suburbs or nearby locations like Toledo.22 Regardless, whether shops moved to the suburbs,
neighboring states, or to the Sunbelt, manufacturing continued in the Detroit metropolitan area.
The question is where it was located and what the quality of employment in the manufacturing
sector was, as well as the broader context of local employment. Further, as sociologist Ruth

“Introduction,” in Cowie and Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins, 14.
See, for instance, Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005); W. F. Lever, "The Post-Fordist City" and Douglas V. Shaw, "The Post-Industrial
City," in Paddison, ed. Handbook of Urban Studies.
22
Some, including Constantinos Doxiadis, who is the subject of the third chapter, would include Toledo as part of
the greater Detroit metropolitan area.
20
21
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Milkman has written, examinations of job loss and industrial decline should not devolve into rosy
nostalgia for what were harsh and often dehumanizing work conditions and jobs.23
What is useful about the term industrial restructuring is how it conveys how
deindustrialization was part of a larger process, “one episode in a long series of transformations
within capitalism,” and that industrial production itself does not end. As Cowie and Heathcott
phrased it, “deindustrialization and industrialization are merely two ongoing aspects of the history
of capitalism that describe continual and complicated patterns of investment and disinvestment.”24
They are the two sides of a single coin. Moreover, it helps to convey that deindustrialization is a
process embedded in geography, in the sense that the location of manufacturing has always been
place-based, uneven, and changing.
Cowie and Heathcott argue that the point of departure for any discussion of
deindustrialization “must be respect for the despair and betrayal felt by workers,” the “defeat and
subjugation” of “workers who banked on good-paying industrial jobs for the livelihoods of their
families and their communities.”25 Yes, but how necessary was it that these jobs were industrial?
Did workers mourn factories as factories, in and of themselves, or for the good-paying and
seemingly stable jobs ensured by unionization, with a relative ease of entrance? What was lost
when workers no longer had the ability to plan ahead and to count on employment with which one
could support one’s family and sustain one’s community? We should ask to what degree industrial
employment was necessary for these conditions of labor. Other fields of work, such as teaching
and nursing, if they are unionized, meet many of these criteria, although with major exceptions.

23

Ruth Milkman, Farewell to the Factory: Auto Workers in the Late Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1997), 12.
24
Cowie and Heathcott, "Introduction: The Meanings of Deindustrialization," in Cowie and Heathcott, eds., Beyond
the Ruins, 15.
25
Cowie and Heathcott, "Introduction: The Meanings of Deindustrialization," in Cowie and Heathcott, eds., Beyond
the Ruins, 1. See also Sherry Lee Linkon and John Russo, Steeltown USA: Work & Memory in Youngstown
(Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2002).
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The first is the mass employment required by mass production, and the second is the requirement
in these latter occupations for higher education.
Deindustrialization was devastating to workers, workers’ families, and working-class
neighborhood and communities. Most important was the loss of the conditions of labor favorable
to workers, not industrial production in and of itself, with its ear-shattering noise, its inhuman
rhythms, and its back-breaking work. We should ask how stable were these conditions of labor
under an industrial regime. Do we remember as permanent what was really a fleeting historical
moment contingent on the Second World War, followed by the Cold War and proxy wars, such as
that in Korea? Did manufacturers, amiable during time of national security and federal contracts,
merely revert to the status quo as soon as it was expedient? As labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein
has argued, “the very idea of such a postwar accord is a suspect construct,” that whatever industrial
peace that did exist “came flying apart when management in highly competitive industries went
on the postwar offensive.”26
Nonetheless, it is that concept of the postwar accord that provides the foundation for the
American (and Canadian) framework for Steven High and David W. Lewis’s in 2007 work,
Corporate Wasteland, in which they contextualized “the deindustrial sublime.”27 The American
(and Canadian) dream, as it was conceived in the post-World War II era, found fulfillment in the
blue-collar middle class, by which “the higher wages won by unionized workers offered millions

26

Nelson Lichtenstein, "Class Politics and the State during World War Two," International Labor and WorkingClass History, no. 58 (2000): 270.
27
What High and Lewis call the deindustrial sublime overlaps with what others have critiqued as ruin porn. See, for
instance, John Patrick Leary, “Detroitism,” Guernica, January 15, 2011,
https://www.guernicamag.com/leary_1_15_11/, accessed August 27, 2018. High and Lewis are not uncritical of the
preservation of closed sites of industrial production, however, noting that “the factory-scape might be retained, but
the jobs were gone, as were the workplace cultures on which industrial workers depended for status and solidarity.”
See Steven C. High and David W. Lewis, Corporate Wasteland: The Landscape and Memory of Deindustrialization
(Ithaca: ILR Press, 2007), 31.
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of families a home in the suburbs and a broad range of consumer goods.”28 The unsettling impact
of industrial restructuring undermined this dream of economic uplift and underscored the
fundamental economic precarity and vulnerability of working-class people and communities. By
contrasting deindustrialization in the US and in Canada, the authors of Corporate Wasteland show
how economic transformations do not occur in vacuums and how their consequences are shaped
by public policies and laws. High and Lewis argue that deindustrialization in both countries is
often framed as inevitable, “a natural by-product of corporate capitalism.”29 Instead, the authors
pinpoint two major factors in plant closings: relocation and obsolescence. Both are entirely under
the control of companies, although their decisions are guided by cost-saving and profit margins,
not the negative impact on the labor force or local communities. The result is uneven development,
a plant closing in one place with another opening somewhere else, in which “people and places
have become disposable” under the guise of what Schumpeter called creative destruction.30
Jefferson Cowie traced how this played out with RCA Victor in his 1999 study, Capital
Moves: RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor, which chronicled how a Camden, New
Jersey, plant’s workforce was slashed in the late 1940s following unionization in 1937. The jobs
moved first to Bloomington, Indiana, a city attractive to RCA due to “the population’s desperation
for work.” When unionization came to Bloomington, and a strike wave in the mid-to-late 1960s,
RCA moved production first to Memphis for a few years before crossing the border to Ciudad
Juarez. From the 1960s through the 1990s, the Bloomington plant continued to decline until it shut

28

High and Lewis, Corporate Wasteland, 3. See also Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass
Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Knopf, 2003).
29
High and Lewis, Corporate Wasteland, 7.
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High and Lewis, Corporate Wasteland, 8; Joseph A. Schumpteter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
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down completely in 1998 as production was siphoned down south, where labor was cheaper and
non-unionized.31
Industrial Production and Detroit’s History
From the late 19th century through the Second World War, Detroit was a boomtown
propelled by industrialization, even as its early days of industrialization were outpaced by the
behemoth of Fordist production. In 1870, the city’s population was 80,000, and it grew to 465,000
within forty years. Between 1910 and 1920, with the advent of mass automobile production, the
population more than doubled that number, to 994,000. By 1930, the population was 1.5 million,
and the city reached its population peak at 1.8 million in 1950.32 By the postwar era, automobile
production and its secondary industries were what kept Detroit moving as a center of mass
industry. The working-class communities of postwar Detroit were predicated on mass industrial
employment. This employment, or at the very least its enduring potential and possibility, was the
sine qua non of Detroit as a city of a relatively prosperous working class.33
The beginning of the 20th century saw a diverse economy in Detroit, with regional
manufacturing and retail of stoves, carriages, railroad cars and equipment, drugs, and boots. By
1920, however, the automobile industry dominated the economy of Detroit.34 There was a hiatus,
during the Second World War, in 1943 and 1944, when the auto industry produced no cars but
instead focused on defense production – tanks, armored vehicles, planes, and munitions. When
peacetime production resumed, the demand was all the greater for the moratorium. The record year
for automobile production was 1929, when 5.4 million automobiles were made. In 1948, 5.3

31
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million were produced, just slightly under the record, and the next year the number was 6.6 million.
By 1950, it was 8.8 million. This growth bespoke a number of changes, both nationally and
globally. Before the Second World War, the auto industry was largely subject to consumer demand
– and automobiles were, relatively speaking, luxury goods. While that luxury was extended to the
middle class and even better paid working-class consumers, via used vehicles, they were not
crucial for transport or most employment. Consequently, consumer demand often went down
during times of economic hardship, and the entire auto industry, and employment in related
industries such as steel and rubber, went down with it. The advent of the military-industrial
complex during the Second World War meant that defense contracts and the post-war rebuilding
effort could give an impetus to American industry that was independent of consumer demands,
even as war-time savings fueled consumer demand in cars in the 1950s.35
From 1947 through 1967, the number of industrial workers employed in manufacturing in
Detroit proper fell from 281,500 to 149,600, a decrease of 47%.36 In the same years, the workforce
grew in the surrounding communities in the tri-county area (Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne) from
186,700 to 244,700, or an increase of 31%.37 The worst job losses occurred in the 1950s, due to a
combination of four postwar recessions, the loss of small manufacturing plants and defense jobs,
the rise of automation and other technological changes, and decentralization of production to
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communities outside the city proper.38 For example, at Chrysler, employment dropped from
100,000 to 35,000, most of which occurred at its major factories in Detroit.39
Even in good years for the automobile industry, such as 1955, unemployed auto workers
in the city were did not benefit, as the auto companies built new factories incorporating new
technologies of automation in surrounding communities – such as Trenton, Warren, and Utica –
to replace the aging industrial infrastructure in Detroit proper. As auto production increased to new
heights, up to 10,000,000 annually, employment in auto factories stayed the same across the United
States. The result was, in B. J. Widick’s phrasing, “severe dislocations” of Detroit industrial
workers in the 1950s.40 Nor was Detroit alone. Nineteen fifty-six was, after all, the year pinpointed
by sociologist Daniel Bell, writing in 1973, as the year when the United States shifted to being a
post-industrial society, as evidenced by, “for the first time in the history of industrial civilization,”
the number of white-collar workers was greater than the number of blue-collar workers.41
Detroit may not have been a center for high-tech manufacturing, but it was the site of booming
production that went hand-in-hand with a increased consumer demand following the war, which
in turn mean a new demand for labor. In addition to recent migration to the city, the increased
demand for labor deepened the continuing housing shortage. Further, 75% of new housing in the
metropolitan area was happening outside Detroit proper, in Macomb and Oakland counties.
Developers found that it was more cost-effective to build new housing and factories in
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undeveloped areas outside the city rather than rebuilding or renovating existing buildings in the
city.42
That the 1950s were such turbulent years for auto workers in Detroit serves as a reminder that
the Motor City went through several generations of automobile production. The first generation
was the early factories located in the city proper with heavy demand for labor, which gave way to
a second generation of increasingly automated plants located in metropolitan areas. This, in turn,
gave way to a subsequent generations of plant relocation, automation, and worker displacement
and relocation. Indeed, the movement of production from the city proper into the suburbs correlates
to the suburban boom in metropolitan Detroit. In the 1950s, 500,000 people moved out of Detroit,
with a net loss of 270,000. On the other side of the city border, Warren, a suburb just to the north
of Detroit and one of the suburban communities that saw the construction of new auto plants, grew
to a city of over 100,000 as Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors built facilities there, joined by
smaller auto parts suppliers. Nor did these changes occur in a social or political vacuum: Warren
remained an all-white community until the 1970s.43
Journalist Scott Martelle has argued that Detroit’s current fortunes would have been
fundamentally different if the city’s economy had continued to be as closely tied to defense
spending after the Second World War as it had been during the war. Martelle’s argument suggests
the difficulties that arise from equating deindustrialization with a decline in industrial
manufacturing overall, rather than a decrease in manufacturing’s share of the economy and, vitally,
the number and quality of jobs manufacturing provides.44 It is not industrial production per se so
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much as the conditions of production that matter. But neither are industries outside of automobile
production, including defense, immune from the forces that weakened the economies of cities like
Detroit – decentralization of production, automation, outsourcing – that might call for smaller
workforces in dispersed locations, rather than large workforces in centralized locations.45
Moreover, decentralization was often a condition for defense contracts. It is not far-fetched,
given Detroit’s role as the Arsenal of Democracy during the war, that industrial decentralization
was related to, if not direct defense contracts, than at least the possibility of future defense
production on a different model. Regardless, the defense spending that did come Detroit’s way
was on a far smaller scale than that directed towards the Sun Belt, which saw high-tech, computer,
and electronic manufacturing develop in ways they never did in Detroit. The defense jobs that did
exist in metropolitan Detroit were far outside the city’s limits, such as at the Warren tank plant,
and therefore increasingly outside the reach of city residents. The economy of the region might
have evolved differently in Martelle’s hypothetical situation, but it would not done much to change
the situation of Detroit’s central city.46
At the Ford River Rouge complex, workers noted both small scale and more expansive forms
of deindustrialization in the years following the Second World War. Union leadership struggled to
find a language to describe their situation, which they had not witnessed prior to the postwar
period. Layoffs, speedups, automation, and runaway jobs were all decried. As early as 1948, the
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term decentralization was used to identify the loss of employment at Ford and automobile
companies in metropolitan Detroit, even as new factories continued to be opened elsewhere.47
Like other large manufacturing concerns, Detroit auto companies conducted large-scale
decentralization during the 1950s, building factories closer to other regional bases and reducing
the cost of labor.48 In the decade following the Second World War, General Motors build factories
in Atlanta, Kansas City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Wilmington, Delaware; Framingham,
Massachusetts; Linden, New Jersey; South Gate, California; and Parma, Ohio. All of the
company’s new or expanded factories were outside of Detroit. 49 Moves to integrate production
meant that local small-part suppliers lost significant business.50 While the large automakers were
changing their operations, the auto industry in Detroit was undergoing other changes, too. Large
job loss (77,000 jobs) occurred when Kaiser-Frazer, Midland Steel, Hudson, and Packard went out
of business. In 1940, 625,456 Detroit city residents were wage-laborers, and that number grew to
757,772 in 1950. By 1960, however, it has shrunk to 612,295, below the 1940 figure. In 1970, the
number was 561,184. The decline in the number of production workers mirrored this pattern. In
1939, before wartime production kicked off, the number was 181,935. It rose to 281,515 in 1947,
and then declined to 232,348 in 1954. It further dropped to 145,177 in 1958 – again, below the
prewar number. Employment in the auto industry, which was sensitive to consumer demand, was
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constantly in flux and tumultuous. The winter of 1949-1950, for instance, saw sudden layoffs that
raised the number of unemployed in Detroit to 127,000.51
These changes had a profound impact for the economic well-being of city residents. The
median family income for white Detroiters in 1959 was $7,050, while it was $4,370 for black
Detroiters. In the next decade, the median income rose 71% for white Detroiters, but only 40% for
black families. Seventy-three percent of black households lived on less than $6,000 a year, whereas
only 41% of white households did so. Combine this racial disparity with the demographic shift
occurring as white Detroiters began leaving the city proper for the surrounding suburbs, as the
proportion of city residents who were black began its upward trajectory. As Detroit became more
African American in population, it also became relatively more poor, with a corresponding impact
on neighborhoods, small businesses, local shops, and housing stocks. By 1969, the median family
income in Detroit was $10,045, but the median family income for black families, just under half
of the city’s population, was $8,645. “Detroit,” Scott Martelle noted, “was two cities defined by
one boundary.”52
The deindustrialization of Detroit was part of a global economic restructuring. This
restructuring has been variously called post-Fordism, post-industrialism, postmodern, or
neoliberalism, with each term containing differing connotations and critiques. 53 Common
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characteristics among them include a shift to knowledge and service industries, the spread of
consumerism to all areas of life, global interconnectedness and networks (including multi- and
transnational

corporations),

and

flexibility

of

employment,

also

called

precarity.54

Deindustrialization could, theoretically, occur without loss of industrial employment. If the
relative share of a city’s economy taken up by manufacturing decreased, eclipsed by new engines
of economic growth, such as services ranging from medical, educational, and governmental to
consumer services, then one could describe that city as post-industrial – that is, no longer
economically dominated or defined by industrial production. In practice, due to technological
advances such as automation, job loss tends to go hand-in-hand with the decreasing importance of
industrial production.55
Wartime Detroit and the Postwar City
For Detroit, the Second World War began before the bombing of Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941. A year earlier, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called on the United States to
provide aid to Great Britain against the Axis. “The people of Europe who are defending themselves
do not ask us to do their fighting,” the president soberly told those listening, “They ask us for the
implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight
for their liberty and for our security.” Roosevelt’s address announced that “business as usual”
could no longer continue. As production must move away from the market and towards defense,
so workers and management had to work together for the greater good. “We must be the great
arsenal of democracy,” the president exhorted.56
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Detroit industry responded to Roosevelt’s call, and the transition was profound. Of the
city’s existing industrial machinery for automobiles, only 12% could be used for the creation of
tanks, trucks, boat and submarine engines, machine guns, anti-craft weapons, and airplanes.
Consequently, as the auto industry retooled, the tool-and-die industry underwent a profound
change. In an often cited example of wartime conversion, Ford built a new facility in Ypsilanti,
Michigan, roughly 18 miles from Detroit, in 1943. The Willow Run Bomber plant, where Ford
applied the structure of the assembly line to the production of war planes, was the largest war plant
in the world when it opened in September, 1941. In August, 1944, the Albert Kahn-designed
factory could claim to finish a new B-24 every hour.57
The change in production brought a change in labor demands. Through a combination of
industrial recruiters and word-of-mouth, Detroit received around 500,000 migrants – many African
American – between June 1940 and June 1943. This influx led to a severe housing shortage, which,
due to racial segregation, affected black Detroiters the most.58 The growing struggles over access
to decent housing and jobs created a perceptible climate of racial tension. One Catholic unionist
newspaper put it bluntly, stating in June 1943 that “to tell the truth, there is a growing, subterranean
race war going on in the city of Detroit which can have no other ultimate result than an explosion
of violence.”59 Similarly, Walter White, the national director of the NAACP, warned a Detroit
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audience, “Let us drag out in the open what has been whispered through Detroit for months – that
a race riot may break out here at any time.”60
Break out it did. Fighting between white and black Detroiters began on June 20, 1943, on
Belle Isle, a 900-acre Frederick Law Olmsted-designed park located on an island in the Detroit
River, between the US and Canada, that had been open to city residents since 1845. By nightfall,
the fighting involved several hundred people and had migrated from the island onto the mainland.
The violence escalated over the next several days. In the end, thirty-four people were killed and
433 injured. Houses, stores, and factories sustained property damage of $2 million, and the US
Army was required to restore order in the city. Who was killed during the violence, however,
points to an underlying truth. Of the thirty-four killed, twenty-five were black, and seventeen of
those were killed by police. None of the white Detroiters were killed by police.61
Accounts from June 1943 demonstrated that white and black Detroiters behaved very
differently during the tumult. While hundreds of black Detroiters looted white-owned businesses
in black neighborhoods, thousands of white Detroiters concentrated on meting out violence to
black men and women who crossed their path in the city. In other words, a larger number of white
Detroiters were intent on doing harm to people while a smaller number of black Detroiters attacked
property. This dynamic led journalist Scott Martelle to write that “where the whites acted out of a
desire to maintain the Jim Crow-like status quo, the blacks acted out of a frustrated drive to break
down barriers.” He cited a contemporary analyst who noted that “the main difference was that the
blacks acted out of hope and the whites acted out of fear.”62
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This pattern of behavior, of two different forms of rioting, reveals two different forms of
policing in the city. Black looters received the full force of armed agents of the state while white
rioters received indifference, and sometimes a helping hand. As economist B.J. Widick recounted,
“The country got some idea of how Detroit was behaving when newspapers printed a photograph
of a Negro World War I veteran being held by police while a white man hit him.”63 The NAACP,
civic and religious organizations, and community leaders protested the police’s use of force against
black Detroiters and police indifference to the white rioters’ violence. The Detroit Chapter of the
NAACP, then the largest chapter in the country, stated, “There is overwhelming evidence that the
riot could have been stopped at its inception Sunday night had the police wanted to stop it. So
inefficient is the police force, so many of its members are from the deep south, with all their antiNegro prejudices and Klan sympathies, that trouble may break out again as soon as the troops
leave.”64
Protests against the behavior of Detroit police were not solely from the leaders and
institutions of black Detroit. Brigadier General William E. Guthner, former police chief of Denver
and the officer in charge of the federal troops during the 1943 riot, was far from impressed with
the behavior exhibited by the city police during the turmoil. “They [Detroit police] have been very
handy with their guns and clubs and have been very harsh and brutal,” according to Guthner, “They
had treated the Negroes terrible up here, and I think they have gone altogether too far. […] If they
want everybody to get back to normal, the police will have to get back to normal themselves.”65
Most important, none of the underlying issues behind the riot were addressed, let alone resolved
after the disturbance ended. Far from resolution, the official post-riot reports and analyses placed
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on the blame for the riot centrally on the black community. County Prosecutor William E. Dowling
pointed to the black press and the NAACP as the major culprits, arguing that the latter had “been
fomenting trouble with their crusades in the Negro neighborhoods from the start. If they want to
do something constructive they might try to control the Negro Press.” The committee on the riot,
convened by Michigan’s governor Harry Kelly, piled on, stating that the racial tensions came from
“the positive exhortation of many Negro leaders to be militant in the struggle for racial equality.”66
Unsurprisingly, Detroit’s black community was outraged with analyses that placed the blame
squarely and only on black Detroiters. A Michigan Chronicle editorial rued the consequences,
writing, “The race riot and all that has gone before have made my people more nationalistic and
more chauvinistic and anti-white than ever before. Even those of us who were half liberal and were
willing to believe in the possibilities of improving race relations have begun to have doubts – and
worse they have given up hope.”67 Frustrations over racial discrimination in the Motor City were
deeper than narratives of Detroit as the model city on race relations completely taken by surprise
in 1967 allow or acknowledge.
June, 1943, witnessed the brief boiling over of what simmered away beneath the surface of
Detroit during the war years. Perhaps it was the context of the war that open the gates to physical
violence, or perhaps the tension had simply brought city residents to a breaking point. Whatever
were the exact variables that led to the riot, the broader climate was clear. It was tensions revolving
around overcrowded housing, the influx of migrants to the city, and the growing African American
community coupled with widespread white racism and tensions over job discrimination and
security. As blame was placed on civil rights organizations like the NAACP, the city continued to
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be the site of unresolved conflict over who belonged where, who could go where, and what the
consequences of violating these informal rules would be. As the riot proved, violence in the streets
of the city was not an improbable response.
The tensions in the city might have gone back under cover, but they by no means
disappeared. Once the war ended, leaders in Detroit shifted their attention to the need for urban
development, which included highway construction and slum clearance. In 1945, then-city
treasurer Albert Cobo wrote a letter regarding urban development to the city council advocating
highway construction as an integral part of maintaining real estate values in downtown Detroit. 68
The city’s Detroit Plan of 1947, released under Mayor Jeffries, addressed these concerns. It showed
how race, poverty, housing, and the use of space intersected in the immediate postwar moment. In
November of 1946, the mayor announced a plan to raze a hundred acres of “blight” northeast of
downtown Detroit but south of Gratiot Avenue.69 The land would be sold to private developers to
build new, private, housing. Part of the plan was to generate income via property taxes, so the
construction of public housing was out of the question. The upfront cost to the city would be $2
million, taking into account the resale of the land to developers, the mayor reasoned, but the plan
would pay for itself over fifteen years. The plan explicitly moved low-income Detroiters out of
their homes to make way for better, private, housing stock that would generate higher tax returns
for the city.
When the condemnation of housing began in 1947, the area proposed by the city had grown
from a hundred acres to 129. A legal challenge to the city’s right to condemn private property to
sell the land for private development was overcome, and demolition was allowed to begin in 1950.
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The land then sat vacant for five years. The city’s housing department did not successfully relocate
most of the seven thousand black families displaced by the scheme. As black Detroiters were
severely limited as to the neighborhoods into which they could move, many of those displaced
moved into nearby neighborhoods, further worsening overcrowding. “Rather than ending blight,”
journalist Scott Martelle noted, “the Gratiot redevelopment project simply redistributed it.”70
Globally, the era of the Bretton Woods Agreement was beginning. The United States was the
foremost industrial and military power in the world following the Second World War, although its
close rivalry with the Soviet Union meant that the American military and defense communities
actively planned for further conflicts. Part of Cold War planning was an emphasis on geographic
decentralization of strategic locations that could be targets of Soviet weapons. Detroit’s role as an
industrial center, including as a producer of military machinery, meant that new government
contracts came with stipulations requiring production facilities and factories be moved away from
central urban areas.71 The postwar boom in production and resulting demand for labor combined
with earlier migration to the city, placing even more stress on housing in Detroit. The result was
that seventy-five percent of new housing was built outside of the city proper, in adjacent Macomb
and Oakland counties. While existing buildings in Detroit became outdated, cheap land outside the
city required no razing or renovating of existing structures in order to build.72
Detroit’s 1949 Mayoral Race
By the end of the 1940s Detroit was already a city of industrial might, union strength, racial
tension, and a housing crisis. All of these dynamics came to the front during the 1949 race for the
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office of city mayor. The mayoral election saw record voter turn-out in what was then the fourthlargest city in the United States, and demonstrated that these issues were not far from the minds of
most Detroiters following the war. The Chicago Tribune, reporting on the election, called it “one
of the most bitterly challenged in the history of the city.”73 The two main contenders – George
Edwards, Jr., and Albert E. Cobo – represented competing visions of the city. Where Edwards ran
on a campaign of social justice associated with fair housing, employment, and labor, Cobo ran a
campaign premised on “pragmatic” financial common sense. Edwards’ vision entailed a city
government that included the marginalized and the least well-off, while Cobo’s vision was oriented
towards the interests of the professional and business classes of the city.
Edwards was a Democrat, and he came out of the progressive, New Deal liberal, wing of
the United Auto Workers. He graduated from Harvard with a master’s in sociology by the age of
20, and he worked for two years as a researcher in the Student League for Industrial Democracy
under Norman Thomas.74 In 1936, Edwards moved to Detroit to join the industrial union
movement. By 1938, he was the head of the UAW’s Welfare Department. In 1940, Republican
Mayor Jeffries asked Edwards, only 25 years old, to serve as the director of the Detroit Housing
Commission. In 1941 he won his first of four two-year terms on the Detroit city council, the
youngest council member to be elected at that time, and served as Detroit’s air raid warden while
working shifts at the Timken-Detroit Axle Company. Two of his terms on city council Edwards
served while stationed in the Philippines with the US Army. While overseas, he was elected the
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council president, a position he won twice. He earned a law degree from the Detroit College of
Law in 1944. In 1949, Edwards turned his attention away from the city council and towards the
mayoralty.75
By contrast, Cobo, a Republican, was a trained accountant who had left the private sector
to temporarily work for the city during the Depression under New Deal Democrat mayor Frank
Murphy. Cobo wound up being appointed to the vacant City Treasurer position in 1935, and then
won the position in the next election. Cobo wove together fiscal conservatism, which aligned him
with the business and real estate interests in the city, and the sensibilities of “an old-ward-style
politician.” As journalist Scott Martelle characterized him, Cobo “maintained close personal ties
with the leaders of ethnic clubs and service organizations – the life blood of Detroit’s Democraticheavy politics.” While Edwards was back by the industrial UAW and CIO, Cobo was endorsed by
the craft-oriented AFL.76
Housing and race became central questions during the race. Edwards, who had long
defended public housing and voted several times to locate publish housing outside of the inner
city, ran on a platform of public works (such as cleaning streets and building more playgrounds
and public housing) and civic reform (specifically police reform).77 Edwards received substantial
union support during his campaign, including $30,000. The labor movement also produced over
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1.3 million pamphlets, supporting his election, printed in English, Polish, and Hungarian, as well
as door-to-door canvassers, and sound trucks.78
True to his stated fiscal conservatism, Cobo ran on a platform focused on fixing the city’s
budget and implementing better management. In contrast to Edwards’ calls for increased public
housing, Cobo advocated slum clearance, with the cleared land then being sold to private
developers. He also called for better city services, such as fixing sewer problems, but he used
rhetoric that emphasized tax-paying. He told an interviewer that “the people who pay taxes want
better services for their money.” An innocuous-sounding statement, but it had clear implications
in a city where most property-owners were white and many blacks were renters.79 Not all of Cobo’s
positions were racially coded. He was quite clear in his meaning when he warned about the threat
of “Negro invasions” of all-white neighborhoods.80
The voter turn-out for the September 13th primary to determine who would run in the
November election was record-breaking. Cobo came out ahead, with 170,000 to Edward’s
113,000. In the aftermath, Edwards lost no time in painting Cobo as working for well-off
suburbanites and real estate developers in Grosse Pointe, Birmingham, and Bloomfield Hills rather
than being motivated by the interests of city residents.81 The argument was helped by Cobo’s plans
to clear out slums and sell the land to private developers, with no accommodation given to city
residents who lost their homes. Cobo, however, deflected Edwards’ characterization by countering
that such development would result in more tax revenue without a corresponding raise in the tax
rate, thus raising more funds for schools, parks, and other city services. Cobo contended that those
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displaced could be housed in apartments built first on the cleared land for purpose, although where
they would live between the time of condemnation, demolition, sale, and the development of new
housing was unclear.82 “Sure there have been some inconveniences in building our expressways
and in our slum clearance programs,” Cobo later commented when criticized for demolishing
African-American neighborhoods in order to build highway, “but in the long run more people
benefit. That’s the price of progress.”83
Just as the rhetoric and reality of tax-paying had racial implications, so did that of slum
clearance. The majority of those targeted for slum clearance were black Detroiters. The more
Edwards, however, defended public housing and sought endorsements from black Detroit
community leaders – such as Dr. James J. McClendon, the president of the Detroit chapter of the
NAACP – the more radical he appeared to moderate white Detroiters. The election results in
November made this crystal-clear. Cobo won with 313,136 votes to Edwards’ 206,134. Cobo won
every city precinct except for those in black neighborhoods.84 He was true to his campaign
promises and in the first weeks of his mayoralty he vetoed eight of twelve proposed public housing
projects. The ones that escaped his axe were all in black inner-city neighborhoods. The eight he
cancelled were all located in white, outlying, parts of the city. Later, Cobo moved to quash the
city’s public housing program altogether, replacing its director, who had served under the two
previous mayors, with a private developer. Detroit only built 8,155 units of public housing between
1937 and 1955, putting the nation’s fourth largest city behind Boston, Newark, Norfolk, St. Louis,
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and New Orleans in the construction of public housing.85 This would have long-term consequence
for the city’s development and for race relations within the city.
The election showed that Edwards’ UAW backing did not go far, despite his candidacy in
a heavily unionized town. Being a Democrat did not ensure him victory in a heavily Democratic
city. In an UAW campaign debriefing, one organizer related, “They told me that the union is OK
in the shop but when they buy a home, they forget about it […] as long as they think their property
is going down, it is different.” A labor campaign coordinator working on Detroit’s west side
reported that he thought “in these municipal elections we are dealing with people who have a
middle class mentality. Even in our own UAW, the member is either buying a home, owns a home,
or is going to buy one. I don’t know whether we can ever make up for this difficulty.” 86 The
UAW’s political endorsement was strangely limited in the UAW’s city. The UAW’s first foray
into the city’s mayoralty race, in 1937, had resulted in a two-to-one defeat, beginning a pattern
that repeated for the next three decades.87 Since Edwards became a Wayne county judge by
appointment in 1954, won reelection in 1955, and won election to Michigan Supreme Court in
1956, it is clear that he did not have trouble winning public office as such. But he did lose the
mayoralty of Detroit, reinforcing the sense that city politics were more closely tied to racial
dynamics within the city than other public offices.88
The 1949 mayoral race focused on themes that arose time and time again in 20th century
Detroit. There was the interweaving of class and race, sometimes intersecting, and other times
competing against one another. There was the importance of housing and housing policy, and who
lived where, and who had the right to which parts of the city. There was the policing and
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criminalization of certain Detroiters and certain parts of the city. There was the red scare and the
threat of communism. These were pressing issues in the immediate postwar United States, and
they were essential questions in Detroit’s city politics. They shaped the decisions made by voters
and elected officials, as well as those of bureaucrats and functionaries.
Thomas Sugrue has argued that white Detroiters’ politics were due to an investment by the
white working-class, previously a collection of various ethnicities, in protecting their recently
earned “whiteness.” Going further, Sugrue argued that the Reagan Democrat phenomenon should
be placed in the historical context of “Cobo Democrats.”89 In a 1950 study of the union voting
patterns in the 1949 Detroit mayoral election, Harold Sheppard used the anti-Semitism scale
developed in Theodor Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality to correlate ethnic prejudice to
voting preference. The study found that union members were not statistically different from nonunion members in terms of prejudices, but that generation and ethnic affiliation made a difference.
Sheppard hypothesized that younger workers, who tended to have lesser attachment to ethnic
identity and who tended to be better educated, also tended to have fewer ethnic prejudices such as
anti-Semitism. Younger workers also tended, however, to have less involvement in the union.
Thus, older, less-educated, ethnic-identifying union members were more likely to vote Republican
than younger, more educated, non-ethnic-identifying union members.90
Consider the issue of housing, which is, fundamentally, about where an individual or a
family is and is not allowed in a city. In a city with high homeownership, and where working
people, due to union wages, increasingly could afford their own homes, contestations over housing
was tied to the fact that houses were assets. Houses become imbued with the meanings and feelings
that their inhabitants give them (as the location of family life or personal refuge, or as
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manifestations of one’s social standing or respectability, to give but two examples), but they are
also sources of profit and significant investments that were expected, at the very least, to maintain
their value. In this context, people went to extremes to prevent the devaluing of their property, and
fears of racial integration lowering property values further exacerbated feelings, either hidden or
explicit, on race and class.
Chapter Outline
By the time High and Lewis wrote Corporate Wasteland, they could identify a forty-year
decline in North American manufacturing. Using the framework of uneven development and
industrial restructuring, however, one could address deindustrialization outside the framework of
a decline in manufacturing overall. That is to say, a metropolitan area such as Detroit could be the
site of deindustrialization, even as industrial production stayed roughly stable throughout the
country. This is what the workers at Ford’s River Rouge complex confronted in the a few years
after the end of World War II. The first chapter of this dissertation sets the stage for the following
chapters by examining an early case of what would become known as deindustrialization, at the
time called decentralization, in metropolitan Detroit. The case study specifically looks at a Ford
industrial center, the River Rouge facility, that began to decentralize only a few years after World
War II. The UAW local representing the facility brought a lawsuit against Ford for breach of
contract, which was thrown out of court for various reasons, including the red scare during the
Korean War, the lack of support on the part of the UAW leadership, and the primacy of business
prerogatives over community well-being. A vital dimension of the local union’s fight against the
movement of jobs and production away from their communities was the enlisting of those local
communities, beyond the factory gates, in their campaign against industrial decentralization. Local
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municipalities supported the local union, arguing that the future of their communities depended on
the continuing presence of automobile production and employment.
The second chapter moves across town, and examines ethnic and racial segregation in
metropolitan Detroit. The suburb of Grosse Pointe, immediately adjacent to the city, codified
segregation into a methodical and orderly system, in which real estate agents agreed to a pointbased system of client evaluation. Those who failed to receive the necessary number of points, the
number of which varied according to one’s ancestry, were refused housing in the suburb,
regardless of ability to pay. This system was the subject of a state investigation in 1960. The
architects and defenders of the arrangement took the stand to explain and justify their reasoning.
In response to these revelations and in the context of the Civil Rights Movement broadly, some
residents of Grosse Pointe joined together in order to promote integration and inclusion in their
community. Thus, two separate visions of the future were at play in Grosse Pointe, one based on
racialized fear and the other on racial acceptance.
These first two chapters lay the groundwork to understanding how class and race played
into divisions in the metropolitan Detroit area. The third chapter switches viewpoints, and
examines the findings of a prominent urban planner engaged by the local electric utility to project
the future of greater Detroit in the year 2000. The planner, Constantinos Doxiadis, operated within
the framework of ekistics, the scientific study of human settlements that he founded. Doxiadis’
treatment of racism was ambivalent, wavering between arguing that it was a social problem, not
an urban one, yet he also acknowledged that it deeply involved cities. While ambivalent on racial
matters, Doxiadis explicitly considered class stratification to be natural and desirable and coupled
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this view with a belief that industrial production would continue apace, perhaps even expand, in
the Detroit region.91
The fourth chapter continues that examination of responses to the urban crisis, this time at
the federal level. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, in its desire to create a society of
shared prosperity and well-being, targeted the urban crisis via the Model Cities program. This
chapter focuses on the legislative battle prior to the passing of the bill, originally proposed by
UAW-president and Detroiter Walter Reuther. It looks at the reasoning behind objections to the
legislation and arguments for it. Racial and class difference came to the fore, such as objections to
school integration as exposing one’s child, coded white and middle-class, to the “slum child.”
While the fourth chapter focuses on the Model Cities program before its passage into law, the fifth
chapter looks at the legislation itself and how members of the Johnson administration justified it
and defended it. Just as the ways that members of Congress had attacked the legislation before its
passage was indicative of the various ways Americans thought of and understood race and class in
urban spaces, the ways that the administration thought and understood the same came across in
their speeches, white papers, and internal memos. These revealed that members of the Johnson
administration understood the best future for American cities like Detroit to be middle-class. They
were wary of black political power even as they disavowed racial discrimination and segregation.
For some, the future of urban areas was not even urban. Rather, suburbanization was the future
and the ideal.
The first two chapters on racial and class divisions in metropolitan Detroit provide the
foundation for the later chapters – the concrete lived experiences of city residents in the decades
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following World War II. It is in that context that we must understand the attempts by planners and
experts to address what they see as urban problems and ills. The fundamental and overarching
focus of the study are the reality of class and race divisions in the metropolitan areas, and how
these divisions are ignored or inadequately addressed by responses to the urban crisis. I seek to
understand why people thought the way they did, and how they defended their thoughts on
segregation, on integration, on work, on industrial decentralization, on urban planning, and on
federal urban policy to others.92
Taken all together, the study argues that the solutions proposed by Doxiadis and the LBJ
administration, while understanding that racial segregation, discrimination, and unemployment
were parts of the urban crisis, could not quite understand what they were. The flipside of this is
that, in the case of Detroit, local city residents often had a much better sense of what was going
on, although they did not have enough power to challenge the forces of industrial restructuring and
systemic racism. Nonetheless, some residents imagined futures in which employment was assured,
or in which a community could be integrated.93 Despite their expansive and ambitious future
imaginings, the Doxiadis project and the Model Cities team did not dream this big.
This study uses Detroit as a case study, but the themes it explores are not only applicable
to Detroit, or even to cities in the United States. One can see them in the banlieus of Paris, rather
notoriously in urbanist circles. Much academic work focuses on Paris, but it emerges in fictional
work as well, such as the novel Arab Jazz. The same themes are present in cities such as
Amsterdam and Stockholm, as demonstrated in Ian Buruma’s Murder in Amsterdam or Ruben
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Östlund’s 2017 film The Square.94 While the dynamics change when demographic differences
include religion and language, the impact of residential segregation and discrimination in
employment remain similar. While the language of colonialism has been used to critique this
dimension in the United States – by the Black Panthers and others influenced by revolutionary
movements around the world in the 1960s and 1970s – the colonial aspect is clear cut in the cases
of previous colonial powers in Europe and those they previously colonized, as Carl Nightingale’s
Segregation details.95
Furthermore, other scholars have detailed the moment where this study ends. Historian
Tracy Neumann, in Remaking the Rust Belt, details how postindustrial urban policy foresaw cities
designed to cater to financial and commercial service sectors, “scrubbed free of evidence of
manufacturing,” and as the sites of “culture and leisure activities that would appeal to tourists and
suburbanites.”96 These ideas did not come out of nowhere. They were the result of international
networks of urban planners and policy creators, as described by Christopher Klemek and Daniel
T. Rodgers.97 This study adds to these works, tracing the responses to industrial restructuring in
the United States during a slightly earlier timeframe. A significant difference is that while
postindustrial ideas in the 1980s were, as Neumann describes it, “closely linked to the ethos of
privatization and devolution that permeated urban developments in North Atlantic nations in the
last quarter of the twentieth century,” the individuals and organizations examined in this study are
by far liberal in orientation. This is the case, certainly, with the Johnson administration and those
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who worked on the Great Society, which was explicitly seen as a descendant of FDR’s New Deal.
Even someone with strong ties to the business community such as Constantinos Doxiadis, was
generally liberal in approach, as well. They accepted the positive role of states in private housing
markets and public sector services. While Doxiadis actively encouraged the involvement of
business and private sector community members in finding solutions to urban problems, he did not
have any qualms about enlisting the aid of government and public funds as well. Yet, as the last
chapter of this study chronicles, one of the main architects of the Model Cities program envisioned
a city that was designed to middle-class tastes and oriented around attracting suburbanites back to
the city.
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CHAPTER 2 “GHOST TOWNS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE”: INDUSTRIAL
DECENTRALIZATION AND WORKING-CLASS ORGANIZATIONS IN SUBURBAN
DETROIT IN THE 1950S
We shall solve the problem of cities by leaving the city.
Henry Ford98
A dominating physical presence up to the present day, the Ford River Rouge complex at
its peak was a sight to behold. The expansive complex located in Dearborn, a suburb adjacent to
Detroit, was, according to a Vanity Fair cover story in February, 1928, “the most significant public
monument in America.” The Rouge plant “[threw] its shadow across the land more widely and
more intimately than the United States Senate, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Statue of
Liberty . . . .” The fashion and popular culture publication dubbed the industrial mammoth
“America’s Mecca,” given that it embodied the “cardinal virtues” of size, quantity, and speed.99
Historian and Walter Reuther biographer Nelson Lichtenstein described the Ford River Rouge
plant as the realization of Henry Ford’s “dream of continuous, integrated manufacture” and an
“industrial marvel, the largest concentration of machinery and labor anywhere in the world.”100
Even today, the complex is clearly visible from the sky and in aerial photographs of metropolitan
Detroit, rivaling the scale of the downtown business district.
From its beginning, the Rouge plant was a monument to American industry. Designed to
be able to construct an entire automobile on site from raw materials, the complex was made up of
over twenty-three buildings packed into a square mile. These ranged from a power station to mills
and foundries to assembly plants. In a fictionalized account of a new worker approaching the
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complex for the first time, novelist and native Detroiter Jeffrey Eugenides described, “the main
building, a fortress of dark brick, [which] was seven stories high, the smokestacks seventeen . . . .
It was like a grove of trees, as if the Rouge’s eight main smokestacks had sown seeds to the wind,
and now ten or twenty or fifty smaller trees were sprouting up in the infertile soil around the
plant.”101 The Rouge plant was so complex that it was and is often compared to the city in its own
right. Allan Nevins, a biographer of Henry Ford, once wrote that the Rouge “was an industrial city,
immense, concentrated, packed with power.”102 In a telling turn of phrase, The Henry Ford’s
website on the history of the complex describes the Rouge in the 1930s as “a city without
residents.” Its workforce in 1929 was around 100,000.103
It was that workforce, the disregarded residents of an immense industrial city, that
contributed to the Rouge’s uniqueness and importance. The industrial complex could not run if not
for its workforce, but the significance of the Rouge workforce went beyond that fundamental fact.
Labor relations in the automobile industry were inherently national, if not global, in scope. This
was not because the union locals involved were engaged necessarily in large-scale battles, but
because of the degree and scope of industrial power located in Detroit. When the president of
General Motors, Charles Wilson, stated during his 1953 Senate confirmation hearings to become
Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense that “what was good for the country was good for GM and vice
versa,” he was not indulging in overblown rhetoric. During World War II, GM accounted for a full
10% of all war materials manufactured from metal in the United States. The course of the auto
industry was of national importance, and consequently so were the labor relations within the auto
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industry. Strikes and contract negotiations were national news. Even the most parochial union
grievance could, under the right circumstances, become a fight with far extending consequences.104
Of the industrial might located in Detroit, the Ford River Rouge complex made up a
significant component. Consequently, the UAW local representing the Rouge workforce, Local
600, was a titan among UAW locals. It was the largest local union in the world. In the late 1940s,
it had more members than twenty-five of the thirty-six national unions in the CIO.105 A good deal
of the local’s strength came from the nature of the River Rouge complex itself: Local 600
represented a large number of auto workers. In Detroit, workers at the Rouge made up 3.7% of the
city’s total workforce, with an estimated 6.5% of Detroit families with employment ties to the
complex.106 Due to the local’s large membership, and the diverse manufacturing process present
at the River Rouge complex, Local 600 wielded an immense influence. Combined with that size
and influence was a clear left-leaning bent in the Local’s political orientation. Local 600 was “a
rank-and-file kind of local,” Ernest Goodman, the labor lawyer who represented the local,
remembered, “None like it anywhere in the country I don’t think.” “It was pretty anarchic in their
thinking at least,” he said of the local’s politics, “It was wonderful democracy-in-action in a local
union.”107
But that anarchic, democracy-in-action spirit confronted a changing power dynamic in the
postwar economy. In 1950 American industry was changing rapidly, with companies investing in
automation, speeding up production rates, and moving their factories away from centralized
industrial cities. In terms of bottom-lines, these changes were beneficial. For workers in centralized
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industrial cities, however, these changes had profoundly negative effects on their employment as
well as for the communities they inhabited. The residents of metropolitan Detroit were aware of
the potential consequences of these policies and choices, including offering organized resistance
to them. In the immediate post-WWII period, the local UAW union at the Rouge began raising the
alarm about what they called decentralization, a deliberate corporate policy of moving jobs and
production away from the company’s manufacturing center.
Between 1950 and 1953, the leadership of Local 600 ran a campaign against
decentralization after they recorded significant job loss at the Rouge complex.108 Ford’s leadership
reassured the local’s leadership that decentralization of production was not an issue.
Unsurprisingly, local members felt angry and betrayed when they discovered the company moving
machinery out of the complex in the middle of the night. Their fears were confirmed. Jobs
originally held at the Rouge were going to contractors, or to Ford plants outside of Detroit, such
as in Buffalo and Cleveland.109
Moving to stop the flow of jobs away from the Rouge complex, Local 600 filed an
injunction against Ford in early 1952. It argued that Ford was committing a breach of contract, as
the company and the UAW had recently signed a historic five-year contract. The union, Local 600
argued, would never had signed the contract if they had known their jobs would be relocated.
Dramatically, at the same time as their claim against Ford was being heard in court, testimony
regarding Communist penetration and influence of Local 600 was being heard by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities in a courtroom down the hall.110 A mix of reasons,
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including different strategic positions between the UAW local and its parent organization, as well
as Cold War anti-communism, led a decision against the local’s lawsuit. The HUAC hearings
proved to be embarrassing, and Walter Reuther and the International UAW stripped the local’s
leadership from office and placed the local under receivership.
While Local 600 was unsuccessful in court, they were successful at a campaign aimed at
raising support within local communities and municipalities surrounding the Ford River Rouge
complex. Industrial decentralization, the union leaders argued, would take away the employment
that supported working-class Detroit, which in turn threatened the foundation of the entire
community. Their campaign relied on a fundamental fact for working-class communities: Without
employment, communities disappear. The rhetoric that emerged from Local 600’s campaign often
evoked the image of ghost towns. But while the original ghost towns were mining towns whose
existence dwindled with the resources they extracted, communities predicated on production
operated under a different economic logic.111
Industrial ghost towns entailed the loss of production. Such a loss could be caused by a
variety of factors: company strategy, lack of materials, or a loss of consumer demand, for instance.
That local politicians supported this argument suggests that these arguments resonated beyond the
union, and that Local 600 was not merely a voice in the wilderness. This was not merely a case
involving industrial workers concerned with their individual jobs and incomes. Community
members outside the factory gates also saw their futures and communities bound together with the
continuing presence of industrial work, and publicly asked for the Ford Motor Company to
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consider the well-being of the communities surrounding their factories when making corporate
decisions.112
In response, the Ford company at first argued that decentralization was due to matters of
national security. Production was down due to wartime demands on steel and, further, was in
compliance to the national defense plan in place at the beginning of the Korean War in late June,
1950. The local union came to the conclusion, however, that decentralization was a deliberate
policy choice by the company, independent of external concerns.113 The Korean War provided a
convenient, if puzzling, cover for industrial restructuring. The outbreak of war created another
boom in demand for labor, and Detroit saw a full-employment economy again.114 There was not
only federal spending at play. Americans bought eight million cars before cutbacks in the winter
of 1951, stemming from the cyclical nature of automotive employment, saw unemployment in
Detroit rise once more to 127,000. Defense spending flowed into Detroit the following year, adding
221,000 more jobs. The spoils of war were short-lived. By the end of 1958, there were only 30,000
defense-related jobs in the state of Michigan.115 In a sense, the moment of well-paying blue-collar
industrial jobs in Detroit was supported by the Second World War and sustained by the Korean
War, a forty-to-fifty year period between the unionization of the auto industry in the late 1930s
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and the significant decline of industrial employment in the 1970s and 1980s. This relationship with
national defense was not unremarked in the 1950s, such as when UAW lobbyist Paul Sifton warned
in 1951 that “under the imperatives of the world conflict, we drift into a military-industrial
receivership.”116
The economic stress on Detroit’s working classes were not solely within their places of
employment. As the next chapter will explore in further detail, the dynamics of segregation existed
throughout Detroit and its suburbs, and affected industry. As decentralization (or what we have
come to call deindustrialization) progressed, the economic pressures of racism increased. Further,
as white Detroiters were able to follow industrial jobs out of Detroit while black Detroiters were
geographically constrained, due to segregation in housing, so did the brunt of deindustrialization
come to rest on the African American community. This burden grew and contributed to tensions
undergirding the 1967 riot and beyond.117
In fact, Dearborn, the site of the Ford River Rouge complex, was openly segregationist. In
1950, its population was 94, 994.118 Its mayor from 1941 until his retirement in 1978, Orville
Hubbard, won eighteen elections. He had declared himself “for segregation 100 percent” in a 1956
interview.119 In 1944, he opposed a Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA) proposal for public
housing for black workers near the Rouge complex. The draft resolution Hubbard gave to the
Dearborn City Council against the proposal called for the protection of property values and called
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the proposed housing “an invasion.”120 Although UAW Local 600 and the NAACP campaigned
for the housing project, Hubbard insisted that housing black workers was “Detroit’s problem.”
“When you remove garbage from your backyard,” he explained, “you don’t dump it in your
neighbor’s.”121 When the FPHA moved the project to neighboring Ecorse Township, Hubbard
called it a “sneak move” on the part of the “goddamned nigger-loving guys” of the agency. The
Ford Motor Company joined with the Dearborn City Council and the board of Ecorse Township
to sue the FPHA to prevent construction.122
In 1948, the John Hancock Life Insurance Company attempted to build private rental
housing on the Ford Motor Company’s property. Orville Hubbard attacked the project as an
opening for black Detroiters, who were confined to segregated and overcrowded Detroit
neighborhoods like Black Bottom and Paradise Valley, to move to Dearborn. He accused the
insurance and automobile company of conspiring against Dearborn. City employees handed out
leaflets reading, “Keep Negroes Out of Dearborn! Protect Your Home and Mine! . . . With none
of the 15,000 Ford Rouge Negro workers living in Dearborn, don’t be ‘lulled into a false sense of
security’.”123
Nor were black Americans the only ones targeted. In the 1950s, Dearborn’s Arab
community was beginning to grow in a neighborhood east of the Rouge complex called the South
End. Calling them “white niggers,” Mayor Hubbard sought to deny permits to homeowners in the
area. He leaned on the Federal Housing Administration to restrict mortgage insurance for the
neighborhood.124 The city then bought up properties with the stated goal of converting the area
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into industrial use. The case dragged year upon year through the court system, with no resolution
until decades after the fact: a class-action lawsuit by the South End Community Council was
awarded in their favor in 1973. Only then was the destruction of the community ceased, and the
350 displaced homeowners allowed the sue the city of Dearborn. Nonetheless, Mayor Hubbard
had achieved his goal. In 1970, Dearborn had remained all-white.125
This dynamic is all the more striking because the River Rouge plant had the largest African
American labor force in any Detroit auto factory. As a consequence, Local 600 had the largest
African American membership of any UAW local. While one cannot argue that Local 600 voiced
the views of Detroit’s black working class, its history contains the possibility of speaking to more
than just the experience of the city’s white working class. Indeed, historian Beth Bates calls Henry
Ford’s policy of hiring African American workers his third revolutionary practice in automobile
production, following the assembly line and the five-dollar day.126 Ford’s policy was not
disinterested, as he hoped that black workers loyal to him would form a bulwark against
unionization. Ford’s plan backfired, however, during the 1941 UAW drive, during which he hired
black workers en masse, driving the number of black Ford workers to an all-time high of 14,00016,000 by the end of March. As Bates argues, the turning of black workers away from allegiance
to Ford and to the UAW was not due to the union in and of itself. One African American union
organizer, David Moore, recalled that the UAW leadership acted “as though they just did not care
about black workers at the Rouge.” Black workers’ embrace of unionization was rather a decision
to work for a better future by building on the opportunities of working for Ford.127
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But, as segregation in Dearborn shows, in the words of labor journalist B. J. Widick,
writing in 1972, “the sad fact is that union solidarity never went beyond the plant in Dearborn.”128
This analysis holds true for housing, but belies a more nuanced, if ambivalent, history of crossracial working-class solidarity. One such example involves the American pastime of baseball, and
its close cousin, softball. In late April, 1943, the Local 600 newsletter, Ford Facts, ran an article
– “CIO Demands City Stops Racial Discrimination in Use of Ball Fields” – in which the
anonymous author related how the Greater Detroit and Wayne Country Industrial Union Council
officially sent a protest to Mayor Jeffries over the “barring of Detroit’s Negro citizens from most
of the public baseball diamonds” in the city. The Detroit Baseball Federation, the article noted,
“actively practices racial discrimination,” and affirmed the CIO position that “no citizens shall be
discriminated against because of color or creed.” Right above the article, with big black letters
inviting the reader to “PLAY BALL!,” Local 600 announced that they “had started forming its
own ball league.”
In the same issue, to drive their point home, Ford Facts ran picture of the Briggs Local 212
UAW-CIO softball champions of the 1939 Inter-Union UAW Softball League. In 1940, the photo
caption related, Briggs Local 212’s hardball team had refused to play in the Detroit Baseball
Federation due to its discriminatory policy against black players. The Briggs Local was “actively
working . . . to promote equal athletic opportunities for all Negro and white workers.” The CIO,
the caption asserted, “is opposed not only to segregation in the shop but also to segregation in all
other activities and pursuits engaged in by Negro and white workers.”129
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Photo captions are one thing, but creating popular, integrated, ball leagues in a matter of
weeks is another. On May 10, Ford Facts ran a picture of Michael F. Widman, the director of the
Ford CIO drive, throwing the first pitch of the Local 600 softball league (“of Negro and white
players”), and a nearby photo caption of a game noted “the fast action on the field Sunday.” A few
pages later, a headline announced, “Negro Players Star in Ford Local Baseball League,” recounting
how, on the previous Sunday (May 4th), the Local 600 baseball series had opened, with “many
Negro lads” who were “active as players and managers.” “All teams,” the article defiantly
explained, “are open to players regardless of race, creed, or color.” Further, the article added that
“most teams are mixed, Negro and white.”130
Crucially, union members did not seem to mind. “The competition became keen and hot,”
players were in “flashy outfits,” but the lack of racial discrimination did not dampen the mood. In
fact, the opposite occurred: despite originally planning for twenty-five teams, over a hundred had
been formed since Local 600 had announced the league, “with more applications coming in every
day,” and more equipment already needing to be ordered. Nor could Local 600 pass by an
opportunity to take a dig at major league baseball, which would remain segregated until opening
day, April 15, 1947, when Jackie Robinson debuted with the Brooklyn Dodgers. “Big league
moguls,” the newsletters scoffed, “have for some time stated that the fans are not in sympathy with
Negro and White playing on the same team. But some Ford Local teams, not only have Negro and
White on the same team, but have a Negro Manager.” These included Frank Milliams, from the
heat treatment department (and “the former manager of the famous West Side Black Hawks”) ,
and Henry “Skippy” Bulkey, from the Rolling Mills. The league was so popular that the union was

130

Ford Facts, Sat. May 10, 1941, No. 19, p. 2 and 4.

50
in negotiations to secure playing fields at night, in addition to already having games going
mornings, evenings, and on Sundays.131
The next week, Ford Facts boasted of the continuing popularity of the integrated league,
describing how “Baseball Draws Huge Crowds To Play and Watch.” Even more teams had been
formed, reaching 125, and forcing the creation of multiple leagues to accommodate them all. Ford
Facts ran the scores of the games, with team names listed like the Motor Building Tomcats, the
Local Boys 751, the Foundry Cardinals, the Foundry Champs, and the Motor Building Heart
Breakers. Nor were players encouraged to keep it on the field: Ford Facts encouraged members
to wear their uniforms to a labor demonstration featuring Philip Murray in Cadillac Square, in
downtown Detroit, the following Monday.132
This brief history of working-class recreation contains much: how working-class culture
existed outside the world of work, despite being dependent on it. How racial discrimination could
be palpable in one arena, such as housing, and irrelevant in another, such as a baseball game. How
something as mundane as an amateur sports game could carry large political weight on its
shoulders. How public spaces, such as baseball diamonds, were not open to all Detroiters equally.
How class, just as much as race, was visibly inscribed in the geography of metropolitan Detroit.133
The neighborhoods encircling the Rouge and other factories were the homes of the workers
whose labor filled spaces of production.134 The loss of large-scale industrial production, and the
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economic and social system of Fordism curtailed communities, physically and socially. 135 In
addition to the geography of socioeconomic class, there is the geography of deindustrialization:
where jobs were, where they went, and which parts of the city were affected. City residents
organized against decentralization at the Rouge, recognizing a threat to their homes, families,
communities, and ways of living, and that threat eventually resulted in diminishing and damaging
the surrounding communities.
Local 600’s Campaign Against Decentralization
By 1950, the internal politics of UAW Local 600 were, as historian Nelson Lichtenstein
phrased it, “an entire world of ethnic and ideological complexity.”136 A sample of the diversity of
positions present in the local union came across during the 1950 election for the local’s presidency,
won by thirty-four year old Carl Stellato. He had started out working as a machine-setter in the
River Rouge complex when he was eighteen years old and with a eighth-grade formal education,
followed by a few years of working on the International UAW’s staff before winning the local’s
presidency. Stellato and his slate were seen as being pro-Reuther, which was not necessarily a
positive comment in the Rouge plant.
One candidate, Fred Soretti, boasted that he “has never been a supporter of Walter Reuther”
and “has not made a deal with Reuther” as the top two reasons to vote for him, before assuring
voters that “the fight will continue for Democracy and against Dictatorship from the top in
UAW.”137 The Stellato slate released a flier defending themselves against another faction in the
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plant, “the Thompson Group,” that accused them of being “stooges for the International Union,
[and] that the UAW-CIO, to which we all belong, is a sinister organization which is trying to
destroy our Local Union.” Stellato and his group, the flier continued, would “fight any individual
or group” that tried to separate Local 600 from the UAW, before finishing with a call against
company unionism, speed-ups, job movement, and “to restore militant union leadership in Local
600.”138 The campaign manager for the Progressive Unity Slate, Ed Lock, attacked candidate Paul
Kay for following “the Reuther role of confusing, dividing and disrupting,” reminding voters that
“you all know that the undemocratic actions of the Administrators HAVE NOT brought greater
benefits for Ford workers.”139 Separate from the election, the officers and committee members of
the Gear and Axle Building in Local 600 sent Walter Reuther an letter asking him if “the walls of
Solidarity House [are] so sound proof, or are you so far removed from actual conditions in the
shop that you do not hear the angry resentment of Ford workers?”140
Thus, it is unsurprising that Stellato and his team responded, following their successful
campaign, that “We are independents. We are independent of Reuther. We are independent of the
Communist Party.” Rather, they identified as “free Americans and militant Unionists.”141 Stellato
began his presidency by removing left-wing and anti-Reuther union officials from office, via a
UAW constitutional clause prohibiting members of the Communist Party from holding office, a
difficult process given Local 600’s history and culture. Throughout the 1940s, the local union had
consistently elected left-leaning leaders with a preference for direct action on the shop floor. In
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May of 1949, for one example, the Rouge workers shut down the entire complex for twenty-four
days to protest the increased speed of production. Nor did Stellato’s attempt to change the local
union’s direction endure. Local 600 demonstrated its stubbornly independent streak by reelecting
the purged leadership in that fall’s elections.
A complicating factor to the politics of Local 600, especially in relation to the left-wing,
was its large African American membership, which overlapped with but was not directly tied to
the significant Communist Party presence in the local. The Communist Party had been a fixture of
politics at River Rouge since at least the 1920s, thanks to antifascist workers of Polish, German,
and Italian backgrounds. The black and Communist Party membership had a synergistic
relationship, as the Communist Party was known as one of the few white-majority organizations
that openly supported racial equality as well as economic equality. In particular, some parts of the
black community grew more receptive to the Communist Party following the 1931 defense of the
Scottsboro Boys, nine young men falsely accused of and convicted for raping two white women
on a train between Chattanooga and Scottsboro, AZ, by the International Labor Defense (ILD –
the legal branch of the Communist Party) while the NAACP avoided the case. To be sure, not all
black workers were members of the Communist Party or fellow travelers, but many of the
Communist Party members at River Rouge were black. By the middle of the 1940s, half of the
Communist Party members at the plant were African American.142
In the 1940s, the UAW’s African American membership had become a stronghold of union
activism. Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein noted that the Rouge in the 1940s
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“overshadowed all other Detroit area production facilities as a center of black political power.”143
Black unionists took aim at racism and discrimination in the workplace, the union, and in society
and politics. Local 600 became a center of this anti-racist activism. Well-known activists, like
Horace Sheffield and Shelton Tappes, who had backed Reuther since the organization of the Rouge
in 1941, attained high positions within the UAW.

They, along with other members, like

Willoughby Abner, formed the Trade Union Leadership Council (TULC), a black caucus within
the UAW, to open a position on the union’s International Executive Board (IEB) to an African
American member. At the 1955 UAW Convention, delegates from Local 600 called for a
nomination of an African American member to serve as a vice-president, but the resolution was
not carried.144
Yet, while a significant number of rank-and-file Local 600 members supported the CP,
purges of the left-wing leadership that had led the local through the 1940s and into the 1950s
followed wider trends in the United States and coincided with other purges in the UAW. Eleven
unions, with a combined membership of around 900,000 – about a fifth of the CIO’s membership
– were forced out of the CIO in 1949 because of their ties to the Communist Party. 145
Contemporary events contributed to the deteriorating political climate in the United States. In
1949, the victory of Communist forces in China, the successful testing of atomic weapons by the
USSR, and the revelation of allegedly Soviet spy rings in the United States fed fears of Communist
expansion and led to great anticommunist sentiments and politics. Then, in 1950, North Korea
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invaded South. The environment was ripe for the rise of Senator Joe McCarthy, whose inquisitions
in the nation’s capital, and the hysteria is fueled, led prominent political columnist Joe Alsop to
remember later that “The nation had simply taken leave of all sense of proportion.”146
As far as Carl Stellato was concerned, despite working with the left-leaning union officers
after their reelection, communism entailed “disloyalty and unpatriotism to the Government [and]
Constitution of the United States,” and he deemed it a danger to legitimate unionism.147 However,
as Stellato moved away from the pro-Reuther orbit, and accepted a working relationship with the
left-leaning forces within the local, he also would be swept up in the anti-communist hysteria
spreading across the country.148
In the summer of 1950, a few weeks before the Korean War began, UAW president Walter
Reuther successfully negotiated a five-year contract with General Motors that was shortly
emulated by Ford and Chrysler as well. The five-year contract, nicknamed by Fortune the “Treaty
of Detroit,” stipulated a cost of living allowance, a company-funded pension plan, and wage
increases tied to increased production.149 While such a contract provided stability and the means
to plan further into the future for both the UAW and Ford, Local 600 was more concerned with
the increased laying off of workers and the speeding up of the assembly line at the Rouge complex.
In response to widespread work shortage at the Rouge, Stellato and other Local 600 leaders argued
that workers should not be called to work overtime as long as others were laid off. In addition,
Local 600 noted that these were not issues that only affected automobile workers at the Rouge.
Their proposed solution was a thirty-hour work week for forty hours pay, a challenge to Ford
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management as well as to the UAW and Reuther’s recent negotiating victory.150 On a deeper level,
Local 600 radically suggested disconnecting worker pay from the amount of labor he or she
performed. Nonetheless, the actions open to Local 600 were constricted by the contract, including
the ability of workers to respond directly to conditions on the shop floor. Stellato thus described
the five-year contact as amounting to “entrapment.”151
Rank and file campaigns, furthermore, ran counter to Walter Reuther’s vision for the
direction of the UAW. Reuther had been raised in a Socialist household and maintained a belief in
the need for a democratically-controlled economy.152 He saw the UAW as more than a trade union.
Instead, Reuther imagined the union as an organization that provided the means to affect broad
social and economic change. To achieve these strategic ends, Reuther set about centralizing the
UAW and consolidating a hierarchical, top-down, flow of power in the union once he was elected
president in 1946. There were benefits to the union in doing so. The UAW’s history had included
divisions and antagonism between skilled and unskilled workers, native-born Americans, old
Northwestern European immigrants, and new Southern and Eastern European immigrants, white
workers and black workers, and rural migrants and the city-bred. There were political divisions
between communists, socialists, Trotskyists, Catholic unionists, and radical trade-unionists.153
Reuther believed centralization of power would limit such conflicts and allow the UAW to pursue
his broader ends.
The political environment in the postwar United States, with its burgeoning “byzantine
world of federal regulations,” favored centralized union bureaucracy over rank-and-file campaigns
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and shop floor militancy.154 While president, Reuther moved to further consolidate his power.
Capitalizing on the pervasive anti-communism of the post-war period, he purged the UAW of
communist officials, clearing the way for the union to comply with 1947’s Taft-Hartley Act while
removing the main critics of Reuther and supporters of shop-floor democracy.155 The left-leaning
leadership of Local 600 was a fly in his ointment, and Local 600 leaders often spoke out against
Reuther’s desire to pursue a “militant unionism pursued though a centralized union
management.”156 The basis of the long-term contract was the promise of stability. For the
employer, this entailed the ability of the UAW to provide a stable labor force. The trade-off for
Reuther and the UAW for stability for their membership was that the union essentially promised
to provide labor management.157 But it was economic stability, nonetheless, and it was probably
even more important to Reuther and the UAW given that they had gone full strength for an
economic bill in 1949 that would provide for “publicly planned economic abundance” under the
guidance of a tripartite government-management-labor board only to see it roundly defeating after
President Truman, facing considerably pressure form the business community, ordered White
House officials to oppose the bill.158
This context explains why, when Local 600’s executive board began their campaign against
decentralization in 1950, they were met with a chilly response by Reuther and his team. “Local
600 goes on record,” the local resolved on February 10 of that year, “requesting the International
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Union to continue to make a thorough investigation” of reports of a company policy of
decentralization. The resolution ended by confirming the union’s right to strike if such a policy
existed. The summer of that year, the local union created a committee on decentralization, which
pressed to meet with Henry Ford II to discuss the realities and consequences of a policy of
decentralization.159
When Carl Stellato wrote letters to Reuther asking him to arrange a meeting with Henry Ford
II, then president of the Ford Motor Company, Ford himself consistently redirected Stellato’s
requests to the company’s Director of Personnel, John Bugas, as well as “numerous lesser
officials”.160 Stellato was stymied as neither the Ford Company nor the UAW seemed to recognize
that “the decentralization problem” was, in fact, a problem. As he wrote Reuther, Stellato
considered it a vital question, as it “indicates that thousands of our members may be displaced by
this new Ford Motor Company plan.” Nor was he only concerned with union members. Stellator
wrote to Henry Ford II, “You, I am sure, are thoroughly aware of the possible effect on our
members – your employees – and the communities surrounding the Rouge Plant of removing
twenty or thirty thousand jobs from this area.” “Certainly,” Stellato added, “you must agree with
me that there is no issue more important to the worker and the community than jobs.”161
In response to Stellato’s questions, Bugas responded only with vague assurances and guarded
comments. On May 29, Stellato ran through a litany of questions, including how many jobs would
be moved out of the Rouge, how many workers would be affected, and in which buildings and in
which positions. On June 7, Bugas responded that “plans for the future will be determined first of
all by the over-all economic situation” but that the company needed “to remain competitive in a
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highly competitive industry” and that decisions would be made “in direct relation to our ability to
operate efficiently.” Ford would react as management thought appropriate in response to market
forces. “It is true,” Bugas conceded, “that several plants are under construction and that we will
begin work on other in the very near future.” Nonetheless, he concluded, “I believe it is fair to say,
however, that the transition will be a gradual one and that in most instances where work will be
moved out of the Rouge Plant, it will be replaced by operations currently being done elsewhere or
by outside suppliers.” Bugas’s indicated that job loss would not occur due to decentralization, even
as he avoided addressing other means by which the company was eliminating, reducing, or
relocating production work.162
Bugas’ reassurances did not prevent Rouge workers from noticing that, between July 1950 and
July 1951, the hourly workers in the complex dropped from 67,000 to 54,000. The Press Steel
Building alone saw the decrease of 4,069 workers, from 10,905 to 6,836.163 For the members of
Local 600, these losses seemed to contradict what the company told them. Consequently, the
Executive Board passed a resolution at the end of July, 1951, stating that “speed up, layoffs, runaway shops, wage freeze and the high cost of living” were all problems that affected the entire
automotive industry and not just Local 600 or Ford workers. Nonetheless, Walter Reuther assured
Local 600 that the layoffs were a result of a shortage of steel, a consequence of the Korean War.164
So it was that on July 7, 1950, Stellato wrote a letter to Henry Ford II. He insisted that “the
decentralization problem raises questions which go beyond the realm of pure industrial relations.
The moral and economic issues . . . are such as I feel warrant your personal attention.”165 The head
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of Ford Motor Company disagreed, despite Stellato’s continuing and persistent attempts to attain
a meeting with him. Regardless, that Stellato framed the issue of decentralization as a moral and
economic quandary that went beyond “pure industrial relations” was an indicator of how Local
600 understood decentralization and the stakes involved. It was just not a matter of wages and
work conditions, but of the livelihood of entire working-class communities, an argument that
would be brought to the forefront in a matter of weeks and which surfaced again in massive plant
closings two decades later.
Given the response Local 600 had received from John Bugas, they were surprised to learn that
the company was moving machinery out of the Rouge, to be sent other production facilities, in the
dead of the night. It was, as one Ford worker wrote in a letter to Local 600’s newsletter, Ford
Facts, “thievery in the night.”166 Paul Boatin, a member of the local’s executive committee,
reported on August 7 that he had received a phone call early in the morning that machinery was
being moved out of the Motor Plant. Boatin investigated the matter. He was told by management
that the machinery was being moved to the Ford Dearborn Engine Plant, but other union members
reported that the machines to be shipped out were addressed to different plants. “There was no
question,” Paul Boatin told his colleagues on the executive committee, “. . . that very soon now
the workers would be out of jobs, and the company is taking the jobs out without giving the union
a guarantee of other jobs coming in.”167 In addition to machinery being relocated, other jobs were
being outsourced to outside contractors. A part of the six-cylinder engine that was made on
premise, for example, was moved to an independent shop in Brighton. In other cases, the jobs were
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moved to Ford plants in other locations. Jobs in the Press Steel department of the River Rouge
plant were moved to Buffalo, and gear and transmission work was moved to Cleveland.168
Following a summer of uncertainty, and being given a run-around by the company, the
executive board of Local 600 passed a lengthy resolution regarding decentralization on August
21.169 Restating their belief that this was not a parochial concern relevant only to their local union,
the resolution immediately framed the issue as one that affected “workers in the Detroit
Metropolitan Area” who worked at “Ford and other plants.” Local 600 was unambiguous in their
assertion that larger issues were at play than ones that just affected their membership, their
workplace, or even their company.
In addition to alerting UAW members to scope of the problem, the resolution confirmed two
more premises that are crucial to Local 600’s argument. The second premise placed automobile
workers in the context of their entire lives: “Workers,” the resolution declared, “are citizens of
long standing in their communities, home owners, taxpayers, and their complete plans for the
future,” which included the raising of families and the pursuit of social lives, “are geared to their
living in the Metropolitan Detroit Area.” This was not a claim about labor relations, but a claim
about citizen rights and the ways local communities were constituted by those whose livelihoods
depended on the continuing presence and health of the auto industry.
The union’s third premise expanded the idea of community presented in the preceding premise.
“Community groups,” Local 600 explained, “such as the City Councils, Civil Organizations,
Churches, etc., have a responsibility towards the Citizenry in their immediate community.” Again,
the claim regarding the rights of workers as citizens is striking. Workers are citizens, and local
communities, including local government and religious institutions, have a responsibility to
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support their peers. Thus, Local 600 called upon local organizations and institutions to support
workers facing job loss due to decentralization. The reasons for doing so were starkly clear. “If
decentralization of industry continues and workers are continually laid off,” Local 600’s resolution
continued, this would “entail greater financial spending on the part of the community, and these
communities will become partial ghost towns.” The loss of jobs on the part of industrial workers
at the River Rouge and other plants, Local 600 argued, would constitute a severe loss for the
community as a whole. Their futures were intertwined.
Following from these premises, Local 600 suggested immediate steps in opposition to job loss
due to decentralization. First, “all Mayors, City Councils, Civic Organizations, Church Groups,
Fraternal Organizations, Veteran Groups,” should become involved in the campaign against
decentralization, revealing Local 600’s understanding of how far the impact of decentralization
would be felt. If veterans and fraternal organizations gave the list a masculine tilt, it should be
noted that church groups, civic organizations, and even city councils meant that women in the
community were included in this call to arms. Second, Local 600 called for those concerned to
contact all relevant politicians and government employees, beginning with President, in order to
share concerns of how decentralization would “destroy the ‘Arsenal of Democracy.’”170 Once
again, Local 600 moved from local threats and local solutions to factors of national and
international relevance, and emphasized that decentralization was more than just a labor dispute.
Invoking Detroit’s identity as the Arsenal of Democracy, so soon after the Second World War and
in the midst of the Korean conflict, positioned decentralization as a threat to national security.
Whether at the level of national defense or at the local level of the neighborhoods near the
Rouge, the language of the resolution poses job loss as a danger to the community. Unemployment
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from corporate decentralization of production did not solely affect abstract workers, but the
foundations of communities that would also, in turn, suffer because of decentralization. Workers
were much more than a supply of labor; they were community members, homeowners, taxpayers,
and people who planned on raising his or her family in the local community. Consequently,
according to Local 600, it was the duty of local governments, community organizations, churches,
as well as the union to resist industrial decentralization. In a time of war in Korea and the Cold
War globally, Local 600 called on communities to defend their jobs in the name of national
defense, the rights of citizenship, and economic self-preservation. The local union repeated their
right to conduct a strike as one means to resist the threat of decentralization.
The members of Local 600 did not rest following this resolution. Rather, they took their
campaign to the local communities they had exhorted to rally to the union’s cause. The local union
asked municipalities with significant employment at the River Rouge complex to pass resolutions
against decentralization. The city councils of Dearborn, Melvindale, Garden City, and Ecorse all
answered Local 600’s call, and formally condemned the policy of industrial decentralization. A
notable exception was the city of Detroit, whose conservative mayor, Albert Cobo, refused to
support the city council resolution supporting the Local’s campaign.171 The local did not just stop
at city councils. Local 600 also contacted senators from Michigan, Republican Homer Ferguson
and Democrat Blair Moody, to enlist their support. Both Ferguson and Moody agreed to publicly
state their opposition the policy of decentralization. When Local 600 contacted Michigan
Representative John Lesinki, Jr., a Democrat, about joining their campaign, he originally
demurred. A local business owner in addition to being a politician, Lesinki argued that
decentralization was part of the war effort in Korea. Percy Llewellyn, of Local 600, responded that
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the policy of decentralization at begun at the Rouge plant before the war had, and Lesinki agreed
to investigate the matter in greater depth. He later added his voice, along with the two senators, to
those who were, as the union phrased it, “concerned with the possibilities of ghost towns in the
very near future.”172
The resolutions from local city councils were passed in the fall of 1951. Garden City sent
the local union their official statement in October, in which they wrote that they were “going on
record in opposition to decentralization of the Ford Motor Company and calling upon the President
of the United States, Governor Williams, and the Congressmen of the State of Michigan to
investigate the decentralization program of the Ford Motor Company and effect a program of
bringing jobs into the Rouge Plant.”173 The Dearborn City Council voted unanimously to support
Local 600’s position after Percy Llewellyn requested their support. He spoke movingly at a city
council meeting of “pensioners [who] are forced to give up their ties and move along.”174 He also
noted the amount of taxes Ford paid to Dearborn, and “pointed out that city taxes would go ‘sky
high’ if Ford continued to move out.” The city council president, Marguerite Johnson, reportedly
replied, “Why, in ten years this city would be a ghost town.”175
Statements in support of Local 600’s campaign did not always entail support for their
reasoning or, indeed, the same reasoning at all. The Dearborn City Council, while agreeing to
condemn decentralization, disagree over why it should be condemned. One member, Martin
Griffith, argued that decentralization was the result of Dearborn not respecting Ford Motor
Company enough. Mayor Orville Hubbard, Griffith reminded the rest of the council, “ridiculed
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and threatened officials of the Company as well as saying he would punch John Bugas, vicepresident, in the nose.” And now Ford was building factories elsewhere. Another council member,
Joseph Ford, disagreed with Griffith, arguing that he did not see how the mayor’s attitude had any
bearing on Ford’s policies. “We must do something before Dearborn is a ghost town,” council
president Marguerite Johnson reiterated, before declaring that she was not interested in jobs
anywhere but in Dearborn.176
As Local 600 was rallying community members and organizations to its cause, the
competing claims between the local union and the international UAW came to a head. The
Committee on Decentralization finally arranged a meeting with the Ford Motor Company and with
the international union in September. Walter Reuther informed Local 600 that the UAW would
take the meeting over, including determining who would and would not be allowed to participate
in the meeting. Only Local 600 President Carl Stellato was granted permission to attend the
meeting. He walked out of in protest, insisting that he would never presume to represent all of
Local 600 by himself. At the same time, Stellato refuted accusations that the campaign was merely
a ploy against Reuther. The anti-decentralization campaign, he maintained, was not an attempt to
needle Reuther or seek personal glory at his expense. Nonetheless, the conflict between the local
and the international undermined the attempt to bring the local’s concerns to Ford.177
At the end of September, a month after the union began discussing the authorization for a
strike, the local’s language became more militant. The executive board accused the Ford Motor
Company of deliberately misrepresenting decentralization as a matter of government policy
undertaken for security reasons. Further, the leadership of the local urged all possible means of
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disseminating information regarding decentralization, including the use of Ford Facts (Local
600’s newsletter), leaflets, daily newspapers, and meetings at the plant gates. Even more striking
is their demand that
. . . . efforts [to] be physically instituted to stop the job movement out of the plant by having
the workers form a human snake across the gates. In other words, the local would have to
resort to tactics of 1936 and 1937 in order to keep the jobs in the plant.178
The sit-down strikes of 1936 and 1937 were used in the Flint strikes when the United Auto Workers
gained recognition at General Motors and, subsequently, at Chrysler and Ford. Such an allusion
suggested that the local union saw the struggle against decentralization as just as important as the
original struggle for union recognition fourteen years prior. If one accepts that the scale of
significance was similar, then one could argue that those struggling against decentralization could
reasonably respond with tactics such as the occupation of factories in the tradition of the sit-down
strikes.
The environment of the late 30s and the early 60s were not similar. Sit-down strikes had
been declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 1939, and, besides, all the major auto companies
had accepted collective bargaining. At Ford, the stringently anti-union ethos of management that
had spurred the lively leftist worker culture had faded away following the 1945 retirement of Henry
Bennett, the head of the notorious Ford Service Department, and Henry Ford’s death in 1947, after
which the reins were taken by his grandson, Henry Ford II. 179 “Class war,” as B.J. Widick
characterized it, “had been turned into a truce through negotiation.”180
In the case Local 600 did call a strike, they declared that the International UAW had an
obligation to support them and that all Ford plants should be struck. Even as Local 600 moved
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deeper into their campaign against decentralization, Stellato took care to caution the rest of the
local union that decentralization was not the only threat to workers. Conditions during the Korean
war played a part, as did the investment automobile companies were putting into automation under
the name of improving workplace safety. Local 600 continued to request a meeting with Ford head
Henry Ford II, who refused while asserting that decentralization was not occurring. Snubbed by
both the company and the international union, Local 600’s executive board declared their intent to
continue contacting more surrounding communities in order to encourage them to condemn the
policy of decentralization. As Percy Llewellyn argued, Local 600, while doing “an excellent job,”
could only do so much: “The communities would have to be stirred up.”181
In October, Local 600 began pursuing another strategy of resistance. The executive board
retained the services of an attorney, Ernest Goodman, in order to issue an injunction against the
Ford Motor Company for breach of contract. Their argument was that, had the union known what
Ford was planning, they never would have agreed to sign the recent five-year contract. At the same
time, relations between the local and international union disintegrated precipitously. Arguments
between the two included matters over dues increases and relations with other unions. Local 600
responded publicly to their disagreements with Reuther and the International UAW through their
autonomous publication Ford Facts, such as one issues with “Betrayal” in large black letters across
its cover or another mourning “the death of democracy in the UAW.”182
Local 600’s lawsuit against the Ford Motor Company was scheduled to be heard before
federal judge Thomas P. Thornton on January 8, 1952. The suit asked the court to find that the
five-year contract prohibited Ford from pursuing decentralization of the River Rouge complex; if
such a decision could not be made, that the contract be declared null and void, and that an
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injunction be issued preventing Ford from moving production from the River Rouge complex.183
Local 600’s lawyer, Ernest Goodman, described Ford’s actions as fraudulent, asserting that “unless
restrained by the timely intervention of this court” the Rouge plant would become “a mere shell of
its former capacity.”184 His argument rested on section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act,
which allowed for parties to a collective bargaining agreement to sue one another in federal court
for breach-of-contract. As Ford had made assurances that employment levels at the Rouge would
remain steady, if not increase, during the last round of contract negotiations, Goodman’s argument
was that the policy of decentralization, where employment was being sent to other plants and to
contractors, constituted fraud with negative material consequences for the members of Local
600.185
Ford responded that employment was down several thousand at the complex, but that the
reason was to be found in government restrictions. Many, the firm argued, were employees who
had worked less than three months. Local 600 countered that the number was closer to 20,000, and
that at least part of the reason was the policy of decentralization.186 Regardless, Ford defended
their right to follow the market as they saw fit. Conceding that decentralization entailed breaking
down large centers of production into smaller units, and that there was a benefit to those smaller
units being moved to places with less union activity, Ford argued that the overarching strategy was
a response to markets expanding in the South and to the West. As to the accusation of fraud, the
company’s lawyer argued, the fact that Reuther and the other UAW officers who had signed the
contract were not party to the lawsuit spoke for itself.187
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The bitter relations between the local and the international union colored the way that this
suit was viewed. As one newspaper reported, “many observers viewed the union’s actions as
another attempt by Stellato to heckle the administration of UAW President Walter P. Reuther.”
Another newspaper declared that “decentralization is nothing new in the automotive industry.” It
saw the only motive behind the lawsuit as “the feud between Local 600 President Carl Stellato and
UAW President Walter Reuther.”188
Before a decision was handed down, Local 600 was rocked by investigatory hearings
conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). HUAC had originally
held hearings in Detroit in late February, 1952, in order to investigate Communist influence in
industries involved in national defense.189 On the final day of the hearings, Bereniece Baldwin
testified for four hours. Baldwin was the dues secretary of the Michigan Communist Party; and, it
turned out, an FBI informant. She informed the committee that the Communist Party was actively
holding membership drives in Detroit factories associated with defense production and that the
Party had targeted the Rouge for “special consideration” in its recruiting efforts. 190 Committee
member Charles Potter, a Republican Representative from Cheboygan, Michigan, announced that
HUAC would return in March in order to pursue further investigations into Communist influence
in Local 600. Taking the opportunity to score political points off Michigan Democrats, Potter
charged that Governor G. Mennen Williams and Senator Blair Moody “might try to stop the
committee from returning to Detroit.” The state’s governor retorted that “Potter’s statement is an
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example of guttersnipe politics based on falsehood and innuendo. It’s McCarthyism at its
worst.”191
The HUAC hearings that March into Local 600 provided many dramatic moments. Just as
Ernest Goodman represented Local 600 in their lawsuit against Ford Motor Company, so he
represented the nineteen Local 600 officers targeted by HUAC.192 The recording secretary of Local
600, William Hood, refused to answer any questions except to proclaim “that it was a damned lie
that he was a Communist Party member.” Pat Rice, the vice-president of the local, invoked his
rights under the Fifth Amendment, to which committee member Donald Jackson, a Republican
from California, responded that while taking the Fifth did not legally entail an admission of guilt,
“what the American people think and what assumption they draw is an entirely different thing.”193
Dave Moore, an officer in the local, also invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, but not before
condemning the hearings as an “inquisition” in which “I am damned if I do and I am damned if I
don’t.”194
With the threat of a HUAC investigation into the UAW in the background, Reuther and the
UAW leadership were put in a difficult place. They sacrificed Local 600 in order to keep HUAC
at bay. Reuther cooperated with HUAC, out of fear that not doing so would put the UAW “in
jeopardy.” Reuther was on record as opposing the tactics of HUAC, as was the CIO. Yet, while
there were “kids in Korea dying,” Reuther worried that HUAC would move “to try to put the union
in a position where we were condoning the communists and were covering up for the communists.”
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Given that Local 600 was the main locus of Reuther’s opposition within the UAW, it was a choice
that did not give Reuther and his allies much pause.195
Two members of Reuther’s staff, Elesio “Lee” Romano, a former vice-president of Local
600, and Shelton Tappes, a former recording secretary of Local 600, were called by the committee
to testify. “They would never have done it,” Local 600’s counsel, Ernest Goodman, stated later
regarding Reuther’s condoning the testimony, “could never have done it, if he hadn’t give his
consent . . . . It was sickening to so many of us.”196 Romano stated that there were around four
hundred Communist Party members working for Ford, with around two thousand fellow travelers,
and that 175 of them ran Local 600. Stellato, Romano explicitly testified, was not one of them, but
the committee declined to hear testimony from Stellato in defense of the Local 600. Both Romano
and Tappes named names, and both testified as to Reuther’s anti-communist record. The UAW
under Reuther, according to Tappes, was “the most active organization in this country against the
efforts of the Communist Party.”197 Those UAW members that were named in the testimony faced
reprisals when they went to work. They faced firing, sit-down strikes, being hung in effigy, threats,
and simply being run out of factories.198 These reprisals were a reminder that rank-and-file workers
did not necessarily share the viewpoints of either their local’s leadership or of the union’s
leadership.
Stellato, while not allowed to testify in person, nonetheless sent a letter to the committee
defending Local 600 and his administration. The attempt of communists to infiltrate American
factories and other institutions was a fact, Stellato wrote, but their mission was aided and abetted
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by the American government. “The lack of proper legislation,” the Local 600 president continued,
“and enforcement of laws that guarantee all of the American people their civil rights, the unfair
price and wage policy forced upon us by Government control, the inequitable income tax program
coupled with the corruption and thievery on the part of higher Government officials” all worked
to “hinder the efforts of those of us in the trade union movement who chose to direct the course of
the trade union movement to exclude communists and communist objectives and methods.”199 Not
all Local 600 members were convinced. A bulletin circulated among the Maintenance and
Construction Unit, condemned “the unholy alliance” between the Local 600 officers and the
Communist Party, calling them “political prostitutes” who hid “behind the banner of Local 600,”
and derided “the Fifth Amendment boys.” “The overwhelming majority in Local 600,” the bulletin
stated, “honestly and sincerely believe in Free American Trade Unionism,” and ended by granting
Stellato “the crown of Chief Flip Flop Artist of Local 600!”200 An anonymous flier demanded,
“Ford Workers – Do you want Joe Stalin to run your union or do you want to run it yourself? . . .
Let’s clean out Local 600!”201
The day following Romano’s testimony, Reuther charged Stellato and other members of
the local’s leadership before the International UAW’s Executive Board for failing to follow the
union’s constitution. It barred Communists, along with Nazis or members of other Fascist parties,
from being members or holding office. If found guilty, a local’s leadership would be removed from
office and the local placed under receivership.202 “Failure on the part of Local 600 officers,”
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Reuther wrote in a telegram to the officers, meaning the failure to purge communist leaders, “. . .
is strengthening the efforts of anti-labor corporations and competing union to undermine the
organization work of our union.”203
The local’s leadership received only one day’s warning before the hearing, and they were
not allowed to cross-examine witnesses. The presiding UAW officer, Vice-President John
Livingston, supported the charges against the local’s leaders, with the result that the proceedings
were more or less one-sided. Reuther attacked Stellato for nearly three hours before the latter was
allowed to speak in his defense. Not all UAW officers approved of the decision to bring the Local’s
officers up on charges. Leonard Woodock, by contrast, argued against giving in to the “neofascists” of HUAC. Reuther conceded that none of the officers of Local 600 were Communist
Party members; rather, Reuther railed against Stellato’s persistent criticisms of the International
UAW’s policies. Local 600’s leadership rebutted that disagreement was the essence of union
democracy, but to no avail. After more than eleven hours, the International Executive Board voted
to strip the Local’s officers of their positions and to place Local 600 under receivership.204
Local 600 remained under the direct control of the International UAW through an
administrative board headed by Reuther, its elected leadership powerless, until September. In
elections that month, fifteen Rouge buildings elected anti-Reuther candidates, and 80% of the
members of the local’s general council were anti-Reuther union members. Carl Stellato was
reelected as president – he ran unopposed, and he continued filling that office for the next
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decade.205 The antagonism between the international leadership and the local, however, played a
part in undermining Local 600’s legal case against Ford. The international union had assumed
control of the local as the case was heard in the United States District Court in January 1952. A
year and a half later, in July 1953, Judge Thomas P. Thornton dismissed the case. In his legal
opinion, Thornton argued that if the contract between the union and Ford had been, in fact,
breached, then the International UAW would have supported the case. Noting this, Thornton
upheld the right of Ford to run and locate their business as they so chose.206 Following this
decision, decentralization largely disappeared from discussion within the Local. 207 Local 600’s
membership continued to rapidly decrease. With over 60,000 members in 1950, the local stood at
42,000, a decrease of 30%, ten years later.208
Conclusion
This chapter focuses on the campaign of Local 600 against decentralization as an important
precursor to later economic changes in the 1960s and 1970s, and as a vital historical case study
complicating the dominant narrative of the 1950s as a time of shared prosperity. Rather, cracks in
the foundations were beginning to form, and economic tensions and migrations were already
forming in American cities in the immediate postwar period. Local 600’s campaign provides an
insight to how Detroit auto workers saw these changes, and the potential danger such changes
posed for themselves and their communities. Yet, while this chapter finds the local’s campaign a
significant act of resistance to industrial decentralization, it also wants to resist casting them as
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heroic Davids to the nefarious Goliaths of the UAW and the Ford Motor Company. The difference
between Local 600 and the UAW laid in part in the fact that the local union was concerned with
the effects of decentralization on workers, their families, and their communities on the ground,
while the international union took a top-down view. It balanced job losses in one place with new
factories and employment opportunities elsewhere, while maintaining a working relationship with
the automotive companies.
Reuther’s concerns were broad and long-ranging. Such a perspective had been long part of
Reuther’s strategic vision, harkening back to his early days organizing. At the end of 1936, for
instance, when Reuther and the fledgling UAW targeted a parts supplier, the Kelsey-Hayes Wheel
Company, Reuther was able to convince union members to end a sit-down strike, despite the
lackluster concessions from the company. “Reuther proved not only that he could deal with
management,” Reuther biographer Nelson Lichtenstein wrote about this moment, “but that he
could persuade a reluctant rank and file to accept a poor settlement […] in the interests of a larger
collective interest.”209 Reuther’s position towards the Local 600 campaign in the early 1950s was
similar: the interests of the Rouge workers were a reasonable short-term sacrifice to make for the
larger, long-term, interests of auto workers nationwide.
Granting this charitable interpretation of Reuther’s actions, it does not follow that the part
of villain should go to Stellato, even though there are historians who have tried. Kevin Boyle, for
example, in pursuit of praising Reuther, resorts to attacking Carl Stellato. The president of Local
600’s criticisms of Reuther and the International Union were, in Boyle’s words, “nothing more
than gamesmanship.”210 The entire decentralization campaign, in Boyle’s hands, was a mere antiReuther power play. Apparently Stellato’s motivations are self-evident, as Boyle offers no
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evidence in support of this assessment. Stellato, Boyle writes, in early 1951 “decided to use the
restiveness among the rank and file to see just how weak the Reuther machine had become.”211
Boyle’s condemnation of Stellato is odd. He characterizes the local president as an
opportunist and not as someone with legitimate concerns about how Reuther was leading the union.
Then, to make it more bizarre, Boyle criticizes him for being too conservative. Missing the point
of the decentralization campaign, Boyle argues that “Stellato could have offered a radical, even
syndicalist alternative to Reuther’s social democratic agenda. Had he done so, it is at least
conceivable that Reuther would have shifted to the left.”212 It may have been conceivable, but the
entire argument rests on the assumption that what Stellato and Local 600 were criticizing was
“Reuther’s social democratic agenda” and not his top-down and centralized leadership style. As
for Local 600’s proposed policies, such as the 40 hours of pay for 30 hours, this were “essentially
conservative” positions that “accepted labor’s subordinate position.”213 Yet another assertion left
unexplained, as quite a few people would be surprised to learn that a proposal to disassociate
income from labor is “essentially conservative.”
Given that Stellato had begun working at the Rouge when he was 18, with his formal
education ending after the eighth-grade, it seems particularly insidious to criticize him for having
not presented, in opposition to Reuther, a fully-functioning alternative vision of the future of
industry in the United States at a time when great transformations were beginning to take effect.
This is not to argue that Stellato and Local 600 presented perfect solutions to the problem of
decentralization. Rather, it is to highlight that Stellato and Local 600 were attempting to address a
problem – how large-scale job loss hurt local working-class communities – that neither Ford nor
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the UAW took especially seriously. In other words, it is not a matter of who was right and who
was wrong; to present Local 600’s campaign in those terms is to miss its significance entirely. But
even if one grants that Local 600’s campaign was only to needle Reuther, it is still meaningful that
it was decentralization that they picked as an issue. The ways that they addressed decentralization
are still revealing of how Detroit autoworkers understood their city and their communities in the
postwar period. It is revealing that local municipalities and city councils publicly agreed with Local
600 on this issue. In this study, however, Local 600’s campaign is taken as a sincere attempt to
resist structural changes. Even that resistance, as unsuccessful as it was, and as shortsighted as it
might have been, should still be taken seriously, as the people behind it took it seriously.
The paradox is that while workers of different backgrounds mobilized to protect their
communities from job loss, white workers also mobilized to protect their communities from
integration, just as the residents of Grosse Pointe did, chronicled in the next chapter. As one UAW
official put it, the union “helps [workers’] economic interests until they can have a front porch,
and for that they become capitalists.”214 In other words, the increased stability and security that
collective bargaining provided, and of which the Treaty of Detroit was an exemplar, led workers
to work to protect those economic gains at the expense of broader social change. It is noteworthy
that the union official above turned to housing as a prime example of such a gain.
As Local 600 and various communities foresaw, the policy of industrial decentralization
had a profound impact on metropolitan Detroit. The problems that the city and its residents have
faced over the decades since the 1950s are multiple, complex, and interweaving, but most
observers agree that the loss of mass employment in the auto industry was a significant,
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foundational, cause of Detroit’s distress. In the face of the auto industry’s pursuit of profit, the city
of Detroit and its residents were, ultimately, disposable, or at least irrelevant.
Local 600’s campaign was predicated on understanding this, as the repeated use of the
imagery of ghost towns showed. Decentralization threatened the employment of union members,
but also threatened the structure of the communities where they lived. That Local 600 received the
support of local governments and politicians in their campaign suggests that the local union’s
arguments were understood to be motivated by something more than a labor dispute. This would
remain true even if that was Local 600’s only motivation. Its arguments resonated beyond the
factory gates, revealing an acute understanding on the part of different metro-Detroiters that the
loss of industrial employment threatened the existence of their communities.
Nevertheless, the support of city councils and community members paled next to the power
wielded by the Ford Motor Company. Even if Reuther and the International UAW had chosen to
put its formidable influence and power behind the anti-decentralization campaign, the campaign
then would have had to challenge the legal and economic structure of the United States. The
campaign asked that the prerogatives of business take into account the interests of their employees
and the communities in which they are located. This is not an impossible arrangement, but it
challenged conventional and deeply held thought in the United States in the 1950s. The Ford Motor
Company pursued policies meant to maximize their profits in relation to the market, but such a
policy was not self-evident or natural, and should be understood as a deliberate choice that
devalued workers and local communities in the interests of economic “efficiency.” Similarly, the
ruling of Judge Thornton is reasonable within the context of a system that prioritizes the drive for
profits over the stability and well-being of workers or their communities, but that does not mean
that the system is necessarily reasonable or incapable of change.
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Even though they lost their campaign, Local 600’s resistance is important in that it revealed
an awareness of the negative outcomes of what would come to be called deindustrialization. It
called attention to these issues quite earlier than the popular conception of deindustrialization does,
and it received support from people outside of the UAW and Local 600. It reveals how the
leadership of Local 600 and community members such as city council members understood their
city and their relationship to the automobile industry and industrial labor. It is a historical moment
that contributes to an intellectual history from below, in an effort to trace the thoughts and
worldviews of, not scholars and professional philosophers, but autoworkers and other metroDetroiters.215
Despite the resistance organized by Local 600, the end results compose a familiar narrative.
Factories moved away from the old centers of industry; the power and influence of labor unions
in the United States eroded; and the role of manufacturing in the national economy declined
relative to other sectors. At the River Rouge complex, employment fell from 85,000 in 1945 to
54,000 in 1954, and to only 30,000 in 1960.216 The reasons behind the failure of Local 600’s
organization of communities against decentralization in Detroit are indicative of how various
national trends intersected to shape local history: the Cold War, anti-communism and red-baiting,
the factionalism within organized labor, and the dependence of manufacturing cities on the
continued presence of industry. The conflict between the leadership of the local, which had a
grassroots and local point-of-view, and the UAW international leadership, which was top-down
and focused on an international analysis, only added yet another obstacle for Local 600’s campaign
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to confront. To the local union, decentralization meant job loss and the destruction of communities,
whereas the International UAW saw the expansion of industry and union influence.
As old industrial centers continue to struggle to gain their footing in the present global and
increasingly service-based economy, it should be kept in mind that these quandaries are more than
half-a-century old. Local 600’s campaign against decentralization raised questions almost seventy
years ago which continue to be pertinent in the present: to what extent do businesses have
obligations or responsibilities to the communities which house them, if any? Should workers or
communities have a voice in business decisions that drastically affect them? Could workers or
communities have such a voice? This conversation was stifled for Local 600 in the early 1950s by
the Cold War climate, in defense of an ideological position in support of free business and
capitalism, and the House Committee on Un-American Activities investigations of the threat of
Communism. In this milieu, the objections raised by Local 600 were overwhelmed and drowned
out, and the industrial policy of decentralization continued, to the detriment of the health and
vitality of the old urban centers of industry in the United States.
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CHAPTER 3 “THIS POTENT, THOUGH INVISIBLE, BARRIER”: HOUSING
SEGREGATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN SUBURBAN DETROIT, 1943-1973
I have a dream this afternoon that one day right here in Detroit, Negroes will be able to buy a house
or rent a house anywhere that their money will carry them.
Martin Luther King, Jr.217
On opposite end of metropolitan Detroit from Dearborn, a decade and a half after Local
600’s campaign, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council invited Martin Luther King to speak
in their community. He gave his address less than three weeks before his assassination, and after
the fact, he described receiving “the worst heckling I have ever encountered in all my travels” in
Grosse Pointe, Michigan. While King gave a talk on “The Other America,” a couple hundred
demonstrators gathered outside the Grosse Pointe high school on March 14, 1968. They were not
loud or boisterous, but they carried unambiguous signs and posters and “overshadowed” the talk
inside. “Red Scum Get Out of Town,” read one. “Antichrist Must Go,” opined another. “Beware
– King Snake,” announced one more. Inside the building, the tactics of the protesters were more
aggressive. As King attempted to speak, “brazen hecklers” interrupted him with shouts of
“Traitor!” and “Commie!”218
The civil rights leader, who had faced down physical violence and jail repeatedly for over
a decade, was as if “mourning” after the address, according to an Associated Press reporter. “I
can’t talk right now,” King said, when the reporter, Hugh Morgan, asked what King thought of the
protest. As King put his head in his hands, he closed his eyes and sighed “in a series of short
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breaths that was more like a sob.” “I have never received a reception on this level,” King later told
reporters at a news conference.219
The Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council had invited King to speak in the hope of
encouraging “meaningful and forceful programs” in their community, which borders Detroit’s
eastside, on matters of race in the wake of the events during the summer of 1967.220 That King
spoke in Grosse Pointe, specifically, was a symbolically rich moment, resting on the history of
discrimination and segregation in the wealthy, exclusive Detroit suburb. It is a history that
intertwines race, class, and geography in metropolitan Detroit, which was a network of racialized
borders and boundaries, divisions and fragments, unofficial yet well-understood fault lines that
were policed and protected and jealously guarded. The organizing principle used to defend these
divisions was property values; more specifically, the fear of property losing value due to the
perception that certain city residents were, on the basis of their ancestry, less desirable neighbors
than others. Nor was this solely racial prejudice, though it certainly encompassed racial
segregation. It was also about ethnicity, class, and social status.
Grosse Pointe is made up of five small, individual yet related, municipalities often referred to
collectively as either Grosse Pointe or the Pointes. They are situated on the southwest shore of
Lake St. Claire, adjacent to Detroit and less than ten miles northwest of downtown. The five
Pointes – Grosse Pointe, Grosse Pointe Farms, Gross Pointe Shore, Gross Pointe Woods, and
Grosse Pointe Park – together comprise an total area a little more than ten square miles overall, as
compared to the 138 square miles of the city of Detroit.221 Residents historically have included the
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Dodge and Ford families, an indication of the Pointes’ position as one of the wealthiest and most
exclusive suburbs of Detroit. The Edsel and Eleanor Ford estate, designed by Albert Kahn and
sitting on eighty-seven acres on Lake St. Clair, is admittedly one of the grander homes in the area,
yet it serves as an example of the historical character and social milieu of the Pointes.222
The first half of this chapter focuses on the so-called Grosse Pointe point system, a method
that was, as far as it is possible to know, particular to Grosse Pointe from about 1945 until 1960,
whereby potential homebuyers were rated and scored according to their “desirability.” More than
racial restrictive covenants written into deeds or the financial discrimination at the heart of
redlining, both discussed in more detail below, the point system was, in the words of one local
realtor, a conscientious and sincere attempt to practice what was wide-spread discrimination,
practiced nationwide, in a fair and intelligent manner.223 Yet, African Americans and other
minorities were still “undesirable” as neighbors even if they were well-off enough to afford to buy
a home in the exclusive Grosse Pointe community. As explained in the introduction, housing had
been a divisive issue in Detroit since the Second World War. While the stresses on affordable
housing for workers was not a major concern for Grosse Pointe residents – it was one of the city’s
wealthiest suburbs, after all – the same objections to integration found in Grosse Pointe were
forwarded by working-class neighborhoods in metropolitan Detroit with significantly less
economic resources. Therefore, the focus on Grosse Pointe in this chapter is not because housing
segregation was peculiar to the Pointes.
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Rather, segregation was found across Detroit and its suburbs, as it was in most communities
across the country. Instead, the focus on Grosse Pointe is because it offers the benefits of a case
study in which economics is removed as an overriding consideration in the issue of housing
segregation. The relationship between segregation and property values revolves around a number
of interrelated issues, such as the cultural stereotypes of ethnic and racial minorities as incapable
of maintaining a home in proper shape or, more materially, the discriminatory lending practices of
banks and other financial institutions. The result of the latter practice was a self-fulfilling
prophecy: ethnic and racial minorities denied the same access to credit as other homeowners were
unable to buy as nice of homes or to maintain their homes in as nice of condition.224 However, in
a community such as Grosse Pointe, the simple fact was that only those with means could afford
to purchase property in the Pointes.
Yet, the same arguments against integration regarding property values are given in the
Pointes as in less well-off neighborhoods. To argue that integration, ethnic and racial, would still
lead to lowering or eroding property values despite the individual means of minority homebuyers
was to argue that something else was at play. The financial precarity of working-class
neighborhoods where one’s home is one’s largest and often only investment is more distant, even
as the professional class is none less concerned with their financial security and stability. For
working-class Detroiters, the combination of racial and ethnic prejudices could combine with
financial uncertainty to create a potent mixture of precarity, mistrust, and fear. The first part of this
chapter explores how this dynamic appeared in a metropolitan Detroit community with greater
access to financial resources and stability.
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As the history of the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council reminds us, however, there
were white Detroiters and suburbanites who dissented from the prevailing racial and ethnic
attitudes and worked to counter them. The second half of the chapter examines the successes and
failures of the local residents in Grosse Pointe who sought to combat the discriminatory practices
and reputations of the Pointes following state investigatory hearings into the point system in 1960.
These hearings were given significant local media attention, and spurred some Grosse Pointers to
take a stand for integration and civil rights in their community and in metropolitan Detroit. Within
the context of the Civil Rights Movement, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council was mainly
concerned with welcoming African American homeowners into their community. By the late
1960s they also explored ways to increase interracial understanding and appreciation, such as
through an arts festival, in addition to legal strategies revolving around discriminatory homeselling practices. While the point system has a local notoriety unto the present, the history of the
Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council, which joined with similar Human Relations Councils
across the metropolitan area, has garnered less historical attention. Yet, they reveal that
communities were not always unified in their attitudes, and speak to the complex reality of racial
politics in postwar metropolitan Detroit.
The Grosse Pointe Point System
Segregation could be an ad hoc affair – which houses a realtor chose to show, where they
advertised, which loans banks approved – but the Grosse Pointe point system, developed circa
1945, shows that it could be highly organized. Additionally, given the role that suburbanization
played in Detroit’s postwar history, looking at Grosse Pointe in this chapter, similar to looking at
Dearborn in the last, is intended to shift the analytical framework beyond the municipal boundaries
of Detroit and onto the metropolitan area. Often the city of Detroit is presented in scholarly works

86
as an island unto itself, divorced entirely from the large suburban community surrounding it,
except when the suburbs emerge as some kind of white flight deus ex machina in the late 1960s.The
relationship between the city and its suburbs was economic and financial; it was racial, and it was
classed. This uneven relationship became only more significant as suburbanization drained the city
of its professional, middle-class, and upper working-class white residents. The suburbs, as
historian Robert Self and others have argued, were not just sites to which city residents fled. They
actively enticed and drew city residents into them.225 That is to say, certain city residents. Using
the case study of Grosse Pointe to explore the dynamics of segregation reminds us that the suburbs
were carefully constructed racial and social sites.
As mentioned above, the details of the Grosse Pointe point system reached the light of day via
a public state investigatory hearing. On a basic level, this is a benefit because it ensured that the
details of the point system were well-reported and commented upon. More significant is that the
sworn testimony of the architects and guardians of the system shows clearly that they considered
the system both reasonable and justifiable. Rather than seeking to evade legal responsibility or
otherwise excuse the system, they defended it. On the other hand, the fact that there was an
investigation, and the responses registered by newspapers, suggests that the pro-segregation
sentiments evinced by the Grosse Pointers questions were not as universally shared as they
presumed.
It is not clear as to when or how, exactly, the point system came into existence. The Grosse
Pointe Brokers Association (GPBA) and the Grosse Pointe Property Owners Association created
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the system around 1945 and maintained it through 1960.226 The groups designed the system to
replace the widespread use of restrictive covenants, clauses written into property deeds restricting
who could purchase or inhabit a property by one’s ethnic or racial background, which had been
ruled as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in their 1948 decision in Shelley v. Kraemer.227
Restrictive covenants originated in California at the end of the 19th century in order to limit where
Chinese immigrants could live. The use of these covenants was frequently challenged in court, so
that one way of tracing their spread across the United States from the west coast is by noting
challenges in the South by 1904 and in the North by 1922.228
Over time, restrictive covenants were used to target and restrict the housing choices of
blacks, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexicans, including, in some cases, all non-Caucasians. The
use of restrictive covenants arrived in the northern United States around the time of the first Great
Migration north of African Americans, who fled failed cotton crops, sharecropping, and the
increasing racial violence in the South, including recurring incidences of lynching in the 1910s.
The expanded use of restrictive covenants also occurred in the wake of the 1917 Buchanan v.
Warley decision by the Supreme Court, which overturned the use racial zoning, one of the first
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major legal victories for the NAACP.229 Black urban spaces were carved out in cities where the
beginning of the First World War and anti-immigrant policies had created severe labor shortages.
With these new black urban communities and employment opportunities came labor conflicts and
housing disputes.230
Until the 1948 Supreme Court ruling against them, restrictive covenants were enforceable
in court as a private contract. In 1911, a New York Times editorial described the use of “covenants
of restriction” as effectively protecting neighborhoods from “negro invasion,” even as they
claimed that the covenants were “solely for the purpose of preventing depreciation of property
values.”231 Over a quarter of a century later, the Federal Housing Administration’s 1939
Underwriting Manual advocated restrictive covenants, along with zoning and other regulations, as
the ideal means to preserve the stability of neighborhoods. They explicitly meant occupancy by
“the same social and racial classes.” Even after the Supreme Court declared covenants
unconstitutional, the FHA did not make it a policy to cease insuring properties protected by
restrictive covenants until 1950.232
In the case of Grosse Pointe, restrictive covenants declared homes to be for the “Caucasian
race only.” “No lot or building,” declared one such covenant, “or part of any building thereon shall
be used or occupied by any person or persons other than those of the Caucasian race, except that
domestic servants not of the Caucasian race may occupy the premises where their employer
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resides.”233 By no means, however, was Grosse Pointe unique in the metropolitan Detroit area for
deploying restrictive covenants to maintain the racial and ethnic make-up of the community. In the
1940s, over 80% of the housing in Detroit, except for the inner city, was covered by racial
restrictions. In a study of the deeds of ten thousand subdivisions in Detroit, sociologist Harold
Black found that no land developed prior to 1910 had a restrictive covenant, while every
subdivision developed between 1940 and 1947 restricted ownership or occupancy by African
Americans. Despite their ubiquity, “restrictive covenants have never,” as a Grosse Pointe Brokers
Association leaflet fretted, “given more than partial protection.” They were a piecemeal solution.
They were expensive to implement as their efficacy demanded that every property deed in a given
neighborhood or community include one. Besides, they were facing legal challenges in Detroit by
1944, and were ultimately overturned in 1948.234
The point system took housing segregation a step further. The details of the system were
revealed in two lawsuits and an investigatory hearing in 1960, but the testimony of those involved
suggests that not much changed during the fifteen years the system was in use.235 The arrangement
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was straightforward. Real estate brokers submitted names of potential home buyers to the Grosse
Pointe Property Owners Association (GPPOA) and Grosse Pointe Brokers Association (GPBA).
These organizations in turn engaged a private detective to fill out a two-page form on the potential
home buyers. The form, a type of survey, worked on scale of one hundred possible points granted
or taken away for various reasons. Everyone needed at least fifty point to be approved to purchase
a home in the Grosse Pointe, although some demographics needed more than fifty points in order
to pass. A person of Polish descent needed at least 55 points, for example, to pass. Southern
Europeans, defined as Greek, Italian, or Lebanese, needed 75 points, and Jewish buyers needed 85
points. There was not a defined protocol for those of African or Asian descent for, as a real estate
office president stated, “Asian and Negroes had never become a problem.” Other criteria used to
evaluate whether a prospective home buyer was “undesirable” included speaking with an accent,
family size, “swarthiness,” education level, or considering oneself an “hyphenated American.”236
The secretary of the GPPOA, R. Noble Wetherbee, testified in 1960 that 1,597
investigations had taken place since 1945 (of the 1,597 reported investigations, 658 home buyers,
41%, were determined to be undesirable by the guardians of Grosse Pointe). This would average
out to about 106 investigations a year. As each investigation cost between $100 and $150, it meant
that, on average, between $10,640 to $15,960 was spent annually on investigations. While the
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averages are revealing, they cover up the yearly fluctuations. By 1960, about 300 investigations
were taking place in a year. That meant that in 1960, the cost of the point system was between
$30,000 and $45,000 a year. The average income for an American family in 1960 was $5,600.
Despite spending at least five times the income of an average family on these investigations, the
secretary of the GPPOA asserted the findings were advisory only.237
Indeed, if a prospective buyer failed to meet score enough points, the twenty-four brokers
and eleven associated brokers and builders of the GPBA were all advised of the fact. Failure to
heed the results would lead to the personal intervention of the executive secretary of the GPBOA.
According to the GPBA’s own regulations, “the penalty for selling to an ineligible shall be
forfeiture to the Association of the full commission, including the salesman’s share.” 238 Paul W.
Rowe, a former mayor of Grosse Pointe Woods, testified about the consequences of violating the
GPBA’s advisory system when he related how he was expelled from the association in 1957 for
selling houses to two Italian families.239 Expulsion from the broker’s association was a serious
matter for a business that depended on having access to a network of critical contacts and
information.240
In a joint statement by the GPBA and GPPOA, the guardians of the point system defended
their interference in the private market as “a matter of supply and demand,” that is, as a function

Cost of the investigation detailed in Jack Casey, “Grosse Pointe Resident-Screening Plan Defended,” Detroit
Free Press, April 20, 1960; 1,597 and 658 figures comes from Don Beck, “40 Pct. Flunk Grosse Pointe Realty
Test,” Detroit Free Press, April 21, 1960; average income for an American family given in “Average Income of
Families Up Slightly in 1960,” US Bureau of the Census, June 9, 1962, available online at
https://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-036.pdf, accessed August 11, 2016.
238
Jack Casey, “Grosse Pointe Resident-Screening Plan Defended,” Detroit Free Press, April 20, 1960; Joseph E.
Wolff and Robert A. Popa, “GP Point Plan Detailed,” Detroit News, May 3, 1960; from “Regulations Governing the
Screening Process of Grosse Pointe Brokers Association,” quoted in Don Beck, “40 Pct. Flunk Grosse Pointe Realty
Test,” Detroit Free Press, April 21, 1960.
239
Jack Casey, “G.P. Brokers Air Reprisal in Point System Violation,” Detroit Free Press, undated; Popa and Wolff,
“Rebel Realtor to be Called in Pointe Quiz,” Detroit News, undated; Ray Giradin, “Violated Point System, Broker
Expelled – Tells of GP Association’s Reprisal,” Detroit Times, May 12, 1960.
240
Jones-Correa, "The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants," 564.
237

92
of the private market. If neighborhood begins to become home for “a cliquish or clannish group of
families unlikely to absorb local customs,” then it was only to be expected that potential home
buyers (of the non-cliquish or -clannish variety, one guesses) would prefer to buy “where he
believes his investment will be more secure.” It was a matter of home values and appraisals, “a
vicious circle” in which the guardians noted that “even the unprejudiced person is affected.” The
fear of integration lowering home values had the effect of lowering home values.241
The GPBA and the GPPOA were not off the mark, either. Lowered housing values were
not caused by integration, but by racial and xenophobic reactions to integration, or even the
possibility of integration. The vicious circle existed, confirming the worldview of the prejudiced,
and it was exploited by the less scrupulous of the real estate profession. In a move known as
blockbusting, realtors and brokers would sell a house in an all-white neighborhood to a black
family, or begin the rumor that such a transaction was soon to take place. Fearing a “takeover,”
fear actively encouraged by the realtor or broker, the white residents would sell their homes quickly
and – more importantly – cheaply. The broker or realtor would then sell the houses, no longer so
cheap, to African Americans who were searching for a way out of the low-quality inner-city
housing that residential segregation had forced them to accept in the first place. As economist
Richard Rothstein phrased it, “Blockbusting could work only because the FHA made certain that
African Americans had few alternative neighborhoods where they could purchase homes at fair
market values.”242
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This process in the city of Detroit was exacerbated by the changing economic landscape,
as the postwar movement of industry out of the city coincided with the changing racial landscape.
Working-class white Detroiters consequently sought “to defend a world that they feared was
slipping away,” as historian Thomas Sugrue notes, but in their view, “they blamed blacks for their
insecurity.” The urban landscape racism had created served to further confirm the racism of white
Detroiters. In reality, the first black family to move into an all-white neighborhood was often on
better financial footing than many of their new neighbors.243
But it was not working-class Detroiters, white or non-white, who were house-hunting in
Grosse Pointe. The economic argument around property values seems less convincing when, as in
the case of those looking to move to Grosse Pointe, the people involved were far from financial
instability. Economics and property values do little to explain the following three cases.
The first is that of Dr. Jean Braxton Rosenbaum, a psychiatrist and inventor who was also
a direct descendant of a signer of the Declaration of Independence. In a letter to the Michigan
Attorney General Paul L. Adams, Dr. Rosenbaum described how he was told he would have to
wait to be passed by the GPPOA before purchasing a house in Grosse Pointe. Later, his broker
informed him that “I could not buy, or even look at, a house in Grosse Pointe because I was
Jewish.”244 Incidentally, the point system did not exclude those of Jewish background entirely, at
least in theory. As Paul Maxon, the head of the Maxon Brothers, Inc, real estate office, explained,
a person such as Albert Einstein could purchase a home in Grosse Pointe “because he was of
sufficient prominence.”245
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Second is the testimony of Bruce N. Tappan, the president of the GPBA and a resident of
Grosse Pointe Park. While on the stand, Tappan was asked by Solicitor General Samuel J. Torina,
“Suppose a person in the Beaconsfield-Jefferson area has the money to move onto Lake Shore.
Why should he be investigated?” Tappan shot back, “Just because a man is loaded with money
doesn’t make him a gentleman.”246
Third, and last, consider the testimony of Orville F. Sherwood, to the effect that decisions
over desirability could be reversed. In one case, Sherwood related how one prospective home
buyer, who had run a real estate office on Woodward, and “employed a racially mixed staff of
salesmen and office workers,” was “blacklisted from buying in Grosse Pointe.” However, it was
later discovered that that the prospective home buyer had moved his business to a new location
and had hired a white-only workforce. His blacklisting was repealed.247
In the first case, a man in the medical profession with a family history directly connected
with the American Revolution was considered undesirable because he was also Jewish. The second
tells us that personal finances or wealth were irrelevant. The guardians only allowed “gentlemen”
to penetrate their cities’ borders. The term is vague. It easily could include self-made gentlemen
but taken in conjunction with Dr. Rosenbaum’s experiences, perhaps it was more a declaration that
“breeding” or background matters. In the third case, a businessman was undesirable not for any
personal or financial characteristic but because his hiring practices were objectionable to the
guardians of Grosse Pointe. The decision to reverse his blacklisting after he changed his business
practices demonstrates this.
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It also demonstrates how insidiously racial segregation and discrimination operated. The
economic argument forwarded by the guardians of Grosse Pointe rested on rotten foundations.
That this businessman’s hiring practices had no direct connection to his desirability as a neighbor,
and certainly not to housing values, did not stop him from being blacklisted. His undesirability
was rooted in his hiring a “racially mixed staff” in an office nowhere close to Grosse Pointe. His
subsequent desirability came from his adopting discriminatory hiring practices. It is difficult to
conceive how this criterion relates to matters of supply and demand in the housing market or
matters of property appraisal.
Yet, the defenders of the point system maintained that it was merely “the most careful and
considerate method possible for making the best of a difficult fact – of prejudices which affect real
estate value, just as street paving and water systems are also facts affecting value.” With not a hint
of irony, the attorneys representing the GPBA and GPPOA publicly stated that the point system
was “a plan that recognizes that all property owners, of whatever extraction, should be free to sell
to whom they choose.”248 After Bruce N. Tappan expressed his opinion on the difference between
being a gentleman and merely “loaded with money,” he testified that “it is pretty well known
throughout Grosse Pointe that the brokers are always standing guard.”249 Again, that realtors in the
Pointes were always guarding the housing market belies their claims that housing was a matter of
a free market, personal choice, and supply and demand.
Always standing guard, but against whom? The defenders of the point system argued that
they were standing guard in defense of stable property values, but they were not reluctant to testify
that they also stood guard against Jewish medical professionals moving next door and businessmen
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who, in their private practices, hired employees who were not white. The emphasis on property
values should not be dismissed, even as it appears unable to bear the weight placed on it by the
guardians of Grosse Pointe. In spirit, if not in the details, this was in no way unique to Grosse
Pointe or metropolitan Detroit. “This plan is being conducted,” testified realtor Paul Maxon, “in
fine residential communities all over the country, but in a more informal manner, in a more
haphazard, less fair, less intelligent manner than our own conscientious, sincere attempt to make
the best of these well-known prejudices as they exist.”250
Again, there was a bitter truth behind the words of the defenders of the point system.
Violence over integrated housing was a staple of early 20th century Detroit history. In 1925, Dr.
Ossian Sweet moved his family into an all-white neighborhood, causing a mob to crowd the street
outside on September 9, pelting the house with stones, until someone inside the house fired into
the crowd, striking two. The resulting murder trial brought the NAACP and Clarence Darrow to
Detroit to defend Dr. Sweet and his friends who had been inside. Darrow achieved acquittals from
an all-white jury after detailing the pervasive violence faced by African Americans over housing,
and arguing that firing in self-defense was justified.251 In February 1942, fighting broke out among
a crowd of over a thousand people when the Sojourner Truth public housing project, for black
residents in a white neighborhood, opened. The result was at least forty injured, over two hundred
arrested, and over a hundred sent to trial.252
More pervasive was the more mundane, yet sustained, forms of violence faced by black
pioneers in white neighborhoods: in cases from the late 1940s through the 1950s, these included
thrown rocks and bricks, break-ins, water damage, thrown paint, smashed windows, constant
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phone calls, crowds outside at night, cars slowly driving at night, thrown eggs, salted yards,
picketing, effigy burning, arson, slashed car tires, burning crosses, shouted epithets, torn down
fences, trampled gardens, firebombing, burning trash cans, dumped garbage and waste.253 Between
1943 and 1960, at least 192 home owners associations were formed in the city of Detroit. As the
flyer of one such association’s emergency meeting in March 1950 alerted the public to the
beginnings of integration, “Neighborhood Invaded by Colored Purchase on Orleans &
Minnesota.”254 The commonly-used language of invasion and calls for defense and protection
indicate the degree to which urban spaces was divided into zones of occupation in the imaginations
of city residents, with borders not to be crossed. Granting the premise of boundaries and borders,
the logic of forceful response, including violence, follows in the case of unauthorized crossings.255
While racial prejudice was widespread – and in the case of Grosse Pointe, ethnic and
religious prejudice as well – it is also accurate to characterize lowering of property values as a selffulfilling prophecy, in the same way that a run on banks produces the outcome that everyone feared
and had acted solely in order to avoid.256 The threat to property values were not just a case of
prejudice, but of material circumstances, even if those material circumstance were, in turn, created
by prejudice. As Jane Jacobs once noted, however, “credit-blacklisting maps, like slum-clearance
maps, are accurate prophecies because they are self-fulfilling prophecies.”257
The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was established in 1933 to underwrite
mortgages in order to reduce foreclosures. Its long-term appraisal system included the building
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itself as well as the surrounding neighborhood. In the case of the latter, homogenous, native-born,
white-collar communities were privileged over diverse, working-class, and ethnic or black
neighborhoods. As historian Kenneth Jackson has argued, the HOLC created the practice of
redlining, named for the color used to designate high-risk neighborhoods on HOLC maps. More
importantly, Jackson notes how this appraisal system rested on assumptions about the causes of
neighborhood decline. It took decline to be the natural outcome of the age of structures and
declining incomes. Just as importantly, there was no provision in the HOLC appraisal system to
distinguish between changing demographics as a cause of decline, or of decline as the cause of
changing neighborhood demographics.258 Private lending institutions, in turn, took their cue from
this system of appraisal.259
When the HOLC was incorporated into the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in
1934, it also incorporated these standards of appraisal. A 1938 FHA Underwriting Manual stated
that, “if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be
occupied by the same social and racial classes.”260 The boundaries between different classes and
races were often symbolic, but they could be all too concrete as well. In the 1930s, white Detroiters
who moved near a black enclave on 8 Mile Road (today the northern limit of Detroit proper) could
not secure FHA insurance due to the geographic proximity of black and white homeowners. In
1941, a developer built a concrete wall between the white and black communities, and the FHA
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then approved the mortgages for the white properties.261 The wall still stands today. It was this
federal support of segregation that allowed local initiatives, like restrictive covenants, to work
effectively. In 1955, Charles Abrams, whom Architectural Forum described as “the foremost
housing consultant in the United States,” described deeds with restrictive covenants due to FHA
policies as “the common form of deed.”262
Even as the HOLC and FHA polices encouraged and reinforced racial segregation
throughout the United States, their loans made homeownership a possibility for more Americans
than ever before, including working-class families. However, the means by which homeownership
was put within the purview of more Americans – and its privileging of new, single-family,
construction – also resulted in the residential hollowing out of inner cities via suburbanization.263
The same programs that made home ownership an obtainable goal for the first time for many
Americans also encourage those new homes to be built outside central cities, in suburban areas,
while also condemning minorities to segregated neighborhoods, often in aging, inner cities. The
causal relationship between integration and lowered property values was a fragment of the larger
interlocking mechanisms of racial inequality in the United States, composed of self-reinforcing
and self-fulfilling prophecies that blamed the victims of prejudice for the discrimination they faced
while simultaneously denying minorities the means to create better lives.
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The Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council
The Grosse Pointe point system is often mentioned when segregation in Detroit is under
discussion. Its systematic nature, based on rationality and efficiency, made it much more grotesque
in a post-segregationist world. It was not a matter of passionate hatred, but rather a pragmatic
solution given, calmly and reasonably, to difficult social tensions and conflicts. It is a reminder
that racial discrimination can manifest in many different forms, and some of them can be banal in
appearance, a far cry from the popular images of racism in the South. Photographs of lynchings or
civil rights demonstrators being attacked spring readily to mind, but more structural forms of
prejudice, such as housing segregation, are more difficult to see and compound over generations.
To borrow from Hannah Arendt, we can speak of a banality of racism, and, to borrow from
President John F. Kennedy, all that is required is for everyday people not to question the status
quo, to follow orders, or, in this case, to follow the rest of the neighborhood.264
This is why it is so important to say that not all Grosse Pointers approved, supported,
condoned, or appreciated the efforts of the Grosse Pointe segregationists. As is broadly true
throughout human history, there were those who disagreed with the majority, and acted to the
contrary. Held up as the bastion of segregation in metropolitan Detroit and as the home of the overthe-top point system, it was rarely, if ever, noted that other Grosse Pointers organized to combat
segregation and racism when the point system became public knowledge in 1960. This newlyformed group continued to challenge segregationist policies for the next thirteen years. None
would have stood out as rabble-rousers or trouble-makers on paper: they were professionals,
upper-middle class, homeowners, men and women concerned with education and reaching out to
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houses of worship. They began by meeting secretly in each other’s homes, but by the mid-to-late
sixties they were marching in the street, knocking on doors, and pushing for a more inclusive
community.
In 1960, the year of the investigatory hearings into discrimination among the real estate
industry in Grosse Pointe, community members organized into the Grosse Pointe Human Relations
Council (GPHRC) to promote integration and cross-racial understanding. Admittedly, the
founding members recognized that their social views were in the minority in Grosse Pointe, and
so their meetings were held clandestinely in members’ homes. At these first meetings, members
largely “listened to Negro and white speakers, and tried to find ways to encourage integration and
open housing.”265 By 1962, the group had developed a wide-ranging general program of action.
The GPHRC discussed education and the hiring practices of schools. They showed the
“support of our group for hiring Negro teachers [and] for the general hiring practices at all levels
in the system without regard to race or creed.” They discussed school curriculum and whether it is
“designed to strengthen the concept of equality and brotherhood as American ideals.” They
wondered if the books in the local library “treat[ed] minority characters naturally and without
stereotype,” and they suggested erecting exhibits “emphasizing the contribution to American life
and culture made by various groups, institutions, races, and nationalities.” They talked about
hosting teas or autographing parties with contemporary authors, “including authors from minority
groups.” Council members proposed that recreation was an efficient means to their goals. They
suggested promoting athletic contests between “teams from the wider metropolitan area” and
organizing a baseball or other athletic clinic with “teachers, prominent sports figures representing
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racial and national origins,” The also explored how to make it “comfortable for minority group
friends of residents” to visit the waterfront parks of Grosse Pointe.266
The Council did not ignore commercial matters in their program. They intended to research
public accommodation in Grosse Pointe among restaurants, motels, stores, banks, and other
businesses. They wanted to know about their employment practices and how they could indicate
their support of businesses with fair hiring practices. They investigated how public servants such
as police officers were hired in Grosse Pointe and noted that many of the postal workers serving
their community were African American. The Council planned to meet with labor unions, such as
those of retail clerks, municipal workers, and waitresses, to further investigate hiring practices in
the Pointes. Finally, there was housing, which was an issue “so broad and significant” to the
organization.
After a few years the organization decided to publicly push for open housing and
integration in Grosse Pointe. Members of the Council, the January 1963 GPHRC newsletter
declared, “will agree that an all-white suburb stands as a symbol of the racism which troubles our
society. Grosse Pointe residents need to make clear that they do not support racial
exclusiveness.”267 Thus, in 1963, the same year which saw police dogs and fire hoses let loose on
civil rights demonstrators in Birmingham, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council organized
a walk through Grosse Pointe in support of open housing. They organized their demonstration for
June, the same month that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., led a march down Woodward Avenue in
Detroit and delivered a speech at Cobo Hall. Flanked by Reverend C.L. Franklin, the father of
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Aretha, and the Detroit Council of Human Relations, Dr. King proclaimed that “segregation is a
cancer in the body politic, which must be removed before our democratic health can be
realized.”268
“In a real sense,” Dr. King continued, “we are through with segregation now, henceforth,
and forevermore.” Before launching into his conclusion, which announced the same dream later
delivered at the March on Washington, King encouraged his Detroit audience, “to work with
determination to get rid of any segregation and discrimination in Detroit, realizing that injustice
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere [….] we must come to see that de facto segregation in
the North is just as injurious as the actual segregation in the South.”269 King’s campaigns against
housing segregation in the North are popularly associated with Chicago in the later 60s, yet at the
height of the voting and anti-segregation campaigns in the South, King was in Detroit sounding
the alarm on racial segregation in Northern cities.270
The Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council was just one of many Human Relations
Councils across metropolitan Detroit to answer King’s call. In 1964, there were twenty-five such
groups, including Human Relation Councils in Grosse Ile, Redford, Rochester, Trenton, Warren,
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Centerline, Allen Park, Oak Park, Pleasant Ridge, and Pontiac. 271 The Grosse Pointe Council
officially incorporated in 1964, with Dr. Charles E. Brake as its president. Seventy-nine Grosse
Pointe residents attended its first membership meeting. Within one year, the Council had grown to
334 members. By 1969, it was over 500.272 Once the Council had decided to take the step to
become a public presence in Grosse Pointe, they did not back down. In 1966, they sent a letter to
their members requesting permission to print members’ names in the Grosse Pointe News and the
Grosse Pointe Press, “as an expression of welcome to the 2 Negro families who are now residents
of the Grosse Pointes.”273 The two families, Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Wright and Mr. and Mrs. Glenn
Brown, both later moved out of Grosse Pointe in 1967 due to job transfers. When the Wrights
moved in, the GPHRC not only welcomed them, but it also made sure that the family was not alone
at the house, especially at night. After sunset, according to GPHRC member Sally Brown, a large
number of cars would drive by the Wright’s home until roughly 10:30 p.m., a chilling reminder
that the Council’s integrationist position was far from universally shared in the Pointes. The
Council developed written plans on how to intervene in the case of “mob action” when families
moved in, when houses were sold but not yet occupied, and when there was just the anticipation
of a house being sold.274
As its members organized for integration and open housing in the Pointes, the Council
found allies among local religious institutions. In 1966, David W. Palmer of the Grosse Pointe
Congregational Church wrote to the Council that, “I believe that the Council’s efforts have resulted

271

The Open Door, June 1964, Vol 11, No. 1, Greater Detroit Committee for Fair Housing Practices, Box 1, Folder
8, GPCROP. Another indication of the spread and importance of Human Relation Councils as a movement is that
Michigan State University hosted a Conference on Human Relations on June 3, 1967. See “University Resources
and the Role of the Human Relations Committee in the Community: Proceedings on the Conference on Human
Relations,” Box 1, Folder 9, GPCROP.
272
1970-1971 GPHRC membership flier and the 1969-1970 GPHRC membership flier, Box 1, Folder 7, GPCROP.
273
Blair Moody Jr. to members of GRPHRC, July 31, 1966. Box 1, Folder 5, GPCROP.
274
“Emergency Plan A,” Box 1, Folder 3 and “Proposed Plan for Dealing with Move-In Problem in Grosse Pointe,”
Box 3, Folder 5, GPCROP.

105
in a reasonable degree of tolerance, and that you should feel encouraged.”275 The spring of that
year, the Council handed out pledge cards at local churches, so that churchgoers could publicly
signal their support for the belief that “We who live in Grosse Pointe believe that any family should
be free to choose its place of residence. We welcome neighbors on a personal basis without regard
to race, creed, or country of origin.” 276
Additionally, the Council spent a decade working to promote cross-cultural understanding.
To them, segregation was not just a matter of economic and political inequality. Practical
responses, such as escorting families during house visits, or planning to intervene in the event of
a mob action, were a central part of their program. But so too were speakers, cultural events, panel
discussions, and education aimed at furthering open housing as well as understanding between
black and white Detroiters. For the Council, increased understanding and communication between
the races was part of the remedy to segregation and racism in the metropolitan area. Many of these
efforts were done in cooperation with ethnic and racial organizations. The Council, for example,
encouraged its members in 1968 to support The Now People Arts Festival in East Detroit as part
of their Human Relations Week. “Art,” the Council reasoned, “is to be the good common
denominator for people to work together in an interreligious, interracial setting.” 277 It was how
they understood art and cultural events to be an essential ingredient in combatting racism. It also
demonstrated how the Council was interested in not just creating a more inclusive community in
Grosse Pointe but in Detroit and other suburbs. Additionally, they sought out ways to work with
other organizations to improve relations across ethnic, religious, and racial lines.
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That same year, 1968, the Council brought Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to speak in Grosse
Pointe. This was their most well-known action as an organization. It would be difficult to say that
it was their most important, for how could one devise a metric to measure the importance of
providing support, solidarity, and friendship to black families moving into a hostile white suburb?
Nonetheless, Dr. King’s speech in Grosse Pointe, especially in conjunction with the tragedy of his
murder on April 4 of that year, was an event of historical significance in its own right.
The Council began organizing in 1967 to bring Dr. King to speak the following spring,
likely as part of their commitment to “sponsor meaningful and forceful programs” following the
Detroit riots.278 In addition to Dr. King, the Council considered inviting Roy Wilkins, of the
NAACP, or Patrick Moynihan, of the Moynihan Report.279 By the beginning of 1968, rumors of
Dr. King’s proposed visit to Grosse Pointe caused the president of the Council, Harry C. Meserve,
to write to members. On February 12, 1968, he wrote that “while a great many rumors have
circulated about this meeting, we believe that it will prove to be an important occasion of value to
our whole community.”280
Once again the views of the members of the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council were
not universally shared by other residents of Grosse Pointe. In March of 1968, the Grosse Pointe
Property Owners Association, one of the two organizations behind the point system, sent a letter
to all residents of Grosse Pointe. The letter listed the officers and directors of the Human Relations
Council and the members of the Board of Education who had voted to allow Dr. King to speak the
Grosse Pointe High School. The GPPOA’s epistolary attempt at intimidation did not end there.
Seeking to drive community opinion against the GPHRC and the appearance by King, the GPPOA
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chided in their mass letter that “Grosse Pointe taxpayers will be forced to pay for additional police
protection.” The letter then threw out the inflammatory supposition that “the [Grosse Pointe]
Farms police are greatly concerned about the possibility of violence resulting from the appearance
of Rev. King.”281 Despite King’s well-known dedication to non-violence, the GPPOA did not shy
away from suggesting that King, and by extension the GPHRC and the Grosse Pointe Board of
Education, would be the ones responsible for any violence that resulted from King’s appearance
in Grosse Pointe.
The GPPOA also distributed an essay, detailing their opposition to Dr. King, with the mass
letter delivered to all Grosse Pointe residents. Printed on the verso of the letter, Frank S. Meyer’s
“Showdown with Insurrection: Principles & Heresies,” from the National Review gave the
residents of Grosse Pointe a better and fuller description of the dangers that Dr. King presented to
their community. The “blatant admission that the aim of the non-violent movement,” the author
wrote
is to provoke violence only exposes the surface. It is not merely in its commitment to the
provocation of violence by others that this movement betrays the hypocrisy of its name; it
is violent in its very essence, relying as it does upon a terror inspired by mobs to destroy
the processes of constitutional government.
Thus the author, and the GPPOA, warned that the Nobel Peace Prize recipient was a violent
hypocrite who, via terror, worked to subvert the constitutional government of the United States. In
contrast to the seemingly dangerous path of Dr. King, Meyer praised that of Booker T.
Washington, the educator who had discouraged thinking progress could be won through direct
challenges to segregation and disfranchisement. “Respect and access to jobs,” Grosse Pointe’s
residents read, “must be earned.” In his call for the “preservation of constitutional order,” Meyer
apparently saw no contradiction in writing that a group of citizens must earn their civil rights,
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guaranteed by the constitution through citizenship. The essay also traded in the classic tactic of
characterizing the Other as inherently dangerous, violent, and criminal. Likewise, Meyer also
blames the recipient of prejudicial treatment for causing that prejudicial treatment; here, that the
possibility of violence in response to a talk in favor of civil rights is the fault of the speaker, and
not the people acting violently.282
While the GPPOA’s mass letter campaign was not subtle, the anti-King campaign of the
far-right Detroit group, Breakthrough, was even less so. In a flyer entitled, “A Call to Action,” the
group wrote to residents of the metropolitan area that “with your help we hope to give Mr. King
[sic] the kind of reception he deserves.” Later in the same flyer, the group griped that “An
American – George Wallace – was not allowed to come into our city to speak.” The group
unfavorably compared Dr. King to Governor Wallace, the notorious Dixiecrat from Alabama and
presidential candidate who once declared that he stood for “segregation now, segregation
tomorrow, segregation forever.” The designation of Wallace as “an American” implies that Dr.
King was not, in keeping with the othering of King, and all African Americans, as dangerous,
violent, and suspect. Immediately, the group lumped their own difficulties in finding meeting
spaces, including halls that had canceled their contract with Breakthrough, to the alleged
censorship of George Wallace in Detroit. “Yet the Groppis, the King’s, and the Carmichael’s,” the
flyer concluded, “can come in here at their leisure and preach their hate and treason with
impunity.”283 While the GPPOA told the residents of Grosse Pointe that Dr. King stood for
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violence and the subverting of constitutional order, the far-right Breakthrough called him a
preacher of hatred and treason. Rhetorical differences aside, the two analyses were not far apart.
Another flyer from Breakthrough, titled “Join the Protest Demonstration Against Martin
Luther King,” managed to be even more belligerent towards the civil rights leader. Throughout the
flyer words like riot, peace, and civil rights were always put in quotation marks. At one point, the
author accused King of seeking to “bring our country ever closer to a state of total anarchy,
communist revolution, overthrow and finally conquest.” It is not too surprising, given this line of
reasoning, that the flyer concluded that anyone who attended King’s talk had to be a communist,
a betrayer of the American forces in Vietnam, and guilty of treason.284
These flyers reveal more than just racial conflict in Grosse Pointe and metropolitan Detroit.
There were claims about free speech, fears over the failure of the democratic process, the Cold
War struggle between communism and capitalism, and the United States’ involvement in Vietnam.
Finally, the Detroit riots of July 1967 were still stalking in the backs of many minds in the spring
of 1968. This was especially so in communities immediately adjacent to Detroit, such as Grosse
Pointe. “The riots polarized the races,” Kathy Cosseboom recalled her mother remarking, “The
fear of the riots spreading to Grosse Pointe was very real.”285 Consequently, tensions were high in
the Pointes preceding King’s speech. Given their “concern about the possibility of violence,” and
“anticipat[ing] that any expense resulting from damage to school property” would be more than
the Council could afford, two of the school board members, Arnold Fuchs and Calvin Sandberg
insisted that the Council insure for the school for $1 million for the night of March 14. The two
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school board members had previously voted against the GPHRC and King being allowed to use
school property.286
Over 1,700 people came to hear King’s speech, “The Other America.” Despite the “brazen”
interruptions and heckling King received, the Council considered the event successful despite the
bill of $2,300 for police protection.287 The Council organized a panel discussion on his speech on
April 9, “in order to preserve the awakened thoughtful feeling that . . . Dr. King has inspired in the
community.” Unfortunately, the event was overshadowed by the assassination of King on April 3,
while he was in Memphis supporting striking sanitation workers. The Council decided the
postpone the event for two weeks. The members of the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council,
like many across the nation and the world, were shaken and shocked by King’s violent death.288
Members of the Council discussed ways of commemorating Dr. King’s life, including publishing
his speech delivered in Grosse Pointe in a commemorative book. They donated $500 to Detroit’s
Department of Parks and Recreation in memoriam.289
By the late 1960s, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council, like many other civil rights
organizations in the United States, was increasingly frustrated with the seemingly slow pace of
change. The night before Dr. King’s assassination, the Council held a board meeting at which a
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member demanded that the organization answer the following question: “Are we going to be a
reactor group only or are we going to initiate action?” The meeting minutes of a board meeting in
October, 1968, succinctly yet eloquently summed up the night’s meeting by reporting that it was
“regretted that the council has been all talk and no action.”290
In 1969, the Council poured its energy into a Fair Housing bill in Grosse Pointe Farms,
which ultimately was defeated, 2,200 to 1,500 votes, after “an exceptionally large turnout for a
spring election.” Despite the loss, the Council noted that there were at least 1,500 residents
welcoming to minority home-buyers.291 In their campaign, the Council was assisted by the Grosse
Pointe Students Council on Racial Equality (SCORE), which took a more direct route to
organizing. Whereas Council members would affix brochures to doorknobs, the students insisted
on ringing doorbells and having discussions on fair housing with the inhabitants then and there.
“There were,” the Council’s Board noted, “some complaints and problems with the police.” 292
Just as the Council was learning to work with more ardent student activists, so they could
not avoid the issue of the war in Vietnam. In 1971, the Grosse Pointe Human Rights Council
connected civil rights with the war in Vietnam. Much like others had done during the previous
wars the US fought in during the 20th century, the GPHRC noted that black soldiers were dying in
Vietnam yet faced discrimination at home. In advertisements in the Grosse Pointe News, the
Council apologized to readers for bringing up dead or maimed black Americans soldiers in
Vietnam. In a slight towards respectability politics, the advertisement asked what a better topic of
conversation would be. “Daylight saving time?” the text demanded. “Municipal boatwells?
Improved snow removal? . . . Meanwhile, back in Viet Nam, Harlem, and Cambodia choices are
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more limited.”293 In addition to the moral case being made over sacrifices of life and limb, the
language also carries an argument about citizenship.
With the new decade of the 1970s, the public statements of the GPHRC contained a new
urgency. Housing continued to be a concern. “The Grosse Pointe real estate complex continues to
be uncooperative,” the Council’s Housing Committee reported in 1971, “and resistive to assuming
its moral obligations to people or its legal obligation to the spirit of the MI Fair Housing Law,
Public Act 112 of 1968.” The Housing Committee continued:
Our business should and must be to break down the relatively unchallenged control which
the real estate complex holds. Real estate firms seldom show blatant discrimination, but,
with few exceptions, engage in subtle tactics aimed at effectively discouraging minority
home-seeks.
The Housing Committee reiterated the need for the Council to accompany home-seekers in order
to “record all interactions, and act as witnesses if necessary.”294
The next couple years did not show much improvement in terms of housing integration, as
far as the Council’s Housing Committee was concerned. Dr. Douglas A. Sargent, the chair of the
Housing Committee in 1973, reported in late September of that year that “It is our opinion that the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 has had little practical impact upon the pattern of minority housing in
Grosse Pointe.” All minorities, the report continued, but especially those of African ancestry, could
find housing in the Grosse Pointe community “by the exercise of great initiative and persistence.”
Such energy and work, the author noted, “would not be necessary for similarly qualified white
buyers.” By qualifying the latter group with “similarly qualified,” Dr. Sargent emphasized that
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discriminatory housing practices in the Pointes were due solely to racial and ethnic prejudice. He
went on, underscoring this point, writing, “the present racial composition of our community is not
accidental, but has come about through long-standing resistance to minority buyers by all parties
involved in real estate transaction,” which included sellers, brokers, and lenders. Sargent
referenced restrictive covenants explicitly, observing that their use “until recent years” had
“created a community pattern which persists until the present day, partly by its own momentum.”
Additional “subterfuges” such as “the infamous Point System, now happily defunct,” had
contributed to patterns of segregation, as did “other covert, restrictive measures, which are still
practiced.” Dr. Sargent concluded by expressing his fear and that of the Housing Committee that
segregation in Grosse Pointe, “this potent, though invisible, barrier,” would continue unless there
was meaningful, vigorous, and sincere action on the part of sellers, lending institutions, and
community leaders to attract minority home-seekers.295
The increasing frustration with the slow pace of change led some members of the Human
Relations Council, such as Reverend Albert A. Fenton, the chair of the Membership Committee in
1971, to rethink how long it would take for integration to take place. “The improvement of the
racial climate of the Pointes,” Rev. Fenton wrote to the members of the Council, “is a process that
will not end in our lifetimes.” Accurately describing the work of organizing for social change as
“long and tedious” and “below the surface and unspectacular,” Rev. Fenton reminded the
membership of the Human Relations Council that “the struggle for human dignity will not be won
by faddists or hobbyists.”296
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Following the 1967 riots, the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council concluded that
desegregation was not merely a matter of signaling welcome to potential home buyers from
minority communities. Rather, they realized that communities such as Grosse Pointe that had
established themselves as hostile to minority groups held little appeal to home buyers from those
groups. Instead, they largely, and understandably, sought their homes elsewhere. Thus the Council
considered how to encourage integration in the Pointes. One idea was to established a public
relations committee, “which would actively sell the Grosse Pointe community to the Negro
community,” as “nowhere has there been a positive program developed with the specific intent of
pointing out to the Negro and other minority groups the positive advantages of residence in Grosse
Pointe.”297 One could imagine that, given its history, the reputation of Grosse Pointe was largely
negative, rather than positive, for many Detroiters. Members of the Council recognized this. One,
for example, wrote to the council president in September of 1967 that “at some point, the Negro
must be enticed with the idea of living in Grosse Pointe.”298
Sally Brown, the chair of the Grosse Pointe Committee for Open Housing, a kindred
organization working for integration that merged with the Human Relations Council in 1969, wrote
a review of their committee’s work between 1966 and 1969.299 She noted the lessons the
Committee had learned from their “experiences over the past three years in accompanying Negroes
as they were seeking homes to buy” in Grosse Pointe. First, Brown wrote that many African
American home-seekers were “genuinely interested” in the good schools, recreational facilities,
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and municipal services that the Pointes had to offer. However, this interest was undermined by the
fact that, “lacking the assurance of an equal opportunity to buy property here, they are reluctant to
commit time and effort to an endeavor that may prove fruitless and, in some instances, involve
experiences which are unpleasant for them.” Second, integration would not be achieved unless
African American real estate brokers were allowed to bring their clients to Grosse Pointe
properties, and, third, those selling property in the Pointes should list their properties with brokers
who supported open housing and who reached African American buyers.300
There was little faith in the brokers in Grosse Pointe who, while they might follow the letter
of the law, would not go out of their way to recruit black home buyers. Part of the problem was
that Grosse Pointe brokers feared that “their business would suffer were they to sell a home to a
Negro and are therefore not eager to do so.” When the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council
had invited members of the Grosse Pointe Real Estate Brokers Association, including Paul Maxon,
to a board meeting on October 3, 1967, the brokers told the Council that it was not up to the brokers
to create open housing in Grosse Pointe, but, rather, the people who lived there. The brokers of
Grosse Pointe, they told the Council, were the “servants of the People.” Besides, they assured the
Council, “the first agent to sell to a non-white would be put out of business.”301
On the other hand, African American brokers had such negative experiences working in
all-white or nearly all-white communities that “they feel it a waste of time and money to bring
clients to Grosse Pointe.” Over three years, Sally Brown wrote, “society has experienced
increasing pressures which encourage division and polarization of the races. Hence, while growing
more difficult to attain, the goal of an integrated community has become vastly more crucial to the
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health of the society as a whole.”302 It was a vicious circle of distrust as far as the brokers were
concerned. Several years later, in April of 1972, the Open Housing Committee of the Grosse Pointe
Human Relations Council attempted to organize a social event that mixed together the members
of the Grosse Pointe Real Estate Board with black realtors in the city. The event was cancelled
after sixty-nine realtors contacted “were not receptive” to the idea.303
Conclusion
Grosse Pointe was surrounded by a potent, though invisible, barrier, as noted by Dr.
Sargent. In metropolitan Detroit, geography was imbued with political and social significance, and
these urban boundaries were vigilantly policed and fervently, sometimes violently, enforced. In a
basic sense, the story of housing is also a matter of labor, as the social tensions over race and
housing in Detroit occurred due to the increasing demand for labor in the burgeoning industrial
behemoth. As African Americans moved to Detroit in the war years, racial tensions grew, and
occasionally grew violent, as shown in the 1943 Detroit riot. Shortly thereafter, in the midst of the
Second World War and in the twilight years of restrictive covenants, the real estate brokers and
property owners of Grosse Pointe organized to systematically protect their community from the
conflicts present elsewhere in the metropolitan area.
The 1949 mayoral election between Edwards and Cobo showed that housing and race were
not minor concerns in postwar Detroit. Slum clearance, public housing, and highway construction
were major issues, and their racial and class component was a part of the conversation. Naturally,
as neighborhoods were targeted as “blight,” it was city residents who had money, clout, and a
voice who could resist such a designation. It was city residents who had neither money, clout, nor
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a voice who were cleared away.304 But by the 1960s, de facto segregation was no longer a routine
phenomenon. The modern Civil Rights Movement stirred consciences. Even in staid, wealthy
Grosse Pointe, citizens organized to dismantle racial segregation and discrimination. Housing was
one of their main concerns, but so too was increasing understanding across racial lines through
education, culture, sports, literature, talking, and meeting people from outside their community.
By the numbers of housing gained or neighborhoods integrated, the Grosse Pointe Human
Relations Council was not successful. The Pointes continue to be largely white and, indeed,
continue to have a reputation for dividing themselves from the city of Detroit, predominantly
African American by the mid-1970s. Why did the GPHRC fail in their aims? They were several
hundred strong. Given that they were Grosse Pointers, many of them held positions of influence:
doctors, lawyers, judges, ministers, businessmen, and their spouses. They had a clear
understanding of the problems of racism and discrimination: that it was multifaceted, and required
not just work in housing but in education, commerce, employment, and many other fields, to fight
against racial prejudice. They consistently were a voice in their community, while they existed,
against segregation and discrimination, even as they provided real and concrete support to minority
home-buyers. They were hurt when Dr. King was killed, and they worried over youth, whether it
be casualties in Vietnam or causalities of a growing heroin epidemic in the city.
Maybe the problem of racial segregation was too large for one organization to take on. Or,
it may be that, much as restrictive covenants required every property in a neighborhood to
participate in order to be effective, so does a truly integrated society require that all neighbors in a
community foreswear prejudice, fear, and distrust of people from other races, ethnicities, religions,
and nations of origin. It might also be that integration will never truly be successful until, in the
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spirit of protecting property values, individuals see themselves as having a financial stake in it,
that integrated communities are an investment worth protecting.

119
CHAPTER 4 THE CITY THAT MIGHT BE: DOXIADIS AND THE URBAN DETROIT
AREA RESEARCH PROJECT, 1965-1970
Dr. Doxiadis smiles when he discusses the common denominator of all cities, whether they be
Detroit or Royal Oak: “They’re build for humans.”
Jerome Aumente305
During a flight from India to the United States in 1963, Walter Cisler, the chair of the
Detroit Edison Company, conceived of the idea behind the Urban Detroit Area study: a forwardlooking and comprehensive study of the metropolitan Detroit area in the year 2000. He talked with
friends of his about this idea, including Clarence B. Hilberry, then-president of Wayne State
University, Jerome P. Cavanaugh, then-mayor of Detroit, and a Greek urban planner named
Constantinos Doxiadis. Doxiadis was internationally prominent, known for designing the capital
city, Islamabad, in the new nation of Pakistan, following the partition of India in 1947. Cisler and
Doxiadis had met each immediately after the Second World War, when both worked for the
reconstruction of Europe, with Cisler on the United States-side of the Marshall Plan and Doxiadis
on that of Greece.306
For Cisler, the motives behind such a comprehensive research project were practical. As
the chair of the board of the area’s electrical provider, Cisler was interested in planning for future
infrastructure needs in the 7,600 square miles served by his firm.307 By the mid-60s, Cisler had
been involved in national and international projects and planning. In 1941 he served on the War
Production Board in Washington and then in Europe, with the Supreme Allied Command, where
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he organized the restoration of electric, gas, and water facilities. During postwar recovery, notably
under the Marshall Plan, Cisler was active in the recovery effort in Europe and Japan. Through the
State Department, he was involved in the development of emerging nations. He had been in India,
for instance, to conduct an energy study for the Indian government. “My endeavors,” he explained
in 1965, “ in helping nations to examine their energy resources and future requirements for
effective economic progress has taught me the importance of approaching such problems in an
orderly way, utilizing the skills of well-versed specialists in gathering the facts, analyzing them,
establishing goalposts and setting realistic goals for the future.”308 Cisler’s interest in a
comprehensive and systematic study of the greater Detroit region’s future infrastructure needs was
a continuation of these postwar experiences planning and executing massive rebuilding efforts.
Doxiadis’s interests tended to the more abstract. He loved cities and understanding cities
and planning cities, and he was the developer of an entire system of thought for understanding
human settlements, which he called ekistics. Through ekistics Doxiadis hoped to move urban
thought into the realm of science more than one of philosophy, but it also hoped to do so in a
resolutely human-centered way. The Urban Detroit Area study was a chance for a deep and wide
application of his urban thinking to one of the largest cities in the United States.
The resulting three-volume study and Doxiadis’s public statements about it are indicative
of how he, as an urban planner, and those who supported him, including Detroit Edison and Wayne
State University, understood the urban crisis and the future of Detroit. As the first two chapters
have shown, Detroit from World War II to the 1960s was an urban area divided by class and race,
where industrial decentralization and racial segregation were powerful social and economic forces
shaping the lives of city residents. During the five-year long Urban Detroit Area research project
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(from 1965 to 1970), planners were faced with an era of urban riots and uprisings, including Detroit
in 1967.309 Remarkably, in his work, Doxiadis avoided discussions of racism, deindustrialization,
and riots. His public comments reveal that he was not unconcerned or unsympathetic to those who
lived with the consequences of racial discrimination and bigotry. Nonetheless, when it came to
analyzing and planning Detroit’s future, such social divisions and tensions were largely absent in
Doxiadis’s work.310
Constantinos A. Doxiadis
The Detroit News in 1967 described Doxiadis as “the world-renowned Greek urban
prophet” and in the Congressional Record by Congressman James H. Scheuer of New York the
year before thus: “His work over five continents in the troubled cities of the world has placed him
in a special pale of eminence – not only in his profession, but among humanitarians of the world.
He has planned better urban environments for over 10 million people, and as provided housing –
mostly low-cost – for over 1 million persons.”311 Even as Doxiadis founded a macro-level theory
of urbanism that combined philosophy with prophecy, he was an accomplished practitioner. He
planned the new capital for the new nation-state of Pakistan, Islamabad. Over twenty-years, he
won over $5 million in grants and contracts from the Ford Foundation. His relationship with the
Ford Foundation was such that Ford staffer and chronicler Louis Winnick characterized this
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monetary flow as “the largest personal award in Foundation history,” even though all the money
was directed towards appropriate nonprofit channels.312
Doxiadis was not without his critics. There were those who saw him and his systems of
ekistics as an urbanist swindler peddling so much snake-oil. Those with more nuanced criticisms
admired his methods, even as they pointed out the blind spots his methods contained. Nonetheless,
even his critics appreciated that Doxiadis was a relentless voice and advocate for addressing issues
and problems of urbanism in the post-war world.
Appropriately enough for someone considered a voice for global urbanism, Doxiadis’s own
life was often shaped by the global forces that shaped the 20th century: wars, revolutions,
reconstruction, migrations. He was born in 1913 in the Greek community in Bulgaria, but his
family fled to Athens after World War I broke out, as the Bulgarians and the Greeks found
themselves on opposing sides during that terrible conflagration. The elder Doxiadis was a
physician. He involved himself in issues of refugees and resettlement following the war, as the
younger Doxiadis would be involved with postwar planning less than three decades later.313
Constantinos Doxiadis attained his first degree in 1935 from the Athens Technical Institute
in architecture-engineering. Afterwards, he went to Berlin for a post-graduate degree from the
Berlin-Charlottenberg Technical Institute, where he received a doctorate in civil engineering in
1937. While in Germany he encountered the urbanist Walter Christaller, who had a large influence
on Doxiadis’s thinking on cities.314
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After his two years in Germany, Doxiadis returned to Greece to become the director of
studies in the town planning office of Athens. He then worked in regional planning. When the
Second World War began, Greece was occupied first by Italy and then by Germany. Doxiadis
joined the military, where he was put in charge of surveying damage from the war at the Ministry
of Public Works. At the same time, he joined the Greek resistance. Acting at the head of a cell, he
passed data he could access through his work to the British intelligence service. This, and his other
activities during the war, resulted in the British awarding Doxiadis a military decoration. It had
the more practical result of establishing his bona fides with the Allied forces.315
With the peace, Doxiadis was became undersecretary and then Director General of the
Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction in Greece from 1945 to 1948. In 1946 he wrote a report
titled Ekistic Analysis. In 1948, he became the Minster-Coordinator of the Greek Recovery
Program—the coordinator of the Marshall Plan in Greece, a crucial position with connections that
later brought Doxiadis to Detroit. According to a Ford Foundation staffer, it was at this point that
Doxiadis gained an international reputation for talent and honesty. He represented Greece at
several international meetings, such as 1945 peace conference in San Francisco and the 1947
United Nation (UN) International Conference on Housing, Planning, and Reconstruction. In 1948,
he was placed as chairman of the UN Working Group on Housing Policies. The following year
saw him as the head of the Greek delegation at the Greco-Italian War Reparation Conference.316
In 1951, however, Doxiadis’s life took a strange turn. He was forced out of office, while
he was hospitalized for ulcers, due to a coup d’etat. He and his family left for Queensland,
Australia, where he was supposed to work in the housing and resettlement of immigrants. The plan
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fell through after the Doxiadis family arrived in Australia, where they became now stranded
without funds, while Constantinos still was experiencing ill-health. The family, in an incongruous
turn of events, took up tomato farming, searching for paper cups thrown out by restaurants in order
to grow seedlings. This misadventure was relatively short-lived for the family, and they made their
way back to Athens in 1953.317
Once there Doxiadis opened his office of consulting engineers, Doxiadis Associates, with
expertise in redevelopment and Marshall Plan administration. The office was successful, growing
to hundreds of employees and branch offices globally, including one in Washington, DC. By 1963,
Doxiadis Associates had projects in forty countries. Doxiadis and his colleagues continued to
develop what they considered the science of human settlement, ekistics; and in 1955 they launched
the journal Ekistics.318 By 1958, Doxiadis founded the Athens Technological Organization (ATO),
a nonprofit institution that housed the Athens Technical Institute, comprised of technical schools
and the Athens Center of Ekistics. The latter included research, graduate training, symposia,
publications, and a library devoted to the field.319
Ekistics
A summary of what Doxiadis meant by ekistics is essential to understanding his approach
to urban planning as it underpins his thinking on all cities, including Detroit.320 The word, as
Doxiadis described to an audience in 1959, came from the Greek noun ekos, or habitat, and the
verb eko, or to settle down, the same root of the words economy and ecology. Thus, “ekistics is the
science of human settlements, which explores the nature, the origin, and the evolution of our
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species. It seeks to establish rules that underwrite the evolution of human settlement and to analyze
and classify all the phenomena surrounding this evolution.”321 Of particular note is that Doxiadis
considered ekistics a field of science, rather than a theory or a philosophy. However, Doxiadis was
always upfront that it was a science in its infancy. “We can ask ourselves what this science of
Ekistics should be,” he informed his 1959 audience in Southampton. “Quite frankly I think it is
too early to outline it in full detail.”322
Nonetheless, such a scientific understanding of human settlements became necessary in the
postwar world, as cities were facing problems that no one, it seemed, had previously encountered
or could solve. Planners had developed responses, ranging including “a new technique in design
or by the use of different scales, or by working on our plans in cooperation with economic and
social planners.” Such responses, Doxiadis argued, were not systematic, but ad hoc, with no set
methodology. Therefore, they were not universally applicable but, instead, were rooted in “mostly
the cities of the Western world and not all of those but really the Western cities after the industrial
revolution.” This was, Doxiadis commented, a very narrow basis for understanding. “A single visit
to new areas under development now will convince us that we do nothing but repeat solutions
which may have been good for Western countries of the post-industrial era but whose application
in the new areas show a complete lack of a scientific approach.”323
There were, as Doxiadis saw it, three fundamental types of urban problems: those that are
eternal, those that are contemporary, and those that will develop in the future. The eternal problems
included economic, social, political, technical and cultural challenges. At first glance this type of
urban problem covers quite a range of territory, but Doxiadis is clearing the ground in order to
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understand how the urban problems of the mid-20th century were different from problems that
confronted cities throughout human history. Elaborating on his typology, a rarity for Doxiadis, he
noted that social problems end up creating economic ones, “because social habit and tradition
affect the supply of economic factors drastically.” In one example, Doxiadis mentioned rural to
urban migration, which resulted in new city residents with rural habits and “the resulting friction
that we see in the forms of slums and blighted areas.”324
The contemporary problems were of a different nature. These were the ones that occupied
Doxiadis’s attention. Contemporary cities faced the problems of machines versus humans, of
increasing discretionary incomes, and new family patterns; or, as he said in an address in Oslo the
following year, “the unprecedented universal increase of population, the introduction of the
machine into our lives, and the gradual socialization of the patterns of living.”325 The fundamental
problem, which was central to his urban vision, was the increasing scale of cities. New
technologies, from building techniques to transportation, meant that cities were built in a new way.
“They can now become much bigger,” argued Doxiadis,
perhaps impossibly bigger, than before; it is also expressed in the new conception about
other dimensions, other elements in the city, like highways, the streets, the squares, such
buildings as garages, etc. But more than anything else, it has affected the psychology of
man, who now feels like a displaced person within his city. He has lost his freedom of
movement, he cannot walk freely, he cannot let his children move around the city because
the machine is there, a constant menace.
It was this psychological impact, according to Doxiadis, that led to the misery of mid-20th century
cities, the pervasive sense of displacement. At its root was the fact that cities were no longer built
for human beings.326
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Eleven years later, in 1970, Doxiadis had a more thorough definition for ekistics, as he
detailed in an article for Science. “Ekistics,” Doxiadis told readers, “starts with the premise that
human settlements are susceptible of systematic investigation.” He once again emphasized that
ekistics was systematic and scientific. He listed the five prescriptive principles that made up the
field. First, human beings desired the maximum amount of contacts with the natural world, with
other people, and with the works of human hands. This, Doxiadis asserted, “amounts to an
operational definition of personal human freedom.” If this is true, then it seemed that Doxiadis
conceived of human freedom, and thus nature, as needing to spread out. Otherwise, humans would
feel “imprisoned” and need to “increase” their contacts with the world around us, which is to say,
to “abandon the Garden of Eden” and seek to “conquer the cosmos.”327
The second principle of ekistics was minimizing of the effort it took for humans to achieve
their “actual and potential contacts.” As we will see shortly, Doxiadis thought often about the
amount of energy it took to navigate urban areas and how it was related to quality of life. Third,
the “optimization of protective space,” by which Doxiadis meant the distance humans could
maintain between themselves and other people, animals, and objects, while also maintaining the
maximum number of contacts (the first principle) “without any kind of sensory or psychological
discomfort.” This protective space began with the clothes humans wore and up to the walls of
houses and the walls built around cities.328
The fourth principle was that humans needed the optimal relationships with the
environment, which included nature, society, “shells” (that is, housing and buildings), and
networks, the latter meaning anything from roads to telecommunications. “This is the principle,”
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Doxiadis explained, “that leads to order, physiological and esthetic, and that influences
architecture and, in many respects, art.” The fifth principle was the optimal synthesis of the
preceding four principles, “dependent on time and space, on actual conditions, and on man’s ability
to create a synthesis.” These principles were based on creating and managing meaningful and
beneficial interactions and relationships. Thus it is no surprise that Doxiadis defined human
settlements as “systems of energy mobilized by man.” Echoing his earlier concern that cities were
dominated by machines and buildings, Doxiadis proposed in a 1970 article that “the answer to this
problem is, I think, a city designed for human development.”329
Doxiadis straddled two views of cities. One was resolutely based on the future, in
predicting where cities will go if conditions remain unchanged and where they had the potential to
go if we acted in the present, for better or for worse. Doxiadis consistently argued for the better as
he saw it. This first view, which we can call his visionary half, was complemented by the second,
which was his wide experience in practice, in urban planning around the world. Often in his writing
and talks he would draw on various examples from projects he had worked on. In an address to
the Oslo Arkitekforening in 1960, Doxiadis drew on examples from Baghdad; Washington, DC;
Philadelphia; Athens; Khartoum, Sudan; Beirut; Caracas, Venezuela; and Karachi, Pakistan. His
interest was in identifying the abstract, universal structures of human settlements that could apply
to all.330
An essential aspect of his urban vision was the belief that cities would only continue to
grow in the future. His view here was intimately tied to the impact of the industrial revolution and
Fordism, although Doxiadis did not use those terms. In 1960, Doxiadis argued, for instance, that
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cities used to be only, at most, several hundred of thousands of people (here he is thinking of
ancient Rome and Constantinople), because more than that “led to a loss of cohesion and identity.”
By the mid-20th century, however, “the machine has made cities of about ten million people quite
possible,” and made increased production and income possible. “The machine” had led to the
Fordist city, as modern technology “has in fact brought large concentrations of people in the same
area by reducing distances, by making possible multi-story structures and by introducing mass
production for large numbers.”331
There was, in Doxiadis’s view, no return from this level of urban concentration. It was
tantamount to a revolutionary moment in urban history, in which city walls were broken and
disregarded. Now, “the modern city is spreading all around endlessly and continuously.” Higher
birth rates and migration from rural areas caused the urban population to expand even more, and
“this added influx of people cause the cities to swell and expand over much larger areas than they
occupy today.” This urban form Doxiadis identified as the Dynapolis, or the dynamic city. 332 By
the mid-1960s, Dynapolis had given way in Doxiadis’s thinking to what he called the universal
city. “This is not imagination,” he cautioned the annual meeting of the National League of Cities
in 1966, “This is a realistic view of the future. Any careful study of the real forces surrounding our
cities shows that within one generation’s time we are going to witness the emergence of a major
continuous systems of metropolises and megalopolises.” By way of illustration, he pointed to the
seemingly emerging conglomeration of Milwaukee to Chicago to Detroit, Toledo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh, an urban area 600 miles long.333
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While the emergence of this universal city was more or less inevitable, the form it would
take depended on choices made in the present. Continuing the ad hoc solutions then being used to
address urban problems, Doxiadis argued, was merely surgery that treated the symptoms but failed
to address the underlying causes. Doing so was to allow cities to decline, while some people
escaped to isolation, “leaving the others to struggle in the downtown areas which manifest the
coming crisis.” Moreover, “present trends” suggested a society that was heading to “an autocratic
system of complex networks, big buildings and fascist administration with the human values
increasingly forgotten.”334 The following year, Doxiadis described the universal city in the
Saturday Review as not the dynapolis, but the ecumenopolis.335
When Doxiadis considered emerging megalopolises, the Detroit metropolitan area was his
main example, likely because of his work there beginning in 1965. His 1968 article, “The
Emerging Great Lakes Megalopolis,” appeared in the Proceedings of the IEEE, the journal of the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Building on the French geographer Jean
Gottman’s 1961 study, Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States,
Doxiadis proposed that the megalopolis developing in the Great Lakes region would surpass that
on the east coast by the end of the century. A megalopolis, importantly, was not a continuous
unbroken cityscape. Rather, it was “characterized by its large size in area and population, its high
regional densities, the inclusion in it of several large centers strongly interacting with each other
and with the surrounding region.” In the Great Lakes region, the potential megalopolis were the
increasingly interconnected metropolitan clusters of Chicago-Milwaukee, Detroit, and ClevelandPittsburgh. As the Great Lakes are shared by the United States and Canada, the Great Lakes
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megalopolis also could extend through Ontario, from Windsor to Hamilton and Toronto, and into
Montreal, Quebec.336
The Urban Detroit Area Research Project
When Walter Cisler brought Constantinos Doxiadis on board to lead the Urban Detroit
Area Research Project, the scale of the project was thus congruent with the latter’s conception of
a megalopolis. Whereas the city proper of Detroit is nearly 139 square miles, and the metropolitan
area is 1,337 square miles, the Urban Detroit Area (UDA) was defined as 23,059 square miles,
stretching from southwest Ontario through southeast Michigan and into northern Ohio. 337 The
large scale of the project did not alter the fact that the city of Detroit was considered the heart of
the region, and therefore received a good proportion of the research project’s attention. Nor did
the large scale of the project mean that it was merely about structural analyses. Doxiadis often
talked about human needs and human suffering, and Cisler himself wrote that he conceived of the
project as more than just one of urban planning. It was intended to be of use to “all who are
concerned with the advancement of human as well as economic values.”338
That contemporary cities had become inhuman was one of Doxiadis’s main concerns.
“Man today had lost the battle for control of his cities,” he began the first volume of the study. “As
a result of this the cities are getting worse with every day that passes and man is more and more at
a loss on what to do about them – he is in great danger of being tamed by the on-going forces
which lead to his sufferings.” Humans were fundamentally confused by their own creations, and
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therefore were unable to adequately address the growing problems of cities.339 Moreover, the
decisions made in the present determine the future. Thus, “we commit ourselves everyday with
thousands of decisions that, unless we provide a system to face the future of Detroit as soon as
possible, will tie us and our descendants with thousands of chains.”340 Elsewhere in the study,
cities are described as being “laid out on an improvised basis,” as “decisions tend to be made on a
sporadic and uncoordinated basis, leading to helter-skelter construction and expansion to meet
only current needs.”341
The UDA Research Project was conceived as a thorough, systematic, and orderly
investigation of the entire Detroit region, the whole urban system rather than an isolated part. It
was not just concerned with five or ten years down the road. The year 2000 was chosen as a target,
partly for symbolic reasons (to “fire the imagination of the people”), but also because it would be
a generation ahead. It was long enough for fundamental change to occur, yet close enough in the
future to make reasonable assumptions about technological, social, cultural, economic, and
demographic developments.342 The results of the five-year project were made public in three
volumes. The first, released in 1966, was focused on a thorough analysis of existing conditions in
the UDA. The second volume, released in 1967, detailed how all possible future alternative
scenarios were computed and then the millions of projections filtered down into the one most
optimal future scenario. Finally, the third volume, released in 1970, elaborated on the optimal
future alternative and how the UDA could move towards that optimal future. Coming after 1967,
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the third volume changed its arguments and emphases slightly, with a new focus on racial
segregation as requiring at least minimal attention.
The first volume described itself as “concerned primarily with an analysis of existing
ekistic conditions,” and it truly was that.343 Beginning with North America as a whole, the volume
addressed matters of geology, climate, water supplies, vegetation, population, economics,
agriculture, mining, energy, manufacturing, and transportation.344 Its focus was then directed
towards what is identified as the emerging Great Lakes Megalopolis. The term refers, not to a
continuously build-up area, but rather clusters of urban and metropolitan areas with interconnected
functions – in this case, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland/Pittsburgh. Ten such megalopolises were
identified as forming around the world, and the volume “anticipated that one of the more important
of these will develop in the Great Lakes area of the United States.” Consequently, great attention
was paid to income distribution, employment, and transportation networks.345 An overview of the
Great Lakes Area was also provided, defined as Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indian, Ohio,
Ontario, and parts of Pennsylvania and New York. Much like the section on North America in its
entirety, the volume detailed the geography, climate, water supply, natural features, socioeconomic features, transportation, and economic base of the region. Of particular note was the
prominence of manufacturing in the region. The Detroit area especially was dependent on the
manufacture of automobiles and other durable goods. Consequently, “the recent trend of
decentralization in the automotive industry has had a marked effect” in the area.346
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Only after these preliminaries did the volume address the Urban Detroit Area specifically.
Arguing that an urban center transcended municipal borders and other visible boundaries due to
its “large, complex, dynamic and influential” nature, the UDA was defined in generous terms. It
extended 100 miles to the northwest, 100 to the north, 100 to the west (where it reached Chicago’s
sphere of influence), 100 miles to the southwest (approaching Cincinnati’s sphere), 75 to the
southeast (approaching Cleveland), and 75 mile to the east, into Canada. Thus it incorporated 25
counties in Michigan, 9 in northern Ohio, 3 in Ontario, with a total area of 25,059 square miles.
Within the UDA was the metropolitan Detroit area, defined by the six counties of Wayne, Oakland,
Macomb, St. Clair, Washtenaw, and Monroe, which together contained 52.9% of Michigan’s
population.347
In examining the economic base of the UDA, the research project judged that it had not
capitalized on its “inherent advantages.” With the Great Lakes and the proximity to Canada, one
would have expected the UDA to have become a center of US-Canadian trade and the gateway for
international trade for “the entire north central region of the United States.” However, for “what
seems to have been accidental” reasons, the UDA instead became the heart of automotive
manufacturing worldwide.348 The overinvestment in automotive manufacturing was “a mixed
blessing,” especially considering, as the research project stressed many times, the automotive
industry was decentralizing and moving away from Detroit. “Since the 1950s,” the study
explained, “Detroit has been passing through a critical phase in its economic history. Several
postwar developments, primarily a trend toward the decentralization of the automobile industry,
have weakened the employment potential and caused some migration from the area.”349
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In addition to decentralization, the postwar loss of defense contracts, increased automation,
and the 1958 recession all took their toll on the automotive industry in the Urban Detroit Area.
While in 1950 the UDA, including northern Ohio, accounted for 55% of all automotive
employment in the United States, by 1960 it had dropped to 44%. Over those ten years, 97,000
automotive jobs were lost in the Michigan and Ohio sections of the UDA. While a record-breaking
demand for automobiles began in 1960, automotive employment in the UDA from 1960 to 1964
dropped almost as much as it had in the 1950s in the UDA, by 93,000 jobs. While the automotive
industry had accounted for 53% of manufacturing employment in the UDA in 1950, it had fallen
to 33% in 1964. As if to emphasize how drastic of a change this was, a footnote was added that
simply noted that the number of lost jobs was “certainly high for a period when the automotive
industry has been experiencing record years in production and sales.”350
In the central region of the UDA, which was defined as the tri-country area of Wayne,
Oakland, and Macomb, the numbers were more severe. The amount of automotive employment in
these three counties relative to the UDA overall fell from 71% in 1950 to 66% in 1960 and finally
to 56% in 1964. The percentage of automotive employment relative to total manufacturing
employment showed a similar downward shift in the central UDA from 60% to 46% to 33% in the
same period. A drastic shift in employment, this downward movement was notable as the UDA,
especially in Michigan, had grown earlier in the century largely due to the growth of the
automotive industry. It had provided good-paying jobs, which in turned “attracted new residents,
mainly semi-skilled and unskilled workers from other parts of the nation and the world.” 351
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The loss of those jobs had a significant impact on the metropolitan area. While skilled
workers could still earn high wages, the decentralization of the industry led to a loss of stability
and security for those working in it. Semi- and unskilled workers were affected, as were
professionals whose employment was altered or threatened the changing nature of the automotive
industry. The future shape of the UDA thus depended on “the extent of further decentralization,”
as well as economic diversification, a more balanced distribution of economic activity throughout
the area, as well as “higher levels of training and education attainment.” Unless businesses
diversified and educational capacity was expanded, the “structural weaknesses of the UDA
economy,” and the resulting “disadvantageous conditions,” would continue to become apparent.352
Nor were economic concerns the only ones confronting the UDA. Commercial
decentralization, from the downtown business district to suburban shopping centers, posed
problems, as did the state of transportation networks throughout the area. Indeed, as the latter
volumes of the study demonstrated, transportation networks were crucial to Doxiadis’s
understanding of urban systems. “Transportation networks are of great importance to ekistic
evolution,” he asserted. “They are the arteries that nourish the cells. Their efficiency or inadequacy
determines the pattern of movement and the distribution of the various forms of urban
development.”353 Additionally, “the transformation of the United States from an urban to a
metropolitan nation has come about quickly” and created a situation of governmental and
administrative fragmentation. In the six counties constituting the metropolitan Detroit area, there
were 221 separate and independent governments, including the 6 counties, 67 cities, 39 villages,
109 townships, and an additional 18 special districts. School districts were not included in these
numbers. For the UDA overall, there were 1,112 governments. As industry and commercial
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activities decentralized from urban centers, so too had local governments decentralized. 354 This
first volume study, however, said nothing about racial segregation in the UDA.
Doxiadis’s divorcing of the condition of urban spaces from those who inhabited is
demonstrated in his 1966 testimony in front of a Senate hearing on the role of the federal
government in urban affairs. “Our cities are weaker than in the past,” Doxiadis informed the
committee, chaired by John L. McClellan of Arkansas and members which included Robert
Kennedy and Edmund Muskie of Maine. “They are gradually becoming irrational […] They are
shapeless, and ugly; the parking lot has come to replace public gardens and squares.” Given that
his testimony came after the Urban Detroit Area research study was already underway, and the
first volume published, many of Doxiadis’s examples came from Detroit. Nevertheless, in
discussing the “holes and pits in the urban tissue,” and those who fall into them, he stated, “we
notice their color, their race, or their religion, and we connect the problems with these causes,
when the real cause is the fact that we have allowed our cities to develop such pits in the first
place.”355
Doxiadis continued by noting that those who fall into the “pits in the urban tissue” were
“the weakest economic groups” and that “this problem is connected with social and racial
problems.” Yet, the problem was not the social and racial problems, but “getting rid of these pits,”
which demanded that “we reverse our thinking.” Part of that reversal of thought involved shifting
resources away from cities, to create new settlements that could relieve the pressure from inner
cities. Not doing so in a planned and thoughtful manner meant that it was done in a haphazard
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manner, which had led to “the escape into the suburbs and new towns conceived not as parts of a
whole settlement but as isolated units for a certain economic, social, or racial group.”356
Doxiadis told the Senate committee that addressing urban problems required immediate
action, as it took decades to change urban trends. He brought up the patterns in Detroit as evidence,
informing the senators that “study of the changing patters of land in farms around Detroit has
demonstrated that many urban decisions have been taken by private people, industry, and
authorities many years before actual construction started.”357 The solution proposed by Doxiadis
was not the avoidance of cities, but embracing them, on a grand scale. The Ecumenopolis was
unavoidable, so “our real challenge, if we are to create a better way of living, is not to avoid the
universal city, but to make life in it human.” At stake was not just the quality of urban life. “If we
do not achieve this in time,” Doxiadis warned, “then the present crisis will lead to disaster for man,
to an inhuman, undemocratic society.” Decentralization was an illusion, as new settlements still
existed in relation to city centers, and therefore continued to add pressure to these suffering
areas.358
At this point in Doxiadis’s testimony, Robert Kennedy jumped in. “Could I just interrupt,”
the senator inquired. “I know it is wrong of me, but I don’t understand some of this.” Kennedy
asked if Doxiadis could use an example, such as from Detroit. “Yes,” the planner responded, “the
city of Detroit now receives in its downtown area pressures of 7 million people who live within
the city and within the broadest urban area.” All of them, even those in the broadest area, ultimately
depended on Detroit’s downtown, and thus exerted pressure to various degrees on it. By the year
2000, Doxiadis predicted that 7 to 8 million more people would join the existing population in
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exerting pressure on the center of Detroit. “If we continue these policies,” Doxiadis added, “we
will kill our cities.” The solution was a twin urban center, to relieve that added pressure.
To this, Kennedy asked if suburbanization did not already provide this release function.
Yet, despite suburbs, “the core city is disintegrating because industry is not coming in there and
new buildings are not being constructed there. They are rather moving to the suburbs […] where
there is more wealth.” Doxiadis agreed that this was the case, but did not match quite what he was
proposing, as those suburbs still relied on urban centers where companies, banks, and “all the
services” where located.359 Here Kennedy launched his main critique: namely, if suburbs were
shaped by class and racial exclusion, what would stop the same tendencies from shaping the new
twin urban centers Doxiadis was proposing? Those with financial resources, and the taxes they
paid, were moving out of city centers, “and the people who are moving into the city are the poorest
of our population; namely, the Negro, so that the result is that the whole area becomes more and
more stagnant.”360
“How are you going to deal with this?” Kennedy demanded of Doxiadis. How, Kennedy
continued, did establishing a new city in the state of New York a hundred miles away from New
York and housing General Motor’s new headquarters help those in New York City who were
struggling with employment, struggling with hope, “and are gradually being strangled to death
themselves? I speak of the ghetto areas of the city.” Doxiadis, not to put too fine a point on it,
dodged Kennedy’s question. He said that the senator was right, adding vaguely that “unless we
look at the whole system of cities we cannot solve any of their problems.” Kennedy offered some
of his ideas on urban renewal, which centered on “trying to bring private enterprise into the ghetto
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area,” arguing that that was “in the last analysis, going to be the only solution for the city.” “The
private enterprise system” was, the senator added, “what has made this country as successful as it
has been.” Doxiadis merely responded that all available resources should be used, but that there
were parts of the city where “there is not hope of any profit.” In those areas, one could not rely on
private enterprise, but rather “the Government must sacrifice funds to save the people and to save
the whole structure.”361 Doxiadis ended his comments by remarking that “The Demonstration
Cities Projects,” which would become the Model Cities program, “have great meaning, I think, if
properly carried out.” They only addressed parts of the city, however, and Doxiadis encouraged
his listeners to consider how to help the whole urban region. “It is imperative for us to understand
this.”362
After delivering his prepared comments, the committee members asked the urban planner
a number of questions. “To be fair and honest and realistic with ourselves,” Senator Abraham
Ribicoff, of Connecticut, prefaced his question, “the American city has been complicated by the
fact that there has been a great influx of Negroes, and an exodus of whites.” Was this, he inquired
of Doxiadis, “a basically different problem physically, socially, economically, and
psychologically” than that faced in the slums of Rome, London, and Paris. Doxiadis conceded that
it was, “but only in a tertiary way,” as “it is not the color that creates the problems but the great
difference in incomes.” In this answer, Doxiadis was thinking in global terms, including his work
in Africa and the Middle East. The true problem was that cities allow areas to develop that are like
“open sores” and into which “the weakest economic groups flow,” to which “we have the racial
problem added as a new dimension.” “I would say,” Doxiadis answered further, “certainly that
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where we have racial differences, the problem is more aggravated, because you see the difference,
where in other areas you cannot.”363
Senator Ribicoff followed up with a question about industrial decentralization, especially
in the context of Doxiadis’s plan to create new urban centers. “The Negro and the poorer groups,”
Ribicoff observed, “who don’t have automobiles and don’t have means of public transportation,
live in the core city,” and thus trying to travel to “a job of the most menial task or type” might take
hours. ‘Now what,” the senator asked, “do we do in the interim in finding employment or work for
the people in the core cities, when industry is making an exodus into the suburbs at the present
time?” Acknowledging the difficulty of the problem, Doxiadis repeated that the solution required
examining “the urban structure as a whole, as a system.” A program that created 50,000 new jobs
might not accomplish much if you have a million people “belonging only to the weakes social,
racial, and economic groups in the center of the city,” and that population continues to grow year
after year. To grasp the ever-evolving dynamics of cities, Doxiadis urged the senators, “unless we
understand that we are entering a new era beyond the era of the cities, into the era of the universal
city formed by a system of cities, we will be wrong in our action.”364
When Ribicoff fretted that too much federal money was being poured into urban areas,
Kennedy jumped back in with the observation that it was “absolutely essential that the free
enterprise system [. . ] take a role in the future of the city.” Doxiaids responded that it was not clear
“exactly what and how” urban areas were changing and operating around the world, and therefore
businesses distrusted old urban centers, before reiterating that he considered the main challenges
as related to increasing populations and increasing pressures inside the central cities. To this,
Kennedy rejoined, “I emphasize that the fact that the cities are in such financial difficulty at the
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present, largely due to the great influx of lower income people and the outflow of the middle-class
white into the suburbs.”365
Here Kennedy entered into a prolonged statement on the need to “rebuild those areas, and
make it attractive for industry to come into that area.” He mused that “our philosophy in the past
has been mistaken,” and lamented the lack of results by welfare payments, public housing, and job
training. The latter, he added, “train[ed] people for jobs that are not available in the ghetto, so that
if they get trained they move out of the ghetto into other areas, and if they don’t get trained, they
stay there and go on welfare.” If the federal government continued its current policies, Kennedy
concluded, which he characterized as pouring funds into cities, “we are going to get so far into the
depth of a cavern that we will just never be able to extricate ourselves.” Again, Doxiadis repeated
the need to understand the urban system as a whole, avoiding Kennedy’s remarks directed towards
welfare and political philosophy, and instead, in line with his overall approach, Doxiadis
consistently circled back to this key point.366
The second volume, published the following year, aimed to comprehensively examine the
possible futures of the UDA: “the alternative solutions that were studied, classified, evaluated and
selected for projections to the year 2000,” while reiterating the research project’s focus on human
values, “man’s happiness and safety,” as well as economic ones. Qualifying their proposals with a
disclaimer that it was the start of a process, and not a “definite and final solution,” the research
project hoped to start a conversation on methodology and applications not just for the Detroit area,
but “cities throughout the world.”367
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With a mathematical formula never made explicit to readers, Doxiadis’s basic equation
combined five elements (nature, man, society, shells (buildings), and networks) with five
perspectives (economic, social, political, technological, and cultural) for a possible maximum of
33,554,431 combinations.368 Given this number of possible alternative developments for an urban
system, the research project developed the IDEA method – the Isolation of Dimension and
Elimination of Alternatives – to evaluate and screen out “weaker” alternatives according to an
established criteria. The study, however, acknowledged that this method required “a great number
of assumptions for the future” and that, if the assumptions did not materialize, then the outcomes
would be different.369
From a purely Doxiadian perspective, the project argued that there was no goal for a city
better than that Aristotle declared: happiness and safety. To reach this, the five elements of nature,
man, society, shells, and networks were broken down. The resulting goals revolved around the
preservation of natural resources, population densities, and networks that provided for the
maximum of human needs with the minimum of disturbances.370 Before detailing the alternatives,
the volume briefly reiterated the specific history of the Detroit area. “It is worthwhile,” the
researchers wrote, “to look into the problems which the exceptional and unique development of
the automotive industry has created for Detroit.” Despite being the automotive capital of the world,
and the automotive industry being responsible for the city’s population and income growth, the
reliance on a single industry had created challenges for the area. The automotive industry’s
domination of the area’s financial and labor resources, to name just one obstacle, “resulted in the
atrophic development of the other sectors of activity, particularly services.”371
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Furthermore, the dominance of automotive manufacturing shaped the city itself. It led to
an influx of blue-collar workers and did not attract service and professional workers to the same
degree. Manufacturing centered near Detroit, giving the city an industrial environment “with
limited service facilities and unattractive housing.” The city grew low and horizontally, with parts
of the city so far from the downtown that services could not be administered efficiently. With the
advent of suburbanization, residents with high and middle incomes left the city. Those left behind
had lower incomes and fewer employment opportunities. The result was that parts of the city
became overcrowded, and others “fell into disrepair and deteriorated into slum areas.” 372 The
project rarely mentioned racial segregation and that, principally, after the 1967 riots in Detroit.
Even then there was not sufficiently critical analysis of the forces that concentrated city residents
in over-priced, aging housing while simultaneously denying them credit or well-paid jobs. While
the study occasionally attempted to address the creation of inner-city slums, it often only touched
on how these changes occurred, but not why.
Similarly, the study notes that, out of 43,060 acres of land in the city of Detroit, 4,018, or
roughly 10%, were considered blighted. These, readers were told, corresponded to the housing
stock in the city that was built before 1930. Moreover, the volume quotes a Detroit City Plan
Commission report that these areas “fail to qualify for conventional or governmentally insured
mortgages.” No explanation was provided for these phenomena, nor was racial segregation and
discrimination mentioned. Thus the volume danced around the mechanisms that created racial
segregation in cities, as detailed in our first chapter, in which African Americans were concentrated
in aging housing stock in inner cities and denied access to credit. Instead, the research project
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casually and unqualifiedly commented that “when an American family feels it can afford a better
house, it moves to a better neighborhood.”373
Returning to the millions of possible alternative futures for the UDA, the volume then
further explained the IDEA method, in which fifty million alternatives were developed and then
each put through eight rounds of elimination. The progressive rounds of elimination narrowed the
field of urban futures to 11,000, then 300, followed by 28. The addition of further criteria raised
this number back up to 40 and then narrowed it to a final round of the top seven optimum futures
for the area. The final round of elimination, however, Doxiadis noted, “requires very detailed
investigation.” In one of Doxiadis’s characteristic asides, he assured the reader that “past, present,
and future are connected to form a meaningful whole by which ‘the future takes shape on the
merits of the past,’” recalling to the reader “what was written thousands of years ago in the palace
of Priam of Troy.”374
One of the most novel and distinctive proposals of the UDA research project was then
introduced: a twin urban center to complement downtown Detroit. The idea arose out of Doxiadis’s
conviction that urban renewal was merely surgical, addressing symptoms but not causes. Indeed,
“the possibility of relieving the existing center has proved completely wrong.” Whether planned
or occurring naturally, “in both cases it has failed to save the downtown area from pressures.”
Thus, the creation of a new urban center of “equal or higher order” to Detroit in the UDA would
help relieve the pressures weighing down on the old urban center. Nine possible locations were
considered for such a center, including Bay City, Flint, Toledo, and Port Huron.375
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Such a twin urban center would be supported by the expanding manufacturing economy in
the UDA as, in a unexplained reversal from the first volume, the second assured readers that “all
indications show that the decentralization trend of the automotive industry has just about run its
course.” Even while cautioning that “by the year 2000 radical changes could take place in the
industrial structure of the region,” the research project predicted that manufacturing employment
in the UDA would increase from 950,000 in 1960 to 1,260,000 in 2000. Nonetheless, the project
predicted that the increase in industrial employment would be located completely outside of
Detroit. Half of new industrial employment would be in a secondary industrial center in the UDA
outside of Detroit. “This,” the study explained, “reflects the existing trend of industries to relocated
outside the Detroit region.”376
A set of fourteen criteria, including a breakdown of population between Detroit and the
new proposed twin urban area, were used to further refine the alternative future scenarios generated
by the research project. How the criteria were ranked in this process reflected biases of the research
project. “Scenic attractiveness” was one category of evaluation. It was simply assumed that low
density areas were more attractive than high density areas. Further, “for areas which do not present
attractive features high permissible densities were assumed.” Nevertheless, through this process,
the research project arrived at a final output for the most optimal future for the UDA, known as
Alternative 120. The third and final volume of the project was devoted to describing this alternative
future.377
Before the study could be released, Detroit, like so many other cities in the United States,
experienced an urban disorder rooted in anger and frustration over the continuing racial
segregation and discrimination against African Americans. These cataclysmic events were such

376
377

Doxiadis, Volume 2: Future Alternatives, 160, 189-190.
Doxiadis, Volume 2: Future Alternatives, 238, 241, 261, 264, 303.

147
that, while the first two volumes of the UDA research project never mentioned racial inequality in
urban America, the third volume conceded that racial and economic segregation were forces that
needed to be addressed.
Whether called a riot, an uprising, or a rebellion, the events in Detroit during the long, hot
summer of 1967 have cast a long shadow over the Motor City, 20th century liberalism, and
American race relations. Beginning with a police raid on a blind pig in the early morning hours of
Sunday, July 23, the unrest in Detroit spread from a crowd watching arrests on 12 th Street and
Clairmount Avenue at 4 o’clock in the morning to three thousand throwing bottles and rocks at
only a few hundred police officers.378 By noon, Hubert Locke, the administrative assistant to the
police commissioner, told the latter that police had lost control and that it was a “lost cause.” By
that afternoon looting and arson were reported, and the National Guard had been called to the city.
By the evening, a curfew had been imposed, sniper fire directed towards fire fighters was reported,
and all the city’s gas stations were shut down. At midnight, Michigan Governor George Romney
declared Detroit and nearby communities Highland Park, Ecorse, and River Rouge to be in states
of emergency.379
On Monday Mayor Cavanaugh and Governor Romney asked for the deployment of federal
troops to Detroit, yet a bureaucratic two-step kept the request in limbo for six hours. The US
Attorney General first told Romney that such a request had to be “formally” submitted. When
Romney sent a telegram recommending immediate deployment, the Attorney General responded
that he had to “request” troops, not “recommend” them. When the Deputy Secretary of Defense
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arrived later in the day, he announced that there was “insufficient evidence” that federal troops
were required. By midnight, after two full days of unrest, Hubert Locke described “veteran police
officers” who “were convinced that they were engaged in the worst urban guerilla warfare
witnessed in the United States in the twentieth century.”
Perhaps that siege-mentality explains the indiscriminate use of violence used on the part of
police officers and the National Guard. Brutal and gratuitous violence by police, such as shooting
of three unarmed men and the beating of other residents at the Algiers Motel in the early morning
of Wednesday, July 26, joined together with the reports of snipers, arson, and looting. 380 By
Thursday morning, 1,671 people were being held in custody by Detroit police, and on Friday the
National Guard began to withdraw from the city. Curfews remained in effect over the weekend,
and would only be lifted on the following Tuesday. The National Guard only fully left the city the
following Friday. Over the course of the week, unrest had spread to cover over a hundred square
miles. Two thousand five hundred and nine buildings were damaged, accompanied by a loss of
$36 million in insured property. Over seventeen thousand members of law enforcement were
present in the city, which included the five thousand federal troops deployed by President Johnson
at the request of the governor. Seven thousand two hundred and thirty one people were arrested,
and forty-three died.381
All this occurred in what had been considered the “model city” for race relations in the
United States. “For years,” a Washington Post editorial lamented on July 25, “Detroit has been the
American model of intelligence and courage applied to the governance of a huge industrial city.”382
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Yet, a Kerner Commission staffer later reported that not a single black Detroiter interviewed
reported being happy with conditions in the city before the riot.383 While Detroit was still
smoldering, on July 27, President Johnson announced the creation of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders. While Detroit was considered the worst, over a hundred American
cities experienced riots over the course of the summer of 1967.384 The commission, popularly
called the Kerner Commission after its chair, Illinois Democratic governor Otto Kerner, released
its report in March, 1968. “Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white,” the
report famously concluded, “separate and unequal.” In the course of their investigations into urban
conditions in the United States, the eleven members of the commission “came to feel that America
was in the midst of its greatest domestic crisis since the days of the Civil War,” in the words of
commission member and Oklahoma Democratic senator Fred Harris.385
A Concept for the UDA’s Future Development
The era of urban disorders permeated the third Doxiadis volume in a way it did not in the
first two. The idea of an “urban crisis” had been treated academically, but it became, in the third
volume, a real and threatening presence. “The urban crisis is an universal phenomenon,” the
introduction began, stating that “the situation has reached threatening proportions and is becoming
more menacing every day.” The crisis, the introduction continued, was not just a problem in the
slums. It was not a problem of affordable housing, or systems of transportations, or in the quality
of air and water. It was “a crisis of the whole system.” With those who argued that there was no
crisis or that cities were not dying, the research project responded, “we do not agree simply because
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many cities all over the world continue to deteriorate, and because death has indeed already struck
large or small parts of these cities.”386
This begged the question, however, of what the causes of the urban crisis were. It could
not be that cities had grown too large, as human beings could adequately run large governments,
corporations, and institutions. Nor did too rapid growth seem a satisfactory answer, as human
beings had demonstrated that they could rapidly organize and operate armies, governments, and
corporations. Rather, the research project located the crisis in two forces. The first was that cities
had grown out of balance. The rate of growth of population, energy, and economy did not
correspond with one another. The second was that cities were growing in complexity, but the
physical and institutional structures of cities had not grown to adequately serve that new and
increasing complexity. In the study, the race and class structure of Detroit and its uneven political
development remained an unexplored facet of that complexity.387
In addition to the causes of the crisis, the research project argued, there were four reasons
why humankind was unable to control the crisis. The first was that the conditions of crisis were
addressed via different disciplinary silos, with agents tackling portions of the whole in isolation
from one another, which the research team compared to “refusing to see that man himself is a
single organism which cannot be looked at separately as body or senses or mind.” The second
reason was that researchers and policymakers looked at the crisis in the wrong areas and at the
wrong scale. This in turn was due to a belief that cities were only physically built-up areas or
confined within municipal boundaries. Instead, ekistics defined a city as the “kinetic field” within
which a human can “move within a certain area, within a certain time-span and always within the
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same day.” The third reason was thinking within too narrow of a time-frame—in one, five, or ten
year increments. Instead, the research project suggested seventy years for parts of the city and
double that, 140 to 150 years, for the entire city. The fourth reason was a too narrow conception
of the future. Instead, a four-fold understanding of the future was proposed involving the constant
past, the declining past, the continuing past, and the created future. The most important was the
last, which was “the ability of man to create the future.” Without this, the only possibility was
stagnation.388
The bulk of the third volume was given to elaborating the most optimal future alternative
for the UDA, Alternative 120. Building off the idea of a twin urban center, Alternative 120
proposed, “among other things, a new twin urban center to Detroit on the St. Clair River in the
vicinity of Port Huron, Michigan.” With a projected population of one million, the new city would
be as integrated in the UDA as Detroit was. Further, it would “relieve the pressures now exerted
on Detroit and permit revitalization and remodeling of its suffering and declining areas.” In
addition, the final alternative planned for a continuing population decline in Detroit’s central city.
In reference to out-migration to suburban communities, the third volume concluded, “the shift of
the more affluent economic forces from the city to these communities is the principal phenomenon
having an adverse effect on the city.”389
The third and final research volume warned that, “what it does not present are specialized
aspects of economic, social, racial and institutional problems and ways to solve.” “This research
project,” it continued, “is very concerned with the human settlement as a whole,” but that to
address all problems at all scales was beyond “the capabilities of any group within a reasonable
period of time.” Instead, the project hoped to provide an understanding of “the geographical and

388
389

Doxiadis, Volume 3: A Concept for Future Development, 5-6.
Doxiadis, Volume 3: A Concept for Future Development, iv.

152
functional components” of the overall urban system, which in turn would provide insights into
other problems, whether they “economic, social, racial, political, technological or cultural.”390 This
was a different tone from the first two volumes of the UDA research project. Not only was there a
new need to justify not looking at social problems, the introduction introduced the element of race,
a category absent from the first two volumes. What the third volume did not explicitly mention
was the Detroit riots, but nonetheless the research project articulated “the conviction that Detroit
is faced with a great urban crisis which is becoming more and more acute.”391
The first two volumes, while not explicitly addressing racial inequalities, did discuss
economic inequalities, albeit obliquely. This, too, changed in the third volume. Not only had the
population of the UDA grown from 4.7 million in 1940 to 7.1 million in 1960, but “social and
economic barriers have also developed with the flight of the more privileged sections of the
population to the suburbs.”392 The result was the concentration of the lowest incomes in the central
city. Unlike earlier volumes, the third acknowledged that there were barriers, and not merely
economic ones, that kept certain city residents in the inner city. In keeping with the first two
volumes, the third identified “trends of decentralization” as having “resulted in a sharp decline of
employment in the automobile industry since 1960, a decline which has not been counterbalanced
by non-durable manufacturing activities.” The result was an overall decline in manufacturing
employment, which was “indeed an unusual trend for the economy of UDA.”393 It was a trend that
also underwrote the growing inequality that the volume finally acknowledged.
Nonetheless, while the percentage manufacturing constitute of total employment in the
central region fell from 48% in 1950 to 40% in 1960 and then 39% in 1965, the numbers in the
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central region of Detroit were still higher than those in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. The effects of decentralization and automation, however, were still felt,
even among skilled workers. Between 1963 and 1969, 119 industrial establishments moved out of
the Detroit central city. A growing service sector absorbed some unemployed industrial workers,
but service jobs were located in the suburbs, which were “relatively inaccessible to the lower
income, mainly non-white workers of Detroit.”394 They also required a different skillset, let alone
higher levels of education within social services or clerical work, which was something the study
did not explore. Also unexplored was the growth in female employment or women’s
disproportionate share of public and service sector work. This also had implications for the subject
of the research project.395
Besides unequal access to outlying metropolitan areas, one of the problems of
decentralization, whether it was industrial, commercial, or residential, was that it meant more
energy had to be expended to navigate the metropolis. “Confusion begins,” the study reported,
“when there are too many automobiles and industrial plants, resulting in a revolutionary increase
in energy available to people as a community and as individuals. They spread their installations
far out and create confused patterns in the countryside and within the urban areas.” This related
back to the increasing complexity of urban systems that was beyond the control or understanding
of those who had build them or lived in them. Regardless, “these problems have not arisen by
chance; they are the result of forces at work over long periods of time.”396 And yet, automobiles
and transportation infrastructure explained how cities became decentralized, but not why.
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The history of the Detroit presented by the research project underscored this point. The
moment that city became the automotive capital of the world, between 1910 and 1930, also
contained the seeds of the outmigration of the well-off population. By the 1920, the movement of
high-income residents to suburbs such as the Grosse Pointes, Birmingham, Bloomfield Hills, and
Dearborn “assumed the dimension of an exodus.”397 This outward movement was counteracted by
immigration from Europe and upward migration from the South, with the latter becoming
increasing more important over the decades. In 1910, European immigrants in the central city
outnumbered nonwhite migrants from the south four to one, although the ratio evened out between
1920 and 1930 and reversed by World War II. With this demographic shift, the research project
noted, matter-of-factly, the total income of the central city declined. It gave no explanation why
the incomes of black southerners would be lower than European immigrants in the same central
urban area. At the same time, commercial and service activities began leaving the central city, as
well.398
Between 1950 and 1960, this outward migration reached the automotive industry, which
“began decentralizing its operations to new locations, some even outside UDA.” The nail in the
coffin, so to speak, was the construction of the highways, which “became the channels of
decentralization while at the same time they completely broke up the physical structure of the
central area.” Middle-income city residents also moved away, so that the central city became the
largely the residence of “the lowest income groups of non-whites.” This was, the study remarked,
“the most characteristic phenomenon of the 1950-1960 phase.” With the loss of income came “the
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creation of numerous social problems in the ghettoes.” In the following decade, “per capita income
of residents will drop even further and the area will acquire all the characteristics of a ghetto.” This
section marked the only time the central city was described using that term in all three volumes.399
As if afraid that too much attention was being paid to social issues at the expense of the
abstract, structural focal points of ekistics, the volume at several moments repeated its caution that
it and the research project as a whole could not adequately address all the sundry specific
challenges facing urban systems. “There are urgent problems,” the volume conceded, “such as
human relations, poverty, social welfare, etc. These are grave problems which must receive
immediate, substantial and continuing attention. They are not, however,” the volume continued,
“directly caused by the city nor is their solution intrinsically related to the overall structural
problems of the city. Thus they are dealt with only indirectly in this volume.” For the research
project, their proposed improvements to the urban system were designed to help alleviate and
contribute to solving all these other problems.400
Still, the research project drew a distinction between “human problems” and “urban
problems,” and lamented the “confusion” that blurred the two together. “Man looks at the suffering
of people in the cities,” the study sought to explain, “and speaks of their problems as urban ones.”
But these so-called urban ills were not necessarily urban in nature. Rather, they were the results of
low incomes, and “if the same people, of very low incomes, lived in the countryside, they would
be faced with the same problems, perhaps even greater ones.” Perhaps that would be true of some
city residents, but it entirely ignored – if , indeed, the authors were aware of – the economic and
legal structures of segregation under which black city residents were charged exorbitant rents for
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dilapidated and overcrowded housing, because they could not, were not allowed to, find housing
elsewhere, regardless of income. This segregation led to other ills, such as the epidemic of rat bites
among children in the inner cities, which was also the focus of a public health campaign by
President Johnson in cities nationwide. One imagines they might have been, on the contrary, better
off in the countryside after all.
Thus the inability to see the workings of racial segregation in urban areas, rooted in a belief
that it was more or less natural, worked against the best intentions of those who sought to address
the urban crisis. If one accepts that nonwhite city residents naturally had lower incomes, then it
follows that they would have lower quality housing, and that naturally they would concentrate in
the same inner city communities, either out of preference or out of economic necessity. Yet such
a belief that it was natural for nonwhites to earn lower incomes or that they would naturally
segregate suggests an underlying racial bias that shaped the entire study. This is not to say that the
UDA research project or other planners and policy creator thought segregation was desirable.
Often, the opposite was the case. Rather, it is to underline that they did not understand the origins
of segregation, and they were willing to allow assumptions and even prejudices guide how they
approached it.401
The research project acknowledged that these problems existed but then explained why
their study did not specifically address them. They were not “concerned with all problems here,
but primarily with those which cause people to suffer because of the urban system in which they
are living.” This was a point that Doxiadis made several times, such as when he gave testimony in
Congress regarding the problems facing American cities in the late 1960s. When explicitly asked
about certain problems, like segregation, he agreed that they should be addressed, but his
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understanding of cities encompassed a more abstract, structural view of the urban system. He was
more interested in the relationship between population densities and transportation networks,
which he saw as being unique to the urban system and not to other more general problems. Racism
and other social ills, on other hand, might be manifested in cities, but they were not of the city, and
occurred independent of cities as well. This assumed, however, that all racism was the same, and
that there was nothing particular and nor any unique forms or variants of racial inequality, some
of which, I would argue, are specific to urban systems. Further, Doxiadis argued that cities were
created by humans, yet somehow he believed that they were immune to the biases and prejudices
of their human creators; that is, that cities were purer forms than societies or politics.
Nonetheless, there was a new-found sensitivity to racial inequality in the third volume. In
discussing the demographics of Detroit, the volume included maps with the distribution of
population according to race; and it noted that the nonwhite population of the central region of
Detroit in 1960 was three times as large as that in 1940. In actual numbers, the non-white
population increased from 155,000 in 1940 to 495,000 in 1960. Of this population, 87.3% was
concentrated in the central city, and 76.2% in what the research project identified as the critical
area. Within the critical area, the non-white population had increased from 12.5% in 1940 to 53.1%
in 1960, while the corresponding numbers for the central region overall were 8.9% and 28.4%,
respectively. Furthermore, the per capita incomes of non-white residents in the critical area were
roughly 60% of their white neighbors, or $935 and $1500 respectively. Areas of the city that were
predominantly nonwhite were, the project concluded, “not only spreading but intensifying.” At the
same time, some areas had a non-white population that had declined between 1950 and 1960,
“largely as a result of land clearance and urban renewal.” 402 Despite this discussion of racial
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demographics in Detroit, no explanation was offered for why the non-white population was
distributed in this way, nor why non-white communities were targeted for land clearance and urban
renewal.
The increased focus on racial inequalities in the city led the research project to comment
that “one of the greatest problems in all American cities today is segregation and the growing
conflict among racial groups.” The analysis continued, in seeming contradiction to the basic
contours of American history, as well as those of Detroit, by explaining that racial conflict was
growing as “the inhabitants of large settlements today have many more contacts with other people
and consequently encounter more differences and potential conflicts.” Segregation was the tool by
which city residents avoided “contacts they do not like.” While it might start out informally,
segregation became more rigid over time. With the construction of highways in Detroit, “social
segregation has become a much more critical problem because these physical structures break up
the unity of the city.” The social prejudices of the city were manifested in concrete.
To argue that racial conflicts were growing in urban areas during the 1960s due to city
residents confronting each other’s differences for, presumably, the first time, is to misunderstand
urban racial inequalities on two fronts. On the one hand, it is to identify racial frustration as the
result of personal, or interpersonal, bigotry and prejudice. To suggest that African American
Detroiters in the 1960s felt frustrated by the differences between themselves and their white
neighbors, rather than the systematic and pervasive practices of segregation and discrimination, is
to minimize and dismiss the desire for civil rights in northern cities. On the other hand, it also
fundamentally misunderstands, or is willingly blind to, the history of slavery, the Civil War and
Reconstruction, Jim Crow and lynching throughout the United States, or Detroit’s own history of
conflicts over housing or the 1943 riot.
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This analysis also put forward to an idealized answer to those conflicts. The study
comments that an imbalanced racial distribution of the population “intensifies the overall problem
and leads to a lack of communication and understanding among social groups,” suggesting that
the problem is just a failure of communication and not of power and profit. Similarly, the research
project warned that the task of addressing racial segregation was “extremely difficult” and needed
to be “pursued with caution and patience.” The upmost consideration was to be given to “the
reduction of conflicts” and the “improvement of communication and understanding among social
groups,” as if the demand for desegregation, in 1970, was too much, too soon. The implication
was that the conflict was the fault of those asking for, or frustrated by the lack of, change.403
Running through discussions of race in the UDA research study was the underlying belief
that it was not so much a problem of racial inequality that caused urban disorder as it was economic
inequality and lack of economic opportunity. While encouraging the improvement of
communication and understanding between social groups, the research project assured readers that
“as the economic condition of the less privileged groups improve and the economic gap is reduced,
social taboos may have less relevance in the future.”404 In a similar vein, elsewhere the authors
argued that not all city residents had the same ability to choose what contacts they wish to make,
but “this is not due to racial discrimination alone but also to economic discrimination.”405
Conclusion
The Urban Detroit Area research project was one of Doxiadis last projects. He passed away
in 1975, five years after the third volume was published, from ALS, or Lou Gehrig’s disease, after
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a three-year fight. He was in his early sixties.406 Nonetheless, the UDA research project stands as
a testament of his love and concern for the future of cities and the system of ekistics he developed
to explain and plan them. The critiques forwarded in this chapter should not overshadow his
considerable understanding of the macro-processes governing urban systems, nor his openness to
the possibilities of the future. Driverless cars, underground highways, high-speed trains, and
factories contained within mountains were ideas that excited him. He believed they pointed the
way to future cities that were vitally designed for human life and health.
The point is not that Doxiadis and the UDA research team got some things wrong. The
point, rather, is that to someone with as much experience and knowledge as Doxiadis, how race
and class operated as divisions and boundaries within the metropolitan area were not seen as
important as the city was concerned. In other words, classism and racism were not spatialized.
They happened, but they happened anywhere; and so they just happened to also happen in the city.
As the first two chapter argued, this was not an objective view, but thoroughly subjective. For
those discriminated against, segregation occurred in specific spaces. For those who enforced
segregation, it, too, occurred in a specific space. Similarly, for the workers at the River Rouge
complex, their jobs and communities were rooted in particular spaces, and, in fact, those jobs
helped create and constitute their communities. To say that racial and class inequalities occurred
outside of space, or independent of geography, is to reveal a worldview in which those inequalities
are, while intellectually recognized, nonetheless unexperienced and unacknowledged.
The UDA research project did not ask what the human causes, or political forces, were that
created conditions of inequality in cities. Rather, the inequalities are accepted in and of themselves.
Thus, while decentralization was a problem facing Detroit, it was not questioned at any point why
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residents and businesses and industries were decentralizing. That automobiles and highways
allowed people to move further away from downtowns did not mean that they necessarily would
do so or even would want to do so. Perhaps these human causes were legitimately thought to be
irrelevant, but it might be because the study was funded by a major regional business. Such a
discussion might have been deemed inappropriate or too controversial given the context. Or,
perhaps, it was taken for granted that readers would know the context of racial and class tension
in the city–that it was an open secret that did not need to be explicitly referenced.
One reason social ills fit uneasily within Doxiadis’s framework was the result of scale. The
smallest scale used in the UDA research project was 4-6 square miles.407 Using the concept of
ekistics, Doxiadis took a large regional perspective, and the details could only be so finely-grained.
The UDA research project freely admitted that they had made a certain set of assumptions and that
these assumptions might be wrong. If they were, then the results for the UDA would be different
than they had forecast. Additionally, the research project straddled the line between trying to accept
how people wanted to live with what would be the optimal scenario. Given that people wanted to
live outside of Detroit, Doxiadis proposed a twin urban center for them. Given the tendency
towards decentralization in so many facets of urban life, building another entire city does not
intuitively seem a desirable or achievable goal. Yet, one could argue that Doxiadis fully accepted
the premise of decentralization and suburbanization – that people no longer wanted to live in
Detroit – and formulated a solution that was still predicated on being connected to an urban system.
In any case, it was not for the existing city residents who lived in Detroit that the UDA
research project planned for in the 1960s. Rather, they planned for imagined residents in an
imagined city.408 The goal was not how to improve life for the real residents, but how to attract the
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kind of city residents – high-income, white – whom the planners saw as desirable and valuable to
the future prosperity of the city. Even as problems of inequality and barriers were identified, there
was an inability to confront why those problems existed.
While the UDA research project was invested in the Detroit region and paid close attention
to its dynamics, they nonetheless understood Detroit to be a case study, as a stand-in for other
cities facing similar problems. In a way, this further explained the lack of interest in the experiences
of city residents or those who had to navigate the city on daily basis. What was of interest was the
built environment, transportation networks, and people in the aggregate, as data or sociological
phenomena. What is singularly lacking in the three volumes of the UDA research project was
people, certainly as seen or understood as individual human beings, an ironic turn given that
Doxiadis emphasized the need for a human city. Planners, policy makers, and politicians were and
are able to ignore existing city residents, and what they are living through and experience, because,
in a sense, they did not and do not exist for them. If they do, it is as a problem to be solved.
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CHAPTER 5 FROM DETROIT TO WASHINGTON: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO
THE URBAN CRISIS AND THE FIGHT FOR MODEL CITIES, 1966-1970
The attractiveness of cities is not gotten by subtraction. It builds up from lots and lots of
different bits and details, lots of different bits of money, lots of different notions, all coming
out of the concern, the affection, and the ideas of lots and lots of different people. The
amenity of cities cannot possibly be planned or bought wholesale.
Jane Jacobs, speech at the fifth monthly women doers luncheon, sponsored by Mrs. Lyndon
B. Johnson, the White House, Washington, DC, June 16, 1964409
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society was the most ambitious legislative reform
since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, and cities were at the heart of it. Johnson announced the
Great Society during a speech in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the spring of 1964, declaring that “it
demands the end to poverty and racial injustice – to which we are totally committed in our time,”
and that “in the next forty years we must rebuild the entire urban United States.” “Our society will
never be great,” Johnson argued in his speech, “until our cities are great. Today the frontier of
imagination and innovation is inside those cities and not beyond their borders.”410
Having grown up in the rural hill country of central Texas, Johnson knew and understood
poverty, and was consequently far from indifferent from those who lived with it and around it. He
worked building roads and as a janitor to put himself through college, and later taught
impoverished Mexican students in rural south Texas.411 The rediscovery of poverty in the United
States, heralded by Michael Harrington’s 1962 widely-read study The Other America, coincided
with the increasing concern over the so-called urban crisis – the overlapping and entangled
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conditions of major cities in the United States that included segregation, poverty, poor housing,
unemployment, crime, health, and juvenile delinquency, among other things.412 Thus, in the wake
of declaring war on poverty in his 1964 State of the Union address, President Johnson oversaw the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964; the Housing Acts of 1964 and 1965; the creation of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1965; the National Capital Transportation Act
of 1965; the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966 (known as Model Cities); and the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968.413 As much as these programs might be considered the heart of
the Great Society, they also were a continuation of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.
While the Johnson administration declared war on poverty and oversaw the passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the details of the Great Society legislation
often failed to appreciate or fill in the details. As historian Robert Dallek later described the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, “neither the President who sponsored it, the director-designate
who would administer it, nor the congressmen who passed it really knew what they had done.”414
This failure is reflected in the Model Cities legislation, in which the policies enacted to benefit city
residents do not seem to address the actual conditions facing urban residents in the decades
following the Second World War. The reasons for this are varied, ranging from the faulty
understanding of the architects of the legislation to the compromises the Johnson administration
had to make in order to get such sweeping reforms passed through Congress. Regardless, it is
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evident that the plans meant to aid cities fundamentally failed to grasp the driving forces of the
urban crisis and therefore failed to offer meaningful solutions.
In this moment the postwar city was the site of experiments in urban forms. Planners,
experts, and technocrats strove to address the changes in cities since the war—population growth,
suburbanization, industrial restructuring. These plans were not useless or irrelevant. While they
might not have succeeded in solving the problems confronted by cities in the United States, they
made sincere efforts to take the best knowledge and insights in urban problems and challenges and
create solutions. The perception of what constituted social ills and what society should do about
them, however, revealed the worldviews of those policy makers. As historian Tracy Neumann has
argued, the visions for industrial cities following the Second World War were often postindustrial
visions.415 As such, they often failed to include in any real way the industrial working classes, just
as they similarly failed to address racial inequalities.
While this chapter focuses on national conversations and federal policy, it still revolves
around Detroit in several ways. First, it intends to demonstrate that Detroit was not unique in the
challenges it faced after the war. Many other cities in the United States confronted similar
conditions. Second, as one of the recipients of Model Cities aid, the discussion of the ideals and
the shortcomings of the Model Cities legislation had concrete local significance. In different ways,
Detroit played a central role in the history of federal urban policy and in the Model Cities program.
Indeed, the idea originated with UAW President Walter Reuther, neatly connecting Model Cities
with Detroit and the labor movement. This link, however, makes it that much more ironic that
legislation like Model Cities was unable to address unemployment and job loss in industrial cities.
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Even when these urban vision originated with working-class city residents at their center, it did
not last. The policies soon morphed into postindustrial urban visions.
The Social Urban Vision of Walter Reuther
That Model Cities originated with Walter Reuther is a consequence of the UAW leader’s
immense interest in creating mass affordable housing. This was true during the war, when he was
involved in adequate housing for defense workers. It was true in the mid-1950s, as well, when
Reuther helped create the Citizens Redevelopment Committee, which brought Ludwig Mies van
der Rohe, the famed Bauhaus architect, to Detroit to design the city’s Lafayette Park community.
For Reuther, housing it was not merely a physical structure but rather a means to “rebuild the
whole inner cores of our great cities and produce in those inner cores an attractive, healthy,
wholesome living environment that will be so exciting that everyone will want to live there.” In a
similar way to Constantinos Doxiadis, Reuther argued that a revitalized and whole urban
environment would mean that “the racial thing will get lost in the shuffle.” Later, Reuther would
champion federal support for mass-produced prefabricated housing in an alliance with former
Michigan governor George Romney, who served as the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development under Richard Nixon.416
It was not surprising to find Reuther, in the spring of 1965, encouraging President Johnson
to organize a planning committee to select cities for a program to “demonstrate” the wide-range
of Great Society programs and their efficacy. It would be, Reuther wrote to the president, a
“Marshall Plan for the Cities.”417 Working with his friend and architect Oskar Stonorov, Reuther’s
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original proposal, in the words of his biographer Nelson Lichtenstein, “perfectly targeted LBJ’s
Rooseveltian ambitions,” following the Watts riots of 1965. Conceived as an “urban TVA,” the
duo proposed building entire communities on tracts of urban land, seven hundred to a thousand
acres in size, where one could find “new technologies of housing construction and prefabrication,
new types of schools, old-age centers, and recreational facilities,” to create a “physically beautiful
and socially sound America.”418
Based on this description, one can imagine Walter Reuther’s urban vision was ran contrary
to the urbanist movement in the mid-1960s. People like Jane Jacobs and sociologist William White
were moving away from overly planned urban environments. “Their appreciation,” as Lichtenstein
phrased it, “of an organic and complex urban synthesis evoked little sympathy from the UAW
president.” As one Johnson aide, Harry McPherson, recalled, Reuther was for “bull-dozing and
rebuilding.”419 Nonetheless, Johnson found Reuther’s vision of a “Marshall Plan for the cities”
compelling. He met with Reuther on September 17, 1965, to hash out a fuller plan from the labor
leader’s original proposal to used six cities—Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, DC, Los Angeles,
and Houston—as demonstrations of a new federal approach to aging cities. Following the meeting,
Johnson appointed a task force to work out the details to implement Reuther’s idea. The nine
members included Whitney Young of the Urban League, Charles Haar of Harvard Law School,
and Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, as well as Reuther. As the taskforce moved from
idea to fleshed-out plan, it was Reuther, in the words of one committee member, who supplied
“the vision, drive and sometimes mere rhetoric that has kept us moving.”420
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Reuther was not the first prominent Detroiter to bring the attention of the federal
government to the plight of American cities. As historian Roger Biles described, “Mayor Frank
Murphy of Detroit took the lead in pleading the case of urban America” to the Hoover
administration. In doing so, Murphy argued for increased government spending as the pathway to
saving cities, countering those who urged a balanced budget. Such a thing “isn’t a god, a sacred
thing that is to be accomplished at all costs. It is not right to shatter living conditions and bring
human beings to want and misery to achieve such an objective.” “To sacrifice everything,” Murphy
concluded, “to balance the budget is fanaticism.” The Detroit mayor invited twenty-six big city
mayors in 1932 to petition the federal government for a $5 billion public works program. This
initiative failed, but it did serve as the foundation for the US Conference of Mayors, membership
in which was open to mayors of cities with other 50,000 residents. Murphy’s plan in many ways
prefigured the Great Society’s urban initiative.421
Reuther was not just an advocate in the spirit of Mayor Frank Murphy. Reuther also
organized a nonprofit, the Metropolitan Detroit Citizens Redevelopment Authority, to organize
and facilitate Model Cities funding to the city. He served as the Authority’s chair. His mission, as
he understood it, was “rebuilding the inner core of Detroit . . . so that people living in a slum can
move into neighborhoods worth of citizens of the Great Society.”422 Moreover, President Johnson
leaned on Reuther’s position as a prominent liberal voice in order to defend Great Society
programs. For instance, on January 27, 1966, LBJ aide Joe Califano sent the president a memo
referring to an “extremely unfair” Washington Post editorial from the day before. He informed the
president that he had called Reuther in order to have the AFL-CIO make a public statement in
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support of Demonstration Cities.423 The US president listened to and relied on Reuther, and the
UAW president gave public and visible shows of support for the Johnson presidency. At the UAW
convention in the spring of 1966, Reuther presented Johnson with the union’s Social Justice
Award.424 While Reuther might have been outside the urbanist trends of the 1960s as represented
by those like Jane Jacobs, he was a go-to authority on urban affairs for the Johnson administration.
Creating Model Cities
In contrast to the ensuing debate over urban policy, the expanding war in Vietnam was a
major focus of President Johnson’s 1966 State of the Union address, but he did not ignore domestic
issues. “There are men who cry out that we must sacrifice,” President Johnson calmly and
deliberately pronounced, scanning his entire audience. “Well, let us rather ask them who will they
sacrifice?” Would they sacrifice children seeking learning, the sick seeking medical care, “or the
families who dwell in squalor now brightened by the hope of home?” Will they, he inquired,
“sacrifice opportunity for the distressed, the beauty of our land, the hope of our poor?”425 The
Great Society, he stated, meant growth, justice, and liberation. He argued for ending racial
discrimination and expanding the war on poverty, for helping “that other nation within a nation,
the poor whose distress has now captured the conscious of America.” It meant addressing rural
poverty but also helping to “rebuild entire sections of neighborhoods containing in some cases as
many as 100,000 people.” Uniting private interest with the power of the federal government,
Lyndon Johnson urged that the country “press forward with the task of providing homes and shops,
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parks and hospitals, and all the other parts of a flourishing community where our people can come
to live the good life.”426
In his January 26, 1966 presidential address to Congress on cities, President Johnson made
a rousing call for a response to the urban crisis. “What we may only dimly perceive,” the address
went, “is the gravity of the choice before us: whether we shall make our cities livable for ourselves
and our posterity, or by timidity and neglect damn them to fester and decay.” 427 While words do
not necessarily translate into action, especially within the realm of politics, the rhetoric used by
the Johnson administration in regards to the urban crisis were revealing. It is clear that they
understood that race and class were at the root of who suffered in cities and who did not. “The
special problem of the poor and the Negro” and the “the flight to the suburbs of more fortunate
men and women” were listed as part of the crisis.428 Johnson mentioned the “social and
psychological effects of relocating the poor” that had arisen from urban renewal and noted that
they were “the unavoidable consequences of every urban renewal project, demanding as much
concern as physical redevelopment.”429 Even the conflicting tendencies of federal policy were
acknowledged in Johnson’s address: “the goals of major federal programs have often been
conflicted, some working for the revitalization of the central city, some accelerating suburban
growth, some building and some destroying urban communities.” He recognized that those who
were impoverished and non-whites suffered disproportionately, that those who could fled to
suburban communities, and that the response of the federal government up to this point had been
inchoate and disorderly.430
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The response of the Johnson administration was clear. In the Demonstration City program,
there would be a focus on entire neighborhoods and their impact on the entire city. There would
be a focus on the total environment and the use of available social programming, “so that the
human cost of relocation is reduced and new opportunities for work and training are offered.”431
There would be more housing, with a focus on creating equal opportunity for housing for those of
different races. There would be the “maximum occasion for employing residents of the
demonstration area in all phases of the program” and the fostering of “local initiative and
widespread citizen participation.”432 Modern technologies would be used, and there should be
“attention to man’s need for open spaces and attractive landscaping.”433 Returning to the statement
that relocation had been destructive in human terms, Johnson stated that the program “should
make relocation housing available at cost commensurate with the incomes of those displaced by
the project,” as well as offering “counseling services, moving expenses, and small business loans
[as well as] assistance in job placement and retraining.”434
Johnson argued that the development authority should include “a broad cross-section of
community leadership” and the municipality should provide “adequate municipal appropriations
and services.” The program was to be “predominantly residential” and “consistent with existing
development plans.”435 Moving from the more practical matters, Johnson insisted that the outcome
would be intangible and hard to measure: that of hope, “that the city is not beyond reach of
redemption by men of good will; that through cooperation, hard work, wise planning, and the
sacrifice of codes and practices that make widespread renewal impossibly expensive today, it is
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possible to reverse the city’s decline.”436 While the impact would ultimately be beyond the cost in
dollar amounts, Johnson reassured his listeners that the benefits would be for “the ultimate relief
of the general taxpayer, as well as for city administrators, land developers, and for the urban poor.”
In the context of rising costs of municipal services and declining property values, Johnson
reminded his audience, the estimated federal spending was for the common good.437
At this point, Johnson returned to the theme of the suburbs. He reminded his listeners that
the “reality of urban life” was that the suburbs and the city were intertwined, “what happens in the
central city, or the suburb, is certain to affect the quality of life in the other.”438 Much like Doxiadis
had argued, Johnson understood cities and suburbs to part of one large regional network. Further,
“at the center of the cities’ housing problem lies racial discrimination” – as clear-cut a denunciation
as one could wish. “Crowded miles of inadequate dwellings – poorly maintained and frequently
overpriced – are the Negro American’s lot in many of our cities […] Where housing is poor,
schools are generally poor, unemployment is widespread, family life is threatened, and the
community’s welfare burden is steadily magnified. These are the links in the chain of racial
discrimination.”439 Johnson does not, however, argue for a causal relationship. The relationship
between these issues was not so much a chain, with an end and a beginning, but a web.
Fundamentally, the basic assumtion of Demonstration Cities was that the physical
landscape influenced human behavior. Johnson proclaimed a new approach to urban design,
insisting that “they [cities] must also provide a rational and harmonious environment, with
integrated transportation systems, attractive community buildings, and open spaces free from
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pollution.”440 Another fundamental idea behind Demonstration Cities emerged relatively soon, in
which the “the rebirth of our cities” meant “the possibility of retaining middle-income families in
the city, and even attracting some to return.”441 The aims of the federal program, thus, had certain
class assumptions about urban renewal. Creating middle-income opportunities for city residents –
the poor and the non-white – were not necessarily its focus. Retaining and attracting middleincome families – those who already had middle-income positions – was. By using a term like
“middle-income,” however, and not “middle-class,” the gate remained open for the inclusion of
unionized industrial workers, who would have been characterized in some cases as “middleincome working-class.”
Rhetorically the rebirth of American cities was for all city residents. In a passage cut from
the President Johnson’s Congressional address, but used in a January 26, 1966, press release, the
dream of cities was expanded. The ideal future of cities was “to rebuild where this is hopeless
blight, to renew where there is decay and ugliness, to refresh the spirit of men and women grown
weary with jobless anxiety, to restore old communities and to bring forth new ones where children
will be proud to say, ‘That is my home.’” Contrary to cities of ugliness and hopelessness, where
the only dream is escape, Johnson proposed cities full of life, joy, beauty, prosperity, and
vitality.442
The Demonstration Cities bill delivered to Congress declared that “The Congress hereby
finds and declares that improving the quality of urban life is the most critical domestic problem
facing the United States.”443 The language incorporated those below a middle-income. The
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legislation aimed to increase the supply of “adequate housing for low- and moderate-income
people,” while attempting to “make marked progress in serving the poor and disadvantaged people
living in slum and blighted areas with a view to reducing educational disadvantages, disease, and
enforced idleness.”444 Who was responsible for the “enforcing” was not named. The legislation
sought to contribute to “good access to industrial or other centers of employment,” as well as
“encourage good community relations and counteract the segregation of housing by race or
income.”445
The program called on cities to submit proposals for federal funds, which would come from
the recently-created Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The program
emphasized targeting urban blight and slums, segregation, and lack of housing, offering up to 80%
of funds for projects that addressed these urban ills via a regional plan. The basic idea was local
control of a vast array of federal resources used to target interlocking urban problems, which would
demonstrate the power of various federal programs and agencies working in tandem rather than at
cross-purposes.446
The draft legislation received mix press, including negative responses such as the editorial
that Harry McPherson forwarded to Joe Califano on February 12, 1966. The editorial, written by
public conservative and open segregationist James J. Kilpatrick for the Washington Evening Star,
was from two days earlier. “Have I lost touch with reality?” McPherson wryly asked Califano. In
his op-ed, “Urban Crisis and Its Solution,” Kilpatrick concluded that Demonstration Cities “is
largely a dream.” Kilpatrick’s objections were manifold, but they were indicative of conservative
reactions to Johnson’s Great Society, revolving around fears of federal overreach and a
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misunderstanding of human nature. They also underlined the conflicted position of urban America
a few decades after the Second World War.447
Kilpatrick was not completely dismissive of Johnson’s address on Demonstration Cities.
“If it lost touch with reality,” Kilpatrick wrote of the speech, “it was nonetheless a good message
in many respects, filled with bright hope and grave warning.” Kilpatrick disapprovesd on two
accounts: first, that the Constitution does not give the Federal government the authority to pursue
such legislation, and, second, that it does not account for human nature. Putting aside the first
objection – more ably dealt with legal scholars and, presumably, by the legal counsel of the
Johnson administration – Kilpatrick’s defense of the second objection rested on a number of biases.
“It has to be said,” Kilpatrick assured his readers, “realistically, that mankind never has known a
free society that was not characterized by gaps between the haves and have-nots. To the extent that
these gaps are diminished arbitrarily by the compulsions of the state, freedom itself is diminished.”
Such abstractions gave way to concrete examples: “Johnson is annoyed that the affluent have fled
to the suburbs. If he cannot drag them back to the cities, he will see that disadvantaged families
are transplanted by their side.”448
Kilpatrick’s irony does not mask that he understood the legislation as intended to punish
the affluent by forcing them to encounter the disadvantaged. Conceiving as freedom as the freedom
to discriminate, in addition to being free of governmental coercion, it became clear that
Kilpatrick’s argument also centered on racial matters. Kilpatrick continued that Johnson “is
aroused by the prejudice that prevents some white owners from selling their property to potential

447

Memorandum, Harry McPherson to Joe Califano, February 12, 1966, Box 2, Folder 2, MC. See the New York
Times obituary for James J. Kilpatrick, “James J. Kilpatrick, Conservative Voice in Print and on TV, Dies at 89,”
August 16, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/us/17kilpatrick.html. Accessed May 16, 2016.
448
James J. Kilpatrick, “Urban Crisis and Its Solution,” The Evening Star, Thursday, February 10, 1966, Box 2,
Folder 2, MC.

176
Negro buyers. So he will make them sell.” Even while granting that prejudice existed, Kilpatrick
dismissed it with the qualification of “some,” as if residential segregation was a minor eccentricity
on the part of a handful of prejudiced individuals. The real social threat, instead, was the social
uplift that Johnson proposed though “enough compulsion, and enough money, and a sufficiency
of rules and regulations and certificates.”449
It was the means, not the ends, that caused Kilpatrick’s ire with Demonstration Cities. He
referred to “the genuinely noble aims of Johnson,” but chided the President that, instead of
“beneficent compulsions,” his aims should be fulfilled via “ambition, and personal incentive, and
local zeal.” According to Kilpatrick, the legislation would undermine those very values by
providing rent supplements, subsidies, and “federal domination.” Thus, while “the crisis of the
American city is real,” the proposed solution was, at least as far as conservative thinking went,
fantasy.450
The Johnson administration developed responses to these conservative critiques. It is
difficult, however, to disentangle the conservative critiques from those based in both openly and
concealed racist and segregationist thinking. While Kilpatrick, later in his life, disavowed his early
stances on race relations, he publicly argued against the equality of black Americans and white
Americans. He also was one of the main public proponents of southern state resistance to federal
civil rights policies, legislation, and court decisions. Could one separate a purportedly free-market
rationale from a racial one for white homeowners who resisted selling to a black buyer? It was true
that such a sale often lowered property values in a given neighborhood and thus economic
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reasoning considered such a sale as inefficient even if unfair. But such a view artificially
decontextualizes the sale, ignoring the structural racism in the housing market. Why, we might
ask, did the ancestry of the homeowner affect the value of the property? What social factors
reinforced this phenomenon? And why was it so widespread as to be second-nature to all homesellers and home-buyers in the United States during the better part of the twentieth century?
Even in the face of conservative critiques, the Demonstration Cities program had a number
of influential supporters: the US Conference of Mayors, the American Institute of Architects, the
National Housing Conference, the National Governors Conference, the NAACP, Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA), the AFL-CIO and, specifically, the AFL-CIO Industrial Union
Department.451 The AFL-CIO Industrial Union Council formally resolved that “of all the programs
presenting being advanced to deal with urban ills the one that offers the most promise is the
‘demonstration cities’ concept.” The resolution criticized “the piecemeal programs of slum
clearance and urban renewal of the last three decades, which seem to do little more than redistribute
the focal points of urban blight.” The Demonstration Cities program, with “the goal of creating
good city environments,” sought to bring a full program involving “all that we know about
improving the quality of urban life,” and would focus on “city planning, job training, welfare,
health, education, social services, and recreation.”452
Twenty mayors testified to Congress in the spring of 1966 in support of the bill, many of
whom came from cities facing variations of the urban crisis, including Detroit’s Jerome
Cavanaugh. Other mayors included Hugh Addonizio of Newark, Walton Bachrach of Cincinnati,
J. D. Braman of Seattle, Richard Daley of Chicago, Louis DePascale of Hoboken, John Lindsey
of New York City, Ralph Locher of Cleveland, James H. J. Tate of Philadelphia, and James Walsh
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of Scranton. Mayor John E. Babiarz of Wilmington, Delaware, who intended to testified, was
prevented from doing so after spraining his ankle, but a representative from Delaware delivered
his testimony for him.453
Mayor Tate of Philadelphia was vociferous in his support, writing a letter Senator John J.
Sparkman, and forwarding a copy of HUD director Robert Weaver. He criticized the testimony of
the Chairman of the Washington Committee of the National Association of the Real Estate Boards,
Alan L. Emlen, before the Senate Sub-Committee on Housing, which had opposed Demonstration
Cities. “Private investment and business interest,” Tate argued, “had abdicated their
responsibilities to the communities in which they live and from which they derive their resources
by their withdrawal from the blighted and deteriorated areas of our major cities, leaving behind a
reservoir of poverty, torment, turmoil, and distress, in times which would otherwise be described
as a period of affluence.” Many Americans, including elected officials, city authorities, the national
administration, and Congress, knew “that without urban renewal our cities would long since have
been laid waste and our people reduced to a level of poverty and hardship unconscionable in the
day and age in which we live.” The argument that the federal government was interfering in the
realm of private businesses was undermined, in Mayor Tate’s view, by the simple fact that private
businesses had given up on the urban realm a while ago. If they had not, there would be no need
for the federal government to intervene. The recent past had “shown that private investment
resources would never have begun to meet the needs of our deteriorating cities” were it not for the
resources available through urban renewal programs. While critical of private investment, Mayor
Tate argument for urban renewal programs was that they encouraged new investment. In
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Philadelphia, for instance, Tate recounted how every dollar of public investment led to $4 to $6,
or more, of private investment.454
Even given the last fifteen to twenty years of urban renewal had not eradicated the problem,
as Mayor Tate argued that the president, Congress, mayors, and “every responsible organization”
knew. “The scope and scale of our urban renewal efforts to this date,” Tate pressed, “have not
reached into the blighted cores of our large metropolitan areas and the poverty sections of our
cities.” Alan Emlen, therefore, “does not speak for the vast majority of sound and responsible
businessmen represented in the real estate industry of this country.” The Philadelphia Board of
Realtors supported Demonstration Cities, as had the Home Builders of America. Far from speaking
on behalf of the real estate industry, Mayor Tate noted that Emlen’s position was politically
motivated. He was previously the treasurer of the Pennsylvania Republican State Committee and
“very active and vocal in GOP affairs.”455
Tate reaffirmed that many individuals and organizations, “Republican and Democratic
alike,” were in support of the Demonstration Cities program. Mayors of major cities thought that
Demonstration Cities was not only desirable, but “that it is essential to the rebirth of our cities.”
The strength of the program was that it was not only concerned with the physical city, but with
“social, economic, and cultural growth and opportunity,” too. The opposition, Tate concluded, was
“a reflection of a school of thought long since rejected by the people of this country in their
assessment of the needs of our cities and our hopes and aspirations for strength and growth in the
future.” As Mayor Tate made clear, Emlen did not represent the views of individuals and
organizations, regardless of political persuasion, who were involved in urban affairs. In a parting
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shot, Mayor Tate did not even grant that Emlen spoke for Philadelphia Board of Realtors, of which
he was the past president.456
For all the “noble aims” of the Demonstration Cities legislation, the law made claims that
had, on close inspection, little support. Despite being aware of the urban crisis, and recognizing
that the federal government should act to curtail it, those involved did not understand how the
crisis had originated or its long-term effects. The Harlem riot of 1964 and the Watts riot of 1965
were present in the architects’ minds. Joseph Califano, wrote a memo on June 29 to Donald E.
Nicoll, the administrative assistant of Maine Senator Edmund Muskie, who was to deliver the
opening statement on the Demonstration Cities bill in the Senate, underscoring this point: “The
object of our proposal is to prevent, if possible, a repetition of the Watts-type riots in the 20-25
‘crisis cities’ this summer.” The bill was to show the benefits of a coordinated federal-local
program on social and physical problems of cities, “and clearly to identify the President with a
more effective and efficient use of Federal resources in support of community action to improve
the quality of living in our cities.”457
In fact, the riots of 1964 were fundamental to the outlook of President Johnson’s Task
Force on Housing and Urban Affairs, assembled in the spring of 1964 and chaired by Robert C.
Wood, a MIT political scientist. In Wood’s recollection, the term urban crisis was used by the task
force due to the urban disorders that summer. It held its first meeting in Washington in the middle
of July after the riot began in Harlem, following the shooting of a fifteen-year-old African
American by a white police officer. The ensuing angry and violent protests moved from Manhattan
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to Brooklyn, and then saw echoes in Rochester, NY, a Chicago suburb, three New Jersey cities,
and Philadelphia. The developing crisis was much on the minds of members of Congress.458
Another way that the urban revolts and Civil Rights fed into the development of the
Demonstration Cities project was the name of the program itself. The transformation from
Demonstration Cities to Model Cities was far from innocent. The first indication that the name
could be flipped into a criticism came early in September, 1966, when HUD staffer Sidney Spector
send fellow HUD worker Harry Hall Wilson the following message: “Dan Smoot has been twisting
the name of the bill for propaganda purposes. Smoot is telling his audiences that the purpose of
the bill is to provide funds for Civil Rights ‘Demonstrations’ in the cities and thus the name,
Demonstration Cities Bill.” 459 The spin of the conservative commentator Smoot was not isolated.
Earlier in the spring of 1966, HUD Secretary Robert Weaver communicated concerns to President
Johnson over the connotations of “demonstrations” in the mid-60s: “Congressman Robert
Stephens is concerned about the title ‘Demonstration Cities’ because he feels it suggests the image
of racial conflict in the South.”460 By October, Representative Paul A. Fino, admonished that “This
program is a tool of black power . . . I can just imagine what kind of city demonstrations black
power has in mind. They will demonstrate how to burn down shops and loot liquor stores. They
will demonstrate how to throw Molotov cocktails at police cars . . . Oh, yes, I can imagine the kind
of demonstration program black power has in mind. Demonstration conflagration. Demonstration
incineration.”461
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Fino was on the more extreme end of the spectrum, but even supporters of Johnson and the
program framed it in terms of urban disturbances, as shown in a memo from Califano. The ThreeCity Pilot Project, he wrote, was “an accelerated program to combat poverty in selected cities” as
a way of showcasing the benefits of the full Demonstration Cities program. Califano explicitly
mentioned neighborhoods “within a Watts, Harlem, or similarly distressed sub-area” as the ideal
targets of a program. The small-scale was desired, because cities like New York, Chicago, or Los
Angeles were too complicated, and the pilot needed to show results within half a year.462
Nonetheless, while those involved with the project constantly referred to poverty and
unemployment, they did not seem to recognize or acknowledge its causes. In one memo to
Johnson, Charles Schultze solely emphasized the need for job finding and job training, seemingly
indicating that city residents were impoverished simply because they lacked training or were
incapable of finding jobs on their own, not that jobs did not exist.
Not all the supporters of Demonstration Cities seemed so unaware of the issues facing city
residents. The opening statement by Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine shared a remarkable
similar to the analysis found in an essay by a radical black Detroit auto worker, James Boggs,
although the politics of the two were fundamentally different. Beginning on a literary note – “from
the Book of Job, to Charles Dickens, to James Baldwin, we have read the ills of cities” – Muskie
quickly launched into a full exploration of distressed cities. Nor did Muskie focus solely on large
metropolitan areas. “We all know,” he told the senators, “of the ‘other side of the tracks’ in smaller
cities, where unemployment comes first and prosperity arrives last.” It was in the “slum and
blighted areas of our cities” where unemployment struck hardest and where city residents lived in
“dilapidated, overcrowded, or unsafe and unsanitary dwellings.” Muskie summoned the memories
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of Watts in his statement and public welfare, right after comments on unemployment and unsafe
structures: “It is in these areas of unrest that public welfare payments are concentrated – 24 percent
of the population of Watts, for example, was on public assistance at the time of the riot.” The
problem of American cities was the problem of unemployment, poverty, the lack of sanitation and
safety, crime, and education. “Whatever its size,” Muskie asserted, “wherever its location in this
land of ours, the city is a problem which grows as our nation grows, a problem which belongs to
all of us, a problem which all of us must join in solving.” It was a explicitly collective problem, as
“we are, increasingly, a nation of urban dwellers,” with 70 percent of Americans living in
metropolitan areas.463
Then Muskie delivered a description of inner cities that, despite coming from a different
perspective, echoed that of various city residents. The two halves of contemporary cities were
crowded, decaying, and blighted areas and the surrounding, too often formless, suburban
sprawl. […] The more affluent members of society, who still use the city for business and
entertainment, but who have used modern transportation to escape the problems of living
in the city, now battle traffic problems, suffer through smog, recoil at riots in the slums and
feel more uneasy over the dangers of urban life. Too often, for the poor, for those of modest
means, and for the rich, our cities have become nightmares rather than dreams.464
Compare this description to that of James and Grace Lee Boggs. James was a black factory worker
who had grown up in the Jim Crow share-cropper South. He was a labor activist, Marxist, and an
early proponent of Black Power. Grace Lee, of Chinese ancestry, was also a Marxist, and held a
PhD in philosophy. In a co-written 1966 article published in the Monthly Review, the Boggs noted
that in the year 1970 it was projected that African Americans would constitute the majority
population in fifty large American cities. They then argued that the historical tendency of majority
rule in American cities to be a means of upward mobility for immigrants to the US would not work
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the same for African Americans, against whom racism was too “deeply imbedded in the American
psyche from top to bottom, and from right to left.” According to the Boggs,
the accumulated problems of the inner city will become increasingly insoluble and . . the
city itself will remain the dangerous society, [..] rendered socially unnecessary by the
technological revolution of automation and cybernation, policed by a growing occupation
army that has been mobilized and empowered to resort to any means necessary to safeguard
the interests of the absentee landlords, merchants, politicians, and administrators, to whom
the city belongs by law but who do not belong in the city and who themselves are afraid to
walk its streets.”465
Arguing that the civil disorders of 1964 in Harlem, Philadelphia, Rochester, and New York, as
well as Watts in 1965, were not just battles in cities but battles for cities, the Boggs pinpointed
unemployment caused by technological change, issues around policing, and, crucially, the
economic relationship between “landlords, merchants, politicians, and administrators” and the
city. Those who profited from the city did not go into the city out of fear of those who lived there.
Muskie described a similar situation, but noted that even those in the suburbs were negatively
affected by this relationship.
James and Grace Lee Boggs were concerned with city residents and particularly the poor
and the black. Muskie and other supporters of Demonstration Cities were careful to keep race out
of their comments, references to Watts and Harlem notwithstanding. Muskie was clear that he saw
cities as a problem for all Americans, including those wealthy enough to live in traffic and smogfilled suburbs. Moreover, Muskie insisted that “our awareness of the problems of the city is not
new,” recalling the turn-of-the-century cities in Maine, where new looms, lights, and modes of
transportation brought both optimism and new problems in their wake.
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Senator Muskie’s point was a fair reminder that the postwar urban crisis did not appear sui
generis, but was a continuation of the concern of cities rooted in the Gilded and Progressive ages.
Ranging from the textile towns of New England, of which Lawrence and Lowell are but two
examples to the streets of Chicago where Jane Addams and Hull House were but an example of
the settlement house movement, the city as a place of crime, poverty, and racialized others has
loomed large in the American imagination for well over a century. 466 Muskie’s description and
critique of technological innovation aptly echoed fellow Maine citizen Henry David Thoreau’s
criticisms of a century earlier: “What is the advantage of travelling at 60 miles an hour if we are
as discontented at the end of the journey?”467
Listing reasons why urban renewals had not helped cities in the past, Muskie noted that a
fundamental issue was the “vicious circle” of the “financial crisis of cities”:
The more determined the city’s efforts to raise funds to meet the need for increased
services, the more likely that effort drives its economically affluent citizens to the nearby
suburbs. Similarly, the greater burden the city places on industry within its borders the less
opportunity to attract and hold the industry and commerce its economy requires. So the
city becomes, increasingly, the home for the economically deprived, those least able to
bear the cost of municipal services.”
This downward economic spiral formed a core dynamic of cities in crisis. Those who left cities
were those with the means to do so. But in leaving, the cities tax revenues dropped just as a
relatively larger number of residents required. Thus, the worst off cities were those least able to
adequately address their problems.
As Muskie argued, the combined forces of mixed priorities, unclear leadership and
authority, gaps in programs, and lack of resources “all prevent us from building and rebuilding
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cities our urban citizens deserve and all of us need.” He emphasized that the urban crisis was a
concern for all Americans, not just those who lived in the economically-deprived inner city and he
framed the problem as one of citizenship. Much as Doxiadis had argued that inner cities and
suburbs were part of the same urban network, Muskie asserted that one could not flee the urban
crisis. Cities, and those who lived in them, did not exist in a vacuum separate from other
Americans. Because President Johnson recognized these problems, Muskie stated, the president
convened a task force to address the problems of urban life. Through this arose the Demonstration
Cities program.468
A convincing analysis of the problem of urban areas did not lead to agreement on the best
means to solve the issues. Unsurprisingly, funding the Demonstration Cities program caused a
fierce fight in Congress. One op-ed by Norman Miller spelled out the situation: “Almost everybody
on Capitol Hill thinks Lyndon Johnson’s plan to rebuild slums in ‘demonstration cities’ is a great
idea. Yet the President’s plan, his most important domestic legislative proposal, is in grave danger
of being defeated by the Democratic dominated Congress.”469 Immediately afterward, Miller
raised the specter of urban revolt, writing that “With mass violence erupting anew in Negro
ghettoes across the country, Republicans and Democrats alike look to the demonstration cities
concept as the most promising response to the slum-dwellers’ angry cries for help.”470 The issue
was the program gave $2.3 billion to sixty-six cities over six years. One Democrat in the House
called it “too big and too little,” with that $2.3 billion being stretched far. In fact, the bill did not
specify a figure. It only noted that funding would be available in “such sums as may be necessary,”
while the $2.3 billion figure was based on administration promises. City administrators, for their
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part, had hopes that the figure might turn out to be $5 or $9 billion over the life of the program.
Offering aid to only a handful of major cities would lead to dwindling support, hence the sixty
cities. Mayors dreaded the requirements it took to be accepted for the program, and they feared
that other federal funding would no longer be available if it was accepted, cancelling out any
benefit, financially, to a given city.471
Yet, the Johnson Administration could not put much more into the budget with the costs
of the Vietnam War rising. In a 1966, memo to the president, following the State of the Union
address, Califano noted that the estimated cost per year was around one billion dollars, which was
not included “formally in your message because of the uncertainty of the Vietnam situation,” an
important reminder of how foreign policy intertwined with domestic policy.472 This was true even
after the program passed, as shown by a 1967 UPI ticker tape bulletin that read “President
Johnson’s chief liaison with state governments indicated that federal money for Model Cities
programs may be delayed until the end of the Vietnam War.” The chief liaison was Farris Bryant,
former governor of Florida and chair of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
responded to a question at the 21st Southern Conference of the Council of State Governments in
Louisville, Kentucky, regarding funding for Model Cities by saying, “You tell me when Ho Chi
Minh stops, and I’ll tell you when we start.”473 While the memory of the Johnson administration’s
domestic policies is often unable to escape the legacy of the Vietnam War, it was also the case that
the Great Society was, ultimately, subservient to global Cold War politics.
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The House subcommittee on housing considered in early June of whittling the program
down to $12 million for “planning grants.” Vice President Humphrey and HUD Secretary Weaver
intervened, but the proposed slashing had the unintended benefit of getting cities to unite in support
of the original program, although demands for more funding continued. A further $600 million
was added to the bill, but, as Housing subcommittee Chairman Barrett, a Democrat from
Philadelphia, announced, the “addition of the extra $600 million makes it all the more likely that
the House, fearful of approving an expensive new program that will fuel inflationary pressures,
will reject the bill outright or drastically cut it back to provide only a small sum for planning.” As
an US Conference of Mayor’s official noted, “no bill would be better than token planning grants
for a program with an uncertain future.”474
The bill contained provisions that did not garner the support of urban officials. The program
increased the Federal housing program and government insurance, to use one example, to promote
the development of “new towns” in rural areas. As Norman Miller bluntly phrased it, mayors saw
this as “a major threat to their desperate efforts to retain and attract middle-class white homeowners
so entire cities don’t turn into massive black ghettos.”475 Whiteness and middle-class status
blended together with homeownership, whereas blackness conflated with the ghetto, but not as
enforced segregation, but as a slum. Behind it all lurked the threat of urban revolt, the “mass
violence erupting anew in Negro ghettos” that Miller referenced at the beginning of the op-ed. In
the struggle over “new town” aid, Wisconsin Democratic Representative Henry Reuss, who had
supported the bill through the House subcommittee, argued that challenged the “new town” aid
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was “an act of apostasy,” and that he would withdraw his support for the entire bill if mayors
challenged the compromise.476
The key opposition to the bill came from a coalition of Republicans and Dixiecrats. “The
bill is anathema to almost all Southern Democrats,” Miller noted, “because to qualify for
demonstration grants cities would have to present plans for demonstration projects that would
‘counteract the segregation of housing by race or income.’”477 Republicans, on the other hand,
fretted over the financial aspect of the bill. Representative William Widnall of New Jersey, for
instance, criticized the threat of inflation due to the bill and described it as “conceived in ignorance
and based on half-truths.” Opposition also came from Democrats from rural and suburban areas
that did not see any benefit from the bill, and which were also in unsafe districts. Many had been
beneficiaries of anti-Goldwater sentiments in 1964, and they now faced Republican challengers.478
A member of the House from Texas, Representative de la Garza, told HUD staffers later that fall
that Demonstration Cities was “a northern big city bill.”479
On Tuesday, July 26, the Senate Housing subcommittee moved to strip the bill down to a
pilot program, with a maximum amount of $900 million attached to it. The extra $600 million
promised to cities had been pruned down to $250 million. The administration indicated its approval
of the bill’s movement but not the limits on funding. The senators on the subcommittee responded
that they would resist any pressure to increase the funding. They reasoned that “it’s necessary to
establish firm limits on demonstration cities so that Congress can order changes if the program
isn’t working right after two years.” Even public supporters of the bill, like Senator Muskie,
disapproved of any bill that allowed a six-year blank check. The administration was forced to
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negotiate the demands of the Senate, House, and the US Conference of Mayors. Without the
support of the latter, it was clear that the administration would be “in the impossible position of
advocating a program the cities don’t want.” A two-year program would threatened just that. As
an US Conference of Mayors official observed, cities would not undertake new projects if they
lacked “the assurance from Congress that we’ll get the kind of money the President has
promised.”480 The hesitancy of mayors did not go far in Congress: “If that’s really the mayors’
attitude,” responded a Senate Democrat who helped design the compromise, “the hell with them –
they won’t get any bill at all.”481
Not all analyses in favor of the bill were necessarily concerned with the plight of inner-city
residents. Some indeed considered the ills of the city as a contagion that needed to be prevented
from spreading outside and quickly. “Our cities are being submerged by a rising tide of confluent
forces – diseases and despair, joblessness and hopelessness, excessive dependency on welfare
payments and the grim threats of crime, disorder and delinquency,” a group of seventeen
businessmen wrote in a statement in support of Demonstration Cities. They continued, “These
forces flow strongest for the city slums, from whence they spread relentlessly to threaten the
quality of life in every quarter.” Representing another interpretation that understood cities and their
surrounding areas linked together, this statement revealed that some supported the legislation out
of self-interest.482
On Thursday, November 3, 1966, the bill was signed at 1:00pm, with organized labor wellrepresented. Walter Reuther was present, as were other members of the UAW and the AFL-CIO,
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including its Housing Department. One notable representative of the AFL-CIO was Jack Conway,
who had worked as Walter Reuther’s assistant since 1946, until serving as Robert Weaver’s deputy
administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) under President Kennedy. 483
Members of unions representing carpenters, joiners, bricklayers, masons, electricians, and other
building and construction trades were in attendance, which might indicate their ties to the
Democratic Party as much as hope the rise in construction brought by the Model Cities program.
Other unions, which did not necessarily benefit directly from the bill, also signaled their support
by accepting the president’s invitation to attend, such as garment and clothing workers, meat
cutters and butchers, machinists, and steelworkers. In total, 172 invitations were sent out to
business, religious, community leaders as well as union officials. Henry Ford II and David
Rockefeller also were included. Nonetheless, the twenty-two union officials, representing 12.7%
of the total, formed a larger percentage of the crowd than the fourteen mayors or two corporate
vice-presidents.484
The president spoke for six minutes. He commented on the Model Cities program and the
importance of employment for the future success of American cities. “It does us no good,” Lyndon
Johnson argued, “to give workers new skills if they are unable to find any job.” The ultimate goal
was, he continued, to create the conditions so that “our unemployed citizens can come off the
welfare rolls and get onto the payrolls.” Providing employment was an integral aspect of reviving
inner cities, and Johnson presented Model Cities as the means to do so.485
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A month after signing the bill, Robert C. Weaver, the secretary of Housing and Urban
Development sent a memo to Joe Califano, along with an article by William Steif from the
Washington Daily, titled “There’s a Sleeper in the Model Cities Law.” Based largely on an
interview with William G. Coleman, the executive director of the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, Steif argued that the Model Cities legislation was designed to further
metropolitan governance, which had “long been the goal of city planners – and often have come
under attack from conservatives who oppose any kind of centralized authority.” Characterizing
repeatedly the powers granted to area-wide agencies in the Model Cities legislation as a “sleeper
provision,” the article reported that the metropolitan-wide agencies would be able to overview the
actions and decision of local governments.486 It immediately qualified this statement with Coleman
noting that there would be no power of veto. Nonetheless they would have a “surprising amount
of impact.” Municipal arenas affected could be “open-space land, hospitals, airports, libraries,
water works, sewage works, highways, transportation facilities and water development and land
conservation.” Thus, Coleman concluded, “cities, towns, sanitation districts, school districts” and
other municipal units would have to start working together.487
Sending the article to Califano, Weaver asserted that Coleman, “seems to have a built-in
problem with the Demonstration Cities program.” This was not the first time that Coleman had
made public statements intended to stir up problems for the bill. When the bill was first introduced,
he had written “an extremely critical analysis of the proposal” independent of the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. That analysis was then used by opponents of the bill.
Weaver was concerned that Coleman was now trying to associate Model Cities with the idea of a
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“metropolitan government,” a criticism that also was launched by Congressman Fino. Further,
Weaver found “little validity in fact and only peripheral support in the language of the statute” and
its legislative history to support such an interpretation. Regardless, Weaver could only recommend
the White House ignore Coleman. “To make an issue of this would,” Weaver concluded, “build it
up into an issue which is far greater than its importance.”488
Even as Weaver dismissed the importance of Coleman’s opposition, it revealed the mindset
of Model Cities opponents on the Hill. The fear, fundamentally and unsurprisingly, was that local
governance would be subsumed by increasing scales of government, resulting in diminishing
control over local affairs. The irony resided in that this would only happen if a metropolitan area
desired to received federal funding as delineated in the Model Cities program and not in any direct
way, as a metro agency would not have any veto, or otherwise formal power, over the plans of
local governments. It was rooted in a distrust of a perceived Faustian bargain, a slow erosion of
local control bought with the promise of increasing amounts of federal funding and, consequently,
increasing federal control. There were those who reached this position from a disregard for cities
and their residents, but there were also those who loved cities and their residents who reached
similar conclusions. Urban renewal alone had cost cities and their citizens much in the name of
expertise and rational planning. It is important to keep in mind the different reasoning undergirding
similar conclusions regarding policy and legislation.
Federal Metro Governments
A small yet vocal opposition to Model Cities arose regarding the belief that the federal
government, and HUD in particular, would take over local governments and render local and state
levels of governance unnecessary. The reasoning that led members of Congress to this conclusion,
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however, were not uniform, and the emphasis ranged from budget deficits to both pro- and anticivil rights sentiments. Minority views of the House Committee on Banking and Currency
accompanying the Demonstration Cities bill are a case in point. “If passed,” the fourteen-page
dissent asserted,
it will still give away much of the national legislative controls belonging to the Congress
and also those local controls which belong to the communities of the Nation. It will use the
power of the Federal purse to first stultify the local knowledge essential to the working of
a much needed demonstration city program, and, second, to ratify the mistakes, faulty
planning, and misleading promises of the Department which has insisted on its proposals
in the face of their manifest impossibilities.
However, the authors were quick to state that they did not disagree with the ideas
motivating the bill: “the minority endorses the concept of demonstration cities, its breadth, and its
sweep as revealed in the findings and declaration of purpose.” It was the means, rather than the
ends, which raised questions for them. The federal government, according to these critics, was
using the lure of funds to garner support for a poorly thought-out program which required local
government to give up power that were right theirs.489
Of the critics, eight authors, all of whom were Republican, submitted additional responses
that further distinguished their concerns from one another and the general objection to the program
they presented as a group. It was a fairly diverse group, outside of their shared objection and party
affiliation. Paul A. Fino, “a dapper cigar-smoking man with a carefully trimmed mustache,” was
a moderate Republican representing an Italian and Irish working-class district in the Bronx. He
opposed school busing and the war on poverty, but he also supported Medicare and called for
increasing Social Security.490 Florence P. Dwyer, a congresswoman from New Jersey, opposed the
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bill and later helped bring the Equal Rights Amendment to the House floor in 1970.491 William
“Bill” E. Brock was a vice-president for a candy company before serving in the House, later the
Senate, and finally as Secretary of Labor under Ronald Reagan.492 Burt L. Talcott, a congressman
from California, was a journeyman carpenter, and German prisoner-of-war during World War II,
before becoming a lawyer.493 Delwin “Del” Morgan Clawson was elected to Congress after serving
as mayor of Compton, California.494 Albert W. Johnson came to the House from Pennsylvania.495
John William Stanton, a moderate Republican from Ohio, served in Congress from 1965 until
1983, when he became a counselor to the president of the World Bank. 496 Chester L. Mize, a
businessman who also owned cattle and agricultural interests, represented Kansas.497
Together, these eight members of the House wrote that Demonstration Cities would not be
“worth the havoc that would be caused by a program conceived in wishful thinking, based on half
truths, and executed with more pride than skill.”498 The authors worried that HUD was leading
cities and towns to think that they would get funding through the program, when realistically only
a handful could possibly be funded. The program, then, was creating unrealistic expectations that
would end in either disappointment or, worse, failure. The only other option would be an
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uncontrollable flow of funding that was not voted on or approved by Congress. “The myriad
problems confronting our cities desperately need to be solved,” the minority report argued, “To do
so well will require the best in engineering and economic thinking – not the juggled arithmetic put
forward by the Department as its panacea.”499 That juggled arithmetic promised Federal funds “to
every nook and cranny” of the country, and the authors found neither sense nor honesty in those
promises. Of particular ire was a provision that would increase the percentage of federal aid to a
local project if additional HUD criteria were met, found under Title II – Planned Metropolitan
Development.
The minority view encompassed more than the expected criticisms regarding federal
budgets and expenditures, and the report soon moved from budget concerns to more abstract fears
about unspecified planners and experts. Model Cities raised “once again” a situation involving
“ivory-tower specialists” who were “secure and isolated in their cloistered retreats.” They “read
the latest news dispatches on violent demonstrations, and too hastily produced a solution – ideal
in concept – but short on practicality and void of impact intelligence.”500 In addition to impractical
specialists, the report raised the specter of urban riots as a synecdoche of the urban crisis, repeating
the linguistic link between “demonstrations,” casually associating riots with marches and picket
lines.
What is it that these secluded and isolated experts proposed, concerned as they were with
riots and full of faulty plans and inadequate solutions? The federal government’s continuing
“intrusion into community life which it obviously hopes to expand,” via the Department of
Housing and Urban Development.501 If passed, Demonstration Cities, they argued, would create a
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system of government in which “HUD officials from the Secretary on down, with billions of
dollars at their disposal, will have more power over urban and suburban life than any mayor or
Governor in the country.”502 Perhaps alarmist, but fears of federal usurpation of local and statelevel powers, along with concerns over federal spending, have been bread-and-butter American
politics. The fear that the federal government was seeking via Demonstration Cities to not only
meddle in urban affairs but, even more significantly attempt to control suburban communities.
This fear was rooted in the belief that the federal government would not help cities at all; rather, it
would reduce suburban communities to the condition plaguing central cities. The fear, as it were,
was that a sinking tide would lower all boats.
The mechanism for this harm to suburban communities was to be, according to the minority
report, was what it referred to as Federal-metro government. Just as the authors explained that they
were not opposed to the ultimate goals of Demonstrations Cities, so they wrote that they agreed
that “the welfare of the Nation and of its people is directly dependent upon the sound and orderly
development and the effective organization and functioning of the metropolitan areas in which
two-thirds of its people live and work.”503 The authors acknowledged that metropolitan areas were
rapidly expanding, and required updated plans and programs to address that growth. The authors
conceded that the nature of this rapid growth and the complicated overlapping of governance in
metropolitan areas was a hindrance to effective government and wasteful. Using President
Johnson’s own words, they noted that government could be “blind to the reality of urban life.”
They further echoed with LBJ’s statement that “What happens in the central city, or the suburbs,
is certain to affect the quality of life in the other.”504
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Yet, having agreed to all the above, the authors found themselves incapable of supporting
Title II of Demonstration Cities, in which metropolitan cooperation is addressed. It would, as the
authors titled a subsection of their report, create a “new level of government”:
The proposed metro development title of this bill would serve to divide the country into
new Federal community development districts – a new administrative or political unit that
would look to the Federal Government rather than the States, cities, or other localities for
guidance. Title II would place the shadow of HUD over every metropolitan area in our
country. Virtually every local governmental division of any magnitude, in areas accepting
supplemental Federal aid, would be subject to review by the Secretary of HUD. This, more
than any other proposal ever to come before our committee, drastically would reshape our
Federal form of government.505

Proper attention, the authors worried, had not been paid attention to this aspect of the
Demonstration Cities legislation, as the potential good that federal aid could provide had
dominated the conversation. With that aid came, however, came significant strings. As far as the
authors were concerned, the mastermind behind those strings was HUD Secretary Robert C.
Weaver, the first African American to hold a Cabinet-level position.
Opposition to HUD Secretary Weaver did not originate under Johnson’s presidency, but
earlier under the Kennedy administration, when he was appointed administrator of the Housing
and Home Finance Agency (HHFA).506 An economist educated at Harvard, with two books to his
name (Negro Labor (1946) and The Negro Ghetto (1948)), Weaver had worked in the Public
Works Administration, the United States Housing Authority, the War Manpower Commission,
and the War Production Board. At the time of his appointment, he was the vice-chairman of the
New York City Housing and Redevelopment Board as well as the chairman of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. An advocate for integration who supported
public housing and regional planning, Weaver garnered opposition for his allegedly leftist politics
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and certainly for his pro-civil-rights stance. During his 1961 Senate confirmation hearings, A.
Willis Robertson (Democrat, Virginia) raised questions about Weaver’s involvement with
Communist groups during the 1930s. William Blakely (Democrat, Texas), noted that Weaver’s
books had received positive reviews in left-wing publications. President Kennedy had to submit a
letter affirming Weaver’s loyalty before witnesses could give testimony. After a congressional
fight in early 1962 left Kennedy without his desired cabinet-level position on urban affairs - widely
believed to be Weaver’s once created – Kennedy declared his intention of creating the new cabinet
position and that it would, indeed, go to Weaver. “They’re [Republicans and Dixiecrats] against it
because Weaver’s a Negro,” the president complained in private, “and I’d like to see them say
it.”507
“Secretary Weaver,” the 1966 minority report continued, “and his successors would have
substantial control over local metropolitanwide location, financing, and scheduling of any public
facility projects that have areawide impact.”508 It would mean, in effect, that Weaver “could
impose his judgment” over parking facilities, traffic control equipment, municipal buildings,
recreation parks, “and even local public school facilities.”509 As the authors emphasized how
Demonstration Cities might affect suburbs as well as cities, so they emphasized that even local
schools could come under the purview of the HUD secretary, only twelve years after Brown v.
Board of Education ordered their desegregation. Fears of federal influence was rooted in fears of
enforcing integration.
Any local project would have to meet “the criteria established by the Secretary.” The report
continued, “if this language doesn’t embrace practically every normal function of local
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government, we don’t know what does.”510 The authors paused to acknowledge that, in hearings,
Weaver had “denied that title II of the bill is aimed at creating metro governments throughout our
country.” They were not prepared to take his word as the bill and HUD clearly sought to
“encourage” metropolitan plans and programs for “coordinating” local development, and “if this
isn’t the clearest definition of what constitutes the ultimate in metro government, we wish the
Secretary would tell us what is.” Not only were the federal government, and Weaver,
untrustworthy, but even words like encourage

and coordinating were given sinister

interpretations.511
The language the authors used make it clear that they simply did not trust the motives of
HUD or its secretary, and it is difficult to untangle their arguments about the bill from the man
who would have authority over the program, as they often refer to Weaver personally. Consider
their criticism of Section 205 of the bill, in which it is stated that the HUD Secretary would
determine the awarding of grants based on evidence that a local project meets the requirements of
a previous section. One criterium mentioned is “the establishment and consistent administration
of zoning codes, subdivision regulations, and similar land-use and density controls.” For the
authors, this raised significant questions, especially whether only communities who followed the
view of federal planners on matters that were largely related to housing, such as “zoning codes,
subdivision regulations, and similar land-use and density controls.” The question, the authors
asserted, answered itself.512 Those who feared metropolitan governance because of the dominance
of central cities, feared to be at the expense of suburbs, would “wake up and find their fears were
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misplaced. Under the Federal-Metro concept, all true power will reside not with the city, but with
the Secretary of HUD.”513
While the authors took the clarity of their argument for granted, their suspicions over the
meaning and general usage of the word “consistent” spoke to a broader distrust towards the bill
and HUD. While they hinted at their distrust of Weaver specifically, they also assured the reader
later in the report that “We will not assert our displeasure with Title II with the hackneyed warning
that these are powers that might be entrusted to Secretary Weaver, but not to his future successors
in office. On the contrary, we will be bold enough to say that they should not be entrusted to any
Secretary of HUD, including the incumbent.”514 It was also clear that, even with fears of large
social expenditures and federal usurpation of local governance, there was more going on than these
arguments as evidenced by the authors’ preoccupations with suburbs and schools, the sites of
significant anti-integration sentiments.
The minority report then quoted Secretary Weaver providing the obvious rebuttal to these
fears: no one had to accept or even ask for federal funding via the Demonstration Cities program,
and therefore would not have to meet any of the criteria laid out in the bill. Even here the authors
accused Weaver of an “old tried and true carrot-and-stick approach,” in which the HUD Secretary
punished those who did not want to participate in the program by not including. Doing so, the
authors argued, meant that grants would not be based on local need, but rather upon “fealty” to
HUD.515 Later, the authors returned to this point, writing that they anticipated the argument that
“if local communities don’t want to comply, they don’t have to ask for the supplementary Federal
grants.” As far as the authors were concerned, it simply meant that “rewards for compliance”
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would become “penalties for noncompliance.” They emphasized by repeating, “Incentives of
today will become the penalties of tomorrow. Today’s incentives will be tomorrow’s penalties.”
The authors then ominously concluded that, when local communities are penalized for not
complying with the Federal-metro standards, “the die will have been cast.”516
As an alternative, the authors called for a “reasonable solution,” as they, once again,
stressed that something had to be done about cities and metropolitan planning. The authors
recommended S. 561, from the previous year, a bill in which grant-in-aids required areawide or
regional planning as a prerequisite, but which “would rely on commonsense and good will to
persuade local governing bodies to accept planning decisions; it would not be mandatory.”517 The
main difference, it seems, was that local bodies could choose not to accept the resulting regional
planning in the earlier bill while still accepting the funding. Under Demonstration Cities, if the
funding was accepted, so were the planning decisions. Moreover, the alternative bill left planning
at the local and state levels. Title II of the Model Cities bill meant that “such metropolitanwide
plans would be under the thumb of the Secretary of HUD, leading inevitably to the creation of
Federal-Metro government throughout our Nation.”518
The minority view report was the creation of a range of dissenting voices and the arguments
for not supporting Demonstration Cities varied. While all those who signed the report had to, to
some degree, support the argument therein, their individual opinions, included as addenda, made
clear that their emphases were different. One of the final sections, entitled “You Can Fight City
Hall,” worried about how local communities could fight decisions made through the program.
Where could one protest a zoning decision or the placement of a highway? “Certainly not to their
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local town council or to their mayor – or their Representative in Congress,” the report answered.519
Here, fears over local control lost their partisan-flavor, as this was a trans-partisan complaint over
urban renewal, whether it was Robert Moses in New York City or the destruction of Detroit’s
black neighborhoods for the construction of urban highways.520 This is a theme that Florence P.
Dwyer in particular took up in her statement, and one to which we will return shortly.
The group report concluded by insisting that “all of this should alarm any community
wishing to preserve its independence.” Then, somewhat contradictory, the authors argued that the
program as outlined could not address the problems of cities as they were because “to do the job
as it should be done, we need planning not so much on the local level as we do on the national
level.” By national planning, the authors must have meant something that was not HUD, to which
along with Model Cities they concluded by calling “economic coercion.”521
Other minority views were not always in the same vein. William B. Widnall, a
congressman from New Jersey, did not sign off on the group report, but submitted his own
supplemental response. In it, he criticized urban renewal as having been used to benefit property
developers at the expense of middle- and low-income housing. In fact, he connected the abuses of
urban renewal directly to the urban upheavals of the mid- to late 1960s. Widnall lamented that
attempts to reform urban renewal had been met with the response that it had to stay “flexible.”
“Flexibility for what?” Widnall queried. “Do they mean the kind of flexibility that has constructed
luxury high rise apartments and promoted commercial downtown renewal at the expense of the
low- and moderate-income citizens left behind in the ghettoes? Do they mean the kind of flexibility
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that has fostered the explosive situations in city after city that we face this summer?”522 The
country did not need to take six years, Widnall argued, to demonstrate that thousands of cities
needed better housing for low- and moderate-income residents. “Let them restrict urban renewal
grants to those cities who are interested in housing the poor instead of accommodating the rich,”
Widnall continued. “Had we kept our urban renewal program on the right track all these years,
possibly millions of our citizens of all races and backgrounds would not be living in fear of their
very lives and properties this summer.”523
Paul A. Fino, who represented working-class white ethnics in the Bronx, had the most
explicit objections to Demonstration Cities. Likely, he was where the concerns over suburbs and
schools originated in the group report. He began by defending his urban bona fides, writing that
“when I oppose this bill, I oppose it as a Representative from a 100 percent urban New York City
constituency.” He then immediately argued that the bill would give Secretary Weaver “dictatorial
powers over city living patterns.”524 Under a section entitled “Threat to Neighborhood Schools,”
Fino wrote that his “people know what Dr. Weaver wants this control for.” The answer was for
“so-called ‘open occupancy’” and to give the US Education Commissioner Howe “the tools to
undermine the neighborhood school in the name of ‘racial balance.’” Despite having “heard a lot
of talk about the need to head off the ‘explosion’ of the ghettoes,” Fino argued that Demonstration
Cities was “obvious demagoguery.” “All this bill is really designed to do,” Fino informed his
readers, “is force Federal control on our cities: to make them accept Federal social criteria straight
from the backroom social planners down at HUD or the Office of Education.” For Fino, Model
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Cities was not about helping cities at all. Rather, it was a legislative trick through which the federal
government could enforce social planning, by which Fino meant integration.525
Fino then accused President Johnson of wanting “control, pure and simple,” The bill was
designed to “give him massive powers over our cities.” Obscurely, Fino connected this with “the
string of Asian ‘brush-fire’ wars the President expects to fight because of Asian ‘poverty’.” If
nothing else, his response suggested that Fino was not only suspicious of the motivations of
Secretary Weaver and HUD but of the entire Johnson administration. Fino then quoted James J.
Kilpatrick, the conservative opinion writer, describing the bill as a “trojan horse.” If people knew
what was in the bill, they would “hang its sponsors.” Fino conceded that the language was a bit
extreme, but that did not stop him from placing in the Congressional Record the view that those
sponsoring a bill that he objected to, because he accused it of facilitating a dictatorial desire for
racial balance, should be hung.526
Fino broke down his objections further. Demostration Cities was an “economic pistol to
the heads of our cities – all in the name of social coercion.” The coercion was to force “conformity
and compliance” to criteria that included busing school children in order to achieve school
integration and housing policies that sought “economic integration.” Pointedly, Fino characterized
those seeking busing as “ridicul[ing] the suburban way of life.” He quoted the US Commissioner
of Education as saying “that he intends to take aim on those ‘fortunate white families who flee to
the suburbs to escape integrated schools.’” Without a hint or recognition of irony, Fino asserted
that “such racism is a stain on the Federal Government” and that the Commissioner sought to
violate the 1966 Civil Rights Act.527
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In addition to his fears of “racial balance” in neighborhood schools, Fino was concerned
about “economic integration” in terms of housing. The bill would give “the Secretary power to
force” housing with rent assistance “in neighborhoods where they don’t want it.” The congressman
feared that “Dr. Weaver can draw up local ‘civil rights’ laws” under the provisions of the bill,
which would impact both suburban housing and schools. He concluded that “this program is not
aimed at meeting the needs of the tense ghettoes – that is only propaganda. Nowhere in the bill is
there a section giving precedence in ‘demonstration city’ grants to high-tension neighborhoods
suffering the most extreme socioeconomic pressure [….] The administration wants to play with
other neighborhoods where it can implement Dr. Howe’s school ideas and Dr. Weaver’s rent
supplement economic integration ideas.”528
Finally, Fino returned to the impending “metrogovernment,” his preferred term for what
the bill calls a “Federal review board.” If local communities do not agree to “hand away their
sovereignty,” then Fino considered it likely that requests for federal funding would be rejected.
Thus, “He [Secretary Weaver] can make airport grants hostages for areawide school districting
mixing slum children with suburban children in schools paid for by high taxing of the suburbs.”
Referring to a July 3 Washington Post article to support his suspicions, he asserted that the Johnson
administration wanted to use the federal government to “provide the lever for Negroes to crack the
suburbs.” “Suburbs would be asked to build scattered low-income housing and work out areawide
plans for school integration.”529 Not mentioned by Fino is that this was the plan supported at the
National Mayors Conference in Dallas a month earlier. He then concluded by once again
mentioning Secretary Weaver and Commissioner Howe, saying that the US needed a plan that did
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not put them “in the saddle in every courthouse and at the head of the table at every town meeting
or board of education meeting the America.”530
Bill Brock, the previous business vice-president and later Secretary of Labor, reaffirmed
the group report in his statement, emphasizing that “it becomes patently clear that the motivation
of this bill is founded upon a basic lack of faith in local government and represents solely a stronger
device to control it.” Brock attacked the entire premise of the bill, including the idea that cities
were in trouble, as being anti-local governance. “Do you honestly believe that all local and State
officials of these United States are either inefficient, incompetent, or corrupt?” Brock implored his
Congressional colleagues. “Do you honestly believe that they don’t care, that they are not doing
the best possible job with the resources available for the people in their area?” If cities were indeed
in trouble, Brock concluded, it was likely only because of excessive taxation on the part of
Washington, and therefore further funding, such as Demonstration Cities, would only worsen their
problems.531
The crux of Brock’s argument was that federal aid had become too complicated. The Model
Cities program streamlined the grant-writing process, so that a local project could apply once to
the program in order to access all the disparate federal aid programs and agencies available.
Brock’s conclusion was that cities “cannot effectively utilize many of these programs” and that
perhaps it was “time to pause and reevaluate our past efforts.” Employing even more rhetorical
questions, Brock continued:
When the bill takes four pages just to list those areas in which national controls and
standards must be substituted for local judgment and initiative, doesn’t this ring a small
bell? If our local communities are unable or unwilling to establish reasonable criteria, as
this language implies, then perhaps we had best reexamine the root structure of America.
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Thus Brock moved from the logistics of the Demonstration City legislation to the entire structure
of American governance. He wondered whether “we will cease to earn the title of a great, or even
a free, society.” Given that LBJ’s social programs were titled collectively The Great Society,
Brock’s choice of words was no accident.532
Burt L. Talcott submitted his individual views, which echoe those of Bill Brock, but his ire
was directed more to Title IV, “Land Development and New Communities,” an amendment to the
National Housing Act. The amendment addressed small matters of mortgage insurance and sewage
infrastructure. Somewhat oddly, Congressman Talcott took the opportunity to lambast “federal
suburbs” and “government towns.” They were, Talcott wrote, “the most devastating encroachment
by the Federal central bureaucracy upon the functions of local government, private enterprise, and
individual freedom yet concocted by the Federal planners.” Far from being “a lesson in
democracy,” they were rather “benevolent dictatorships.” Strangely, Talcott described the
proposed communities as “artificial.” He was dismayed that “for the first time we are going to
have our people told where to live and under what conditions.”533
In contrast Paul Fino were the views of Seymour Halpern, a Republican representative
from Queens who was, as his New York Times obituary phrased it, “distinctly liberal.”534 The
broadness of the Model Cities program was, Halpern acknowledged, concerning, but “I feel the
seriousness of the urban ills which plague our cites warrants consideration of the massive programs
outlined in this critical legislation.” So while he held reservations, Halpern also considered it
doubtful that the federal government would seek to limit local governments. He asserted that “the
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local voice, I am certain, will be heard.” Taking up the concept of metropolitan planning directly,
Halpern argued that it would make the process “more immediate, more effective, and more
efficient.” Indeed, “the metropolitan planning title will serve to decentralize and speed
administration of the federally aided urban projects.”535
The additional views of Florence Dwyer were of note as she seemed to follow what one
could term the Jane Jacobs’ view of urban renewal: namely, that local control is vital. The
reasoning was not the coded racial and class prejudice apparent in Paul Fino’s arguments. As far
as Jane Jacobs was concerned, one of the clearest signs of a healthy city was racial and economic
integration. The problem was, instead, that large-scale projects, even by the most well-intentioned
planners, tended to harm neighborhoods, especially those that could not defend themselves. These
were the neighborhoods where those without social, economic, or political power lived. Based on
her individual report on Demonstration Cities, Representative Dwyer shared a similar point-ofview.
Dwyer began her report by saying that the weaknesses of the bill were discussed in the
minority report, “with which I generally concur.” She repeated its concerns over the vagueness of
the language and argued that the problems of cities were so important and urgent that it was worth
doing well. In her estimation, the Demonstration Cities legislation was not good enough. It opened
a flood of money that would be under the control and discretion of the HUD secretary, meaning
that city planning and development would be largely under the direction of one individual. She
was not, she continued, anti-urban-renewal, but specified that it can be done well and it can be
done poorly. She saw local control as the issue. “All too often,” she argued, “the people of a
community have been the missing ingredient in urban renewal.” Despite the clear interest that local
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residents and citizens have in being part of the planning process, Dwyer noted, too often
development agencies sought to discourage citizen interest and participation. The consequences
have been profound, and not necessarily positive:
To many who have experienced it, urban renewal has not been an unmixed blessing. And
the lower down the income scale these people have been the more they have been hurt.
[…] The record is discouragingly full of documented reports of hardship, dislocation,
disruption, higher rents, vacant land, Negro removal, new slums, the unnecessary
destruction of viable neighborhoods, and a host of other ills resulting directly from badly
planned and mishandled projects.536
The contrast with Fino’s response is striking. Whereas Fino feared how urban renewal as pursued
by Demonstration Cities might unfairly affect anyone who did not live in a slum, Dwyer
recognized that urban renewal projects often harmed those who do live in economically distressed
urban areas. Thus she recommended that all urban renewal projects be voted on as a referendum
in communities of 150,000 or less – an amendment that failed to receive support. Where Dwyer
and other writers of the group report, including Fino, agreed is that they saw a general lack of trust
of “the people”.537
Conclusion
The opposition to the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of 1966 did not succeed
in defeating the bill, although it made it a tight race. The 89th Congress passed the bill, but not
before trimming it severely. The original concept had aid targeting only six cities: Washington,
Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Houston, and Los Angeles. Perhaps if aid had flown to only those
six cities, the bill could have lived up to its intention to demonstrate what a city could accomplish
via a coordinated array of services and aids from the federal government. When the bill passed,
the number had grown elevenfold, to 66 cities. As the New York Times diagnosed, after the number
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of beneficiaries grew well into the double-digits, “Eventually the money was shoveled around only
a half-inch deep anywhere. The program was destined to fail.” 538 As the architect of the Model
Cities program, Charles Haar, wrote in his memoirs, “No legislation, despite its merits, is assured
without votes, and to acquire them for Model Cities President Johnson knew he needed to add
more cities as potential recipients.” Not only were the funds diluted via the growing number of
cities included, but the sums requested were enormous. Mayor John Lindsay of New York City
alone asked for $50 billion, noting that the city would likely need more. Detroit asked for $15
billion, even as Mayor Jerome Cavanaugh argued that $250 billion would be required to adequately
address the urban crisis in the United States. “Slowly, the original idea was expanded further,
diluting the effectiveness of federal funds,” Haar observed, “. . . intended by Reuther’s original
letter to the President.”539
While lower than the sums mentioned in the previous paragraph, the surviving bill, which
had originally asked for $2.3 billion, still allocated $900 million to cities to help develop and
implement plans for revitalization. The sixty-six cities that benefited were broken down into six
large cities (over 500,000), ten medium cities (250,000 to 500,000), and fifty small cities (less than
250,000), and called for full citizen participation. It was, urban historian Roger Biles commented,
“arguably his [Johnson’s] most arduous struggle with the Eighty-ninth Congress.”540
One of the core lessons of the Civil Rights Movement in the history of the United States is
the tension within local and national control. Just as states’ rights had been used since before the
Civil War to justify the institution of slavery and, following the Civil War, to decry the tyranny of
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Abraham Lincoln and the federal government, so the argument of states’ rights had been used
since the Civil War to defend local race codes, segregation, discrimination, and Jim Crow
practices. It was the argument used in Little Rock, Arkansas, when the Supreme Court’s ruling
was disregarded. It was to a greater extent used even when federal troops were sent in to enforce
desegregation. It was used in the Deep South when it came to the disfranchisement of African
American voters and desegregation of public facilities, especially when Kennedy and then Johnson
gave their support to the civil rights movement.
Thus, in 1966, when these views of those who opposed the Demonstration Cities bill
deployed the language of local governance versus federal control, it was hard to ignore the
prevalent contemporary use of that language to defend racial prejudice and discrimination. The
explicit references to school busing and integrated suburbs only served to reinforce this
interpretation. While it was possible that the authors of these dissenting views did not consciously
echo these racialized arguments, it is impossible to imagine that the Johnson administration did
not interpret them in just that light. If some of the opponents to the Model Cities program were
rooted in racial and class biases, however, the next chapter will explore the ways that the Model
Cities program itself was also founded upon racial and class assumptions regarding cities and their
residents.

213
CHAPTER 6 THE URBAN IMAGINARY OF THE GREAT SOCIETY, 1967-1968
How strange that Lyndon Johnson, so homespun and regional – the unabashed son of rural Texas
– could become the nation’s advocate for the old and decaying central cities.
Charles M. Haar541
The political fight over Model Cities recounted in the previous chapter was contentious
and revealed deep fault lines between liberal and conservative understandings of racial and class
geography in American cities. It was not just the opponents of the legislation, however, who
worked with flawed racial and class assumptions. The Model City legislation itself, while wellmeaning, misunderstood racial and class divisions in urban spaces, and as a consequence it
inadequately addressed urban conflict. By examining the ways that key members of the Johnson
administration understood urban challenges and conceived of solutions, this chapter explores the
place that the urban crisis occupied in the though of federal policy makers in the Great Society.
This chapter represents the far distance from the first chapters of this study, metaphorically
as well as more literally. The discussion of how federal policy makers thought of the problems of
black and working-class city residents is the complement to the earlier chapters that focus on how
some of those problems manifested in metropolitan Detroit. As the chapters have moved up
geographic scales – from communities to the greater metropolitan region to the federal level – so
too have urban issues become more abstract and generic. Federal policy makers rooted their
discussions in data and observations, including observational trips to distressed urban areas. In
addition to first-hand observation, however, federal policy makers filtered their empirical research
through their own racial and class biases. When it came to, say, treatments of the civil disorders
and black anger in the late 1960s, one could imagine that some authors of reports or speeches wrote
not out of their own biases but in order to accommodate those of their audiences. Yet, still, these
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treatments of cities and the response by the Model Cities program reveal how members of the
Great Society thought about and understood the urban crisis.
Four Johnson administration texts form the main focus of this chapter. Beginning with a
speech by Lyndon Johnson, the chapter will address how the president approached the war on
poverty and the Great Society. Then, the urban vision and imagination of the architect of the Model
Cities program, Charles Haar, will be described. In his secret memo to the president, Haar
described four possible futures for American cities that were used to guide policy decisions
regarding urban questions. Third, a 1968 Center for Community Planning (housed in the US
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) booklet, A City for Man, sought to explain the
Model Cities program to its readers. Finally, the chapter will conclude with two speeches delivered
by the Assistant Secretary for Model Cities, H. Ralph Taylor, who tried to explain what citizen
participation was and what it was not.
Taken together, this different administration perspectives on Model Cities specifically and
urban affairs broadly help reveal the thinking of those directing the Great Society. All sought to
improve the quality of life for urban residents as they did for all Americans. However, their
understandings of the lived experiences within cities could be limited, their treatment of serious
urban problems could be amiss, and their treatment of city residents could be patronizing. It is this
distance between what the Great Society aimed for – and the aim was high – and what
administration members failed to see that helps illuminate what urban thinking in the twilight of
mid-century liberalism got right, and where it went astray.
American’s Unfinished Business: Urban and Rural Poverty, 1967
That the Johnson presidency understood the Model Cities program to be part and parcel of
a larger war on poverty permeates the administration’s speeches and statements. Consider Lyndon
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Johnson’s March 14, 1967, address to congress, “Message on America’s Unfinished Business:
Urban and Rural Poverty.” Johnson began by quoting Jacob Riis, whose 1890 book of
photojournalism How the Other Half Lives continues to be a classic of anti-poverty literature unto
today.542 “The slum is as old as civilization,” Riis wrote in 1902, and those who lost the race of
civilization gave up hope and ambition, until “they are the victims, not the masters of their
environment; and it is a bad master.” Riis’ words were not only applicable to the United States in
1902, Johnson continued, but to the US in the 1960s as well. 543
“The basic conditions of life for the poor must, and can,” the president argued, “be
changed.” Social security, public assistance programs, and fair labor standards all contributed to
Johnson’s “total strategy against poverty,” and he encouraged adding additional measures in
education, health, jobs and job training, housing, public assistance, transportation, recreation, and
clean air and water. It was no coincidence that Johnson originally referred to New Deal measures.
Franklin D. Roosevelt was a political hero, and LBJ consciously positioned himself as FDR’s
heir.544 These measures, Johnson stated, were not mere handouts. Those who would benefit from
the proposed programs against poverty were “capable of helping themselves if given an
opportunity to do so.” For Johnson, it was the opportunity to improve one’s position that
counted.545
Yet, the more that was done to address poverty in the United States, the more the size of
the problem became apparent. Gains had been made, the president observed, “but we have also
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come to see how profound are the problems that confront us, how deeply ingrained are the customs
and practices that must be changed, how stubbornly the heritage of poverty persists from
generation to generation.” Warning his hearers not to give into pessimism, Johnson instead
encouraged his listeners to embrace “a sober determination to carry through.” At the same time,
Johnson recognized and acknowledged the controversy caused by his Great Society programs. He
considered it inevitable, as he was proposing a “fundamental change” to how the federal
government responded to poverty. Waiting, however, was not an option for the president. Change
was required immediately, not in some vague future. “America had to pull the drowning man out
of the water,” as far as Johnson was concerned, “and talk about it later.”546
In addition to being a powerful rhetorical moment, Johnson’s analogy summed him his
approach to his administration overall. On one hand, the Johnson administration would keep
avoiding program details, and occasionally leave in ambiguous or even contradictory language, in
order to help the passage of bills through Congress. “The attitude of the president,” LBJ
administration insider Charles Haar recalled, “was simply to pass a bill through first and worry
about the details of implementation later.” On the other hand, Johnson encouraged taskforces to
develop experimental solutions and programs. This strategy allowed for flexibility and creativity,
but it also meant that mistakes and errors would be made. Johnson recognized this, and accepted
it as the cost of trying to push the federal government in a new direction.547
Describing the Indescribable
The future of American cities in the late 60s, while unknown, was not unforeseen. For the
Great Society, one vision came from Harvard Law professor and architect of the Model Cities
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program, Charles M. Haar. He was a significant advisor to Lyndon Johnson and his administration.
In August of 1967, he wrote a confidential memo to Johnson in which he described the likely
futures of American cities. The memo was intended to sketch the results of different policy
decisions, with the aim of guiding Great Society decision on urban affairs. “President Johnson,”
Haar recalled in his memoir, “considered each of these possibility during intense discussion with
his advisers.” Thus, it provides a window into the thinking of key Johnson advisor on urban affairs;
that it was taken seriously by LBJ and other advisors only underscores that these scenarios found
resonance among policy makers in the Great Society.548
Born in Antwerp, Belgium, in 1920, Haar and his family immigrated to the United States
when he was six months old. After serving the Pacific theater during the Second World War, he
received his law degree from Harvard in 1948. He joined the faculty in 1952 and remained until
1991. At Harvard in the 1950s, Haar was at the head of the newly-emerging field of land-use law.
In 1958 he wrote Land-Use Planning: A Casebook on the Use, Misuse and Re-Use of Urban Land,
an influential text. He advised John F. Kennedy on urban planning and policy during his campaign,
and he helped LBJ craft Great Society programs. Haar also served a chair of LBJ’s National Task
Force on the Preservation of Natural Beauty in 1964, a position that led him organizing the first
White House conference on the environment.
President Johnson afterwards appointed Haar as chair on a commission on the creation and
organization of a housing department, which became the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). Johnson then assigned him to a task force through which he became the
primary architect of the Model Cities program, including drafting the legislation. He later served
as the first assistant secretary for metropolitan development in HUD. Later in life Haar led the

548

Haar, Striving for the Great Society: Lyndon Johnson's Reshaping of the American Dream, 98.

218
cleanup of Boston Harbor in 1983, following a pollution lawsuit in which he was a court-appointed
master. The case demonstrated for Haar the necessity of the judiciary in intervening in the tragedy
of the commons. In addition, he wrote numerous articles and books from the 1950s through the
2000s. As the New York Times wrote in his obituary, “Mr. Haar advocated robust government
regulation of, and intervention in, urban development.”549
In his confidential memo, “Describing the Indescribable in Metropolitan Development: A
Scenario in Four Parts,” Haar provided four “illustrations,” “painted in broad brush strokes.” The
first scenario described the future Haar considered the most likely based on contemporary urban
trends, with the title “The Armed Fortress.” In this vision, urban disorders would become routine.
White Americans would abandon the civil rights movement, treating “the Negro revolution as a
civil war that must be stamped out or contained.” White Americans would therefore isolate
themselves in suburbia. Northern and Southern cities would become centers of “black power,” and
“the white humane impulse [would be] lost amid the rising demands of middle-class whites that
streets be made safe and the order of the Republic secured.” Coupled with continuing violence in
the cities and white backlash in the suburbs, as Haar imagined them, federal budgets would become
constrained, perhaps through an expansion of the war in Vietnam, or tax cuts, or the use of
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surpluses in the pursuit of space exploration. Regardless, the War on Poverty and the Model Cities
program would be dismantled by a Congress concerned with inflation or deficits, or both.550
With less resources, he continued, “resentment in the ghetto flares higher.” Mayors would
have to focus on containing riots rather than addressing their causes. In this scenario, police forces
would grow larger, and “they [would] take on the characteristics of occupying armies in the
ghettos.” Whites who still lived in the central city, fearing violence, would flee to suburbs, as do
downtown institutions and businesses. The remaining non-white city residents would become “an
alien population carrying on guerilla warfare with police and national guardsmen.” One result of
the “white exodus,” Haar argued, would be that housing would become available as they move
out, allowing for more class stratification among black city residents: middle-class and workingclass African Americans, also “anxious to flee the violence of the ghetto,” would move away from
the impoverished.551
In Haar’s first scenario, cities would become centers of black political power, as they
become homes to black majorities, but this is a Pyrrhic victory: “[D]rained of the institutions and
businesses that once provided job opportunities, the central city exists as an angry and unstable
mixture of middle class Negroes who have scant hope of escaping to suburbia, plus a vast host of
lower-class Negroes who can only stew in their own resentment in an environment which has little
to offer them in social services and economic opportunity.” The white power structure, which had
“sacrificed its capital investment in Downtown institutions,” would have no interest in helping to
improve the quality of life in central cities. Only federal aid, “which can hop over the white
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suburbs,” could help cities, but, given this scenario, the forces in Congress would likely decline
such a path.552
Finally, Haar concluded, with cities impoverished and the federal government unwilling to
act, state governments would intervene. They would take over critical functions like policing and
hospitals. Nationally, “Reagan Republicans” would become politically dominate. Their appeal
would lie with “white families with a newly vested interest in maintaining the suburban status quo.
Their platform stresses larger police forces, an end to fair housing laws, cuts in the welfare budget,
and state supervision over central city finances.” Such was the envisioned urban future in the
United States in 1967 by one of its foremost urban thinkers. Fifty years later, a number of details
in this speculative sketch ring accurate.553
Haar’s second scenario, “the Pacified Ghetto,” was preferable only insofar as it was less
violent. Convinced that urban disorders of the late 1960s were caused largely by black power
politics, Haar asked the reader to “imagine” that Stokely Carmichael, Floyd McKissick, “and
others along the ‘black power’ spectrum [would] come to the conclusion that the Model Cities and
related programs [could] provide the mechanism whereby Negroes stand to gain political and
economic leverage in the central cities.” Equating black power with violence, the author imagined
a future in which “the Civil Rights movement realigns itself around the theme of using Federal
dollars to build unified, politically responsible black communities.” The policies of the Johnson
administration were within the realm of political responsibility; those who dissented were outside
of responsible politics.554
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Compared to Haar’s first scenario, in which the Vietnam War or other factors led to a
restricted federal budget, the second scenario was one in which big-city mayors and “a now-united
Negro movement” form a force behind “a greatly enlarged Model Cities campaign,” which would
be financially feasible with the end of the war. With “massive expenditures in the ghetto” the
quality of life would rise, schools would improve, and residences would be rehabilitated.
Unemployment would decline via social services and job training. Unlike the Armed Fortress
scenario, with its rigid segregation, the Pacified Ghetto “remains a place to which whites from the
suburbs travel for commerce and culture.”555
Politically, central cities would become the locus for black political power. With an
“increased capacity to operate the levers of the political system,” a black congressional bloc would
form to advocate and gain benefits for their constituents. This development, explicitly tied to
following the Johnson administration and comprised of middle-class African Americans, Haar
characterized as “the positive results of ‘black power’ ideology.” However, as the white business
community would desire to maintain their influence over the cities, they would support the creation
of metropolitan governments, or else support state intervention in city functions. Haar presented
this as a positive development, as it would lead to better planning and negotiation over the form
of metropolitan areas while maintaining support for Model Cities programs in central cities.556
While suburban whites still would travel to the city, the demographic flow would not be a
two-way street. This scenario ended with “a pacified Negro community reaping the benefits of
massive Federal aid through the Model Cities program,” and the development of a separate-butequal metropolitan space. “The price paid by the Negroes,” the white paper predicted, “for political
domination of the central city and improved housing and service conditions [would be] exclusion
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from the suburbs and from realization of the ideal of a single family home on a plot of grass.” On
the other side, the price paid by the white suburbs for keeping the black community contained in
the central city would be paying taxes to support central city programs like Model Cities. It would
be a tithe to “preserve their freedom to keep their communities exclusionary.”557
While this short-term status quo might have some limited benefits over the urban crises of
the late 1960s, it would not be able to last long. City residents would continue to be cut off from
employment opportunities in the suburbs, creating a pool of unemployed residents which would,
in turn, suppress the wages offered by the remaining employers in the city. Segregated school
would lead to decreasing quality of education in the city. A growing black middle-class, described
as “articulate,” would begin to advocate for “access to suburban housing.”558
The first two cases were Haar’s worst-case scenarios, but they were the ones that he
considered the most likely, given contemporary policies and attitudes. The latter two scenarios
provided a view of a more hopeful, even idealistic, future, but the report cautioned the reader that
serious, even drastic, changes had to be made in politics and policy to achieve them. The third
scenario was the Mini-Ghetto. It was predicated on the passage of a robust open housing law. As
a result, in the United States, it would be “a Federal offense to discriminate against Negroes in any
kind of housing, old or new, single or multi-family.” In another telling description of the black
freedom movement, the author encouraged the reader to “assume also that the Civil Rights
movement [would be] somehow pieced together again,” and that its leaders would agree on a
“grand strategy” which is really just “a reinforcement of natural tendencies.” This imagined grand
strategy, based on purported natural tendencies was to “urg[e] Negroes to abandon the central
cities and start anew in the suburbs.” In this imagining, Haar revealed his own valuation of suburbia
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as more in tune with the natural inclinations of human beings. The city, on the other hand, is
implied to be a greater distance from human nature.559
In turning to the suburbs, Haar assume that the black community would follow the pattern
of other ethnic groups, such as Jewish, Italian, and Irish communities. They would form enclaves
and pockets throughout metropolitan areas: essentially, black suburban communities would be
formed. This development would result in the geographic separation of classes within the black
community, with the middle class choosing middle-class neighborhoods, the working class
moving to working-class neighborhoods, and so on. The author assumed a class-based racism in
the suburbs, in which lower-class white suburbs would respond with “hostility of the worst kind
[…] followed by a massive white out-migration.” Within middle-class suburbs, however, “once it
had been established that only middle-class Negroes were moving in,” the suburbanites would
have “a hesitant willingness to remain.” Haar assumed that a cautious class solidarity would trump
racial antagonism. As chapter one showed in the case of Grosse Pointe, there was no basis
historically for assuming this class difference in regards to attitudes towards suburban racial
integration.
Moreover, the central city would remain “the largest of the ghettos.” Unlike those who
moved to the suburbs, residents of the inner city would continue to face “alienation,
unemployment, and poor education,” which was “the lot of the lower-class Negro in the central
city.” Even lower-class black suburbs, lacking political clout, downtown business districts to
provide a tax base, and diminished access to state and federal aid would find themselves threatened
with becoming “pocket[s] of poverty,” “a series of dispersed small ghettos … throughout the
metropolitan areas.” With the population of the central city moving to the suburbs, city land would
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become vacant and available for redevelopment. “For once,” Haar commented, “redevelopment
could proceed without stirring problems of relocation.” Indeed, with “the exodus of the Negro
ghetto,” institutions and businesses would feel “more confident” in operating in the central city.
Other would feel more confident, too. With “race no longer an issue in the life of the central city,
more suburbanites, especially the young married, might be lured back downtown.” Thus urban
renewal would “come into its full glory” as the central city, “reclaimed ghetto land,” is rebuilt “to
suit the tastes of the middle-class.”560
Haar predicted that this future would be aided by a Democratic Party run by “pragmatic
leaders” who accepted segregation by choice. For instance, there could be “many exclusively white
or exclusively Negro neighborhoods for those who prefer that way of life.” This compromise, as
Haar termed it, could be expanded throughout the metropolitan area. The decision of Brown v.
Board, which ordered school desegregation, would be “extended to require equality of facilities
and expenditures within local corporate unites as between their ghetto and non-ghetto portion; and
on the State level as between all-Negro communities and all-white localities.” Without any sense
of irony the author proposed to put to the Brown v. Board decision in service of the separate-butequal doctrine it had intended to overturn. This era of compromise would create a political climate
in which “a rule of reason prevails” and consensus could be reached. In arguing for such a course
of “reason,” in which segregated neighborhoods for those who desired them represented making
the best of a less-than-ideal reality, contained echoes of the stated reasoning behind the Grosse
Pointe point system. Given how segregated neighborhoods for white Americans and black
Americans have historically led to vastly disparate economic possibilities and futures, the burden
of this imagined consensus would fall unevenly across the racial divide.561
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Haar’s fourth scenario was the most hopeful. It was called the Vanishing Ghetto. Taking
the strict open-housing law of the third scenario, this last scenario coupled it with “major
affirmative housing programs,” backed by full Congressional funding. Congress also would
provide full funding for the programs of the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
including rent subsidies and guaranteed annual incomes. Full geographic mobility would be
recognized as a right guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, with the result that “Negroes are
endowed with unprecedented freedom of movement.” This movement would not be only down to
individual choices; it would be the result of public policy as well. All municipalities would be
residentially opened up equally, guided by a deliberate effort to “fairly evenly absorb the
newcomer.” Thus, new ghettoes would not be created to replace the old ones.562
Imagining that Johnson would win reelection in 1968, “a brilliant New Cities Program”
was envisioned in which “institutional investors and large corporations such as General Motors &
General Electric” supported the creation of integrated communities, where “greater economies of
scale overcome lingering racial prejudice.” “As suburban whites became convinced that the Negro
exodus would be guided so that no single community would receive more than a small share of
the total,” the report continued, “they [would] lose fear of inundation and resist the early inclination
toward panic selling.” Deliberately planned to permanently be a minority population in whatever
community in which they lived, black Americans would have no political power but would benefit
from the services and housing available to white Americans. De facto segregation would be thus
eliminated, with the result that “the Negro population [would] become[…] increasingly
assimilated into American middle-class life.”563

562
563

“Describing the Indescribable,” August 18, 1967, Box 20, HUD Folder, McPherson.
“Describing the Indescribable,” August 18, 1967, Box 20, HUD Folder, McPherson.

226
The author argued that these last two scenarios were not “beyond reach if we use public
policy to deflect current mobility patterns,” but it would require changes in both residential
movement and public policies. Quoting President Johnson’s “Message on Problems & Future of
the Central City and Its Suburbs,” the report concluded by arguing that all people had to have
access to the full range of choices available, whether in the realm of housing, education, recreation,
or culture, and not just “the fortunate.”564 In a follow-up memo clarifying the last two scenarios,
Haar emphasized that the fourth scenario was “unrealistic as a short run goal but minor steps can
be taken in this direction, and as an ideal, it needs stating.”565
While this document contained insightful projections for the future of American urban life
and policy, it also contains important evidence of the perception of cities in the late 1960s. Given
that the main architect of the Model Cities program wrote the report, it provides a perspective into
the worldview that gave birth to that program. One of the first thing that strikes the reader is the
author’s distrust of black power politics. The phrase was always put in quotation marks, as if to
reinforce that it was not the author’s term. Haar associated it with violence, political extortion, and
irresponsibility. The author’s racial politics are ambivalent at best. On one hand, he supported
access to housing, to education, to employment, and the freedom of movement. Equality in terms
of integration is desired. On the other hand, the author balked at the idea of a majority black
population and of black political control. Equal access to resources and services are one thing, he
seemed to say, but equal access to power itself is seemingly a step too far.
Tension existed, then, between the goal of complete integration and the reality of black
political power. As the report reflects in the fourth scenario, the elimination of de facto segregation
would go hand-in-hand with the African-American population remaining a minority in all
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communities, and therefore without access to political control. Assuming complete integration to
be the more worthwhile goal, it followed that a majority-black city, or inner city, was anathema to
the pursuit of civil rights. Not only were black urban spaces to be eliminated, Haar believed, they
were a barrier to progress in and of themselves. American cities, in order to have a healthy future
free from crisis, required the dispersal of the black population into suburbs, leaving the “reclaimed
ghetto land” free for redevelopment. The problem with American cities, the report argued, was not
discrimination, segregation, runaway jobs, or the resulting geographically bounded and racialized
poverty; it was the impoverished population, largely but not exclusively black. That poverty itself
was not the issue was indicated in the acceptance of lower-class suburbs, described as potential
pockets of poverty or smaller ghettos. Here class intersected with race, as middle-class African
Americans were predicted to move to integrated middle-class neighborhoods, where, despite
hesitations, there would be no hostility or white flight. Indeed, the future of black American laid
in its assimilation into American middle-class life. The historical experiences of African American
families that moved into white suburbs, however, seemed to counter this imagined middle-class
integration.
The future of the city was to be middle-class city, rebuilt to “suit the tastes of the middleclass.” The black working class and lower class were to be banished to the suburbs, as, presumably,
working-class and lower-class members of other racial and ethnic groups also were banished in
pursuit of a city oriented around middle-class tastes, desires, and needs. Once again, saving the
city did not mean saving those who lived in them; rather, it meant getting rid of existing city
residents, solving poverty by moving the poor, and overcoming racial strife by relocating black
communities elsewhere.566
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Needless to say, the roots of urban ills – of poverty and of racial strife – were not examined.
They did not need to be, as those were not the problems that needed to be solved. The wording and
phrasing of the four different scenarios strongly suggests this indifference. In praising political
compromise in the third scenario, the author explicitly defended segregated communities “for
those who prefer that way of life.” He then referenced Brown v. Board in a defense of separatebut-equal public policies. One of the key arguments of the Brown v. Board decision was that
separate-but-equal was unconstitutional because separate meant unequal. Taking the argument
about housing segregation presented in the first chapter at face value, that the core problem was
property values, separate-but-equal would mean the end of the motivation behind housing
segregation. If all people, regardless of ancestry or other traits, had access to equal housing, then
fears of lowering values would not enter the equation. It is only in an arrangement in which black
housing equated to slum housing that a black neighbor would have equated to deteriorating
property values. Segregation was premised on unequal access to resources, whether it be housing,
education, or political power.
It is striking that “Describing the Indescribable” never questioned white racism or
segregationist tendencies. At best, it took them for granted; at worst, it suggested they were
reasonable. This bias came to the forefront in the third scenario, in which political compromise is
described as meaning a modus vivendi comprised of exclusively white and exclusively black
neighborhoods throughout the metropolitan area, with a resulting “checkerboard pattern.” In the
fourth scenario, in which full integration was to be achieved through deliberate public policy, the
white suburbs, would be “convinced that the Negro exodus [would] be guided so that no single
community receive[d] more than a small share of the total.” They would, consequently, “lose
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[their] fear of inundation and resist the early inclination toward panic selling.”567 There was no
attempt to explain white panic as anything other than “fear of inundation” that could be assuaged
by guaranteeing that the black population would always be no more than “a small share.”568
A component of this conception of race and space was that Haar saw suburban space as
ideal and to be preferred over the urban.569 Black suburbanization, for the middle class at least,
would give them “the fulfillment of the American dream: the single family house on a grassy plot,
barbecue pits, a good education system, a high level of public services, easy access to suburban
jobs.”570 There was nothing wrong with such a dream in and of itself, though it begged the question
of why were there good education systems and high levels of public services in suburbs, but not
the inner cities. Why were decent jobs to be found, not in cities, but in their metropolitan fringes?
Could one not happily barbecue, in good relations with one’s neighbors and surroundings, in the
city?
The eagerness with which Haar conceived of the city as being remade in the image of
middle-class culture, with “opera houses, art museums, new town houses, and even a sprinkling
of contemporary single-family houses” suggested that it was not the city, inherently, which posed
the problem. The problem was that the city was inhabited increasingly by the impoverished, and
the impoverished were overwhelmingly black. By the late 1960s, Haar believed, city residents
were violent, as demonstrated by riots and by black power politics, which went hand-in-hand in
his mind. It bears repeating that, for Haar, the middle class was not necessarily white. It also
included the black middle class, those who were “articulate” and “politically responsible,” and
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who were “assimilated” into middle class society and culture. Yet, when speaking of the middle
class, he relapsed into language that indicated that he meant a white middle class. In the third
scenario, suburbanites, and particularly the “young married,” could be “lured” back downtown
with “race no longer an issue” in the city.571
By the late 1960s, some of those city residents’ frustrations at social, political, and
economic inequalities manifested in black power politics or in rioting, beginning with civil
disorders in Harlem in 1964 and Watts in 1965. As recounted in Chapter 4, Detroit was the site of
what was considered the worst civil disorder in July of 1967, and what was described by veteran
Detroit police as “in the worst urban guerilla warfare witnessed in the United States in the twentieth
century.”572 Over the course of a week, unrest spread through the city, with looting, arson, and
sniping covering a hundred square miles. Two thousand five hundred and nine buildings were
damaged, accompanied by a loss of $36 million in insured property. Over seventeen thousand
members of law enforcement were present in the city, which included the five thousand federal
troops deployed by President Johnson at the request of the state governor. Seven thousand two
hundred and thirty one people were arrested, and forty-three died.573 These events, less than a
month in the past, constituted the backdrop of Charles Haar writing his confidential memo to the
president in August of 1967.
A City for Man
Half a year later, in a February 1968 booklet, A City for Man, the Center for Community
Planning within the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) outlined the vision
behind Model Cities. It thus provides an perspective on how the urban crisis and the Great
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Society’s proposed course of action was viewed by involved members of the Johnson
administration outside of HUD. For the author of the Center for Community Planning booklet, the
urban crisis was a “a puzzling paradox.” In an era of affluence and technological progress, twenty
percent of Americans lived “in abject poverty and despair.” Millions within that twenty percent
were “crowded into the slum areas of America’s cities,” where some “riot on the streets.” The
urban poor served as “an ever-present bad conscience for the affluent majority.” While never stated
explicitly, the “violent, alienated men with nothing to lose” within the slums were more than just
a bad conscience. The consequence of poverty shifted unto those who were impoverished, so that
the poor became the manifestation of poverty itself. The slums, and those who lived in them, served
as a repository of fear for the affluent majority, a site of projection. It led to conclusions such as
“it is increasingly clear that Americans will either have to abolish the slums, or the slums will
destroy the very fabric of our society.”574
The booklet identified unemployment and underemployment as culprits behind poverty,
but only as abstract forces which, like hunger and illiteracy, were all “part of a horrifying but
familiar picture which often seems all but impervious to human hand and will.” Any attempt at a
causal explanation for these elements of urban poverty was quickly dismissed out-of-hand.
Automation, “racial change,” and migration from rural to urban areas were further identified as
underlying factors behind “slum conditions.” 575 Nonetheless, the fundamental problems of slum
areas had to be studied; existing social programs, even if inadequate, had to be utilized. Urban
planners, along with “private citizens from both suburb and slum,” and different levels of
government, business, labor unions, and private associations and organizations, had to join
together in order to address the urban crisis. Community involvement was “vital,” as city residents
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have an “understanding of local conditions and habits [that] can help the specialists develop
effective programs for aiding the residents.” Explicit in the philosophy of the Model Cities
program, then, was that the program could not be top-down. In fact, speaking of city residents, the
booklet argued that “their cooperation and interest may well determine success or failure of any
new or renovated programs.”576
A few pages later, the booklet returned to this theme, noting that planners would have to
“depend heavily upon residents,” as “too often projects are ‘successful’ on paper without ever
working in reality.” It was necessary that local residents be involved in planning and subsequent
steps of programs, in order to “suggest ways to of making them more pertinent.” Already the
reader could see that local resident involvement, while praised, was conceived as advisory: Local
residents were to make suggestions, but not decisions. But, then, after “long months of
consultation, research, and deep thought,” the arrived-at programs would be ready for “bringing
modern living standards and opportunities to the slums.” At stake for the booklet’s authors was
modernity itself, which did not include slums, and appropriate living standards. The lack of
opportunities, which included employment, were an acknowledgement that there were social
conditions beyond city residents’ control. The booklet did not address why there were no
opportunities present in slums areas, or how one could bring back jobs that had moved
elsewhere.577
The economic deprivation of the slums were to be addressed through what the booklet
called “financial health.” Poverty was, the booklet observed, the “single massive problem” behind
slum conditions. The report betrayed a confusion over what, exactly, caused poverty. On one hand,
there were “men and women who spend every waking hour looking for work, working at menial
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but exhausting jobs, or minding large families,” with the result that they “have little time for
education or job training.” Indeed, “many of the poor are still eager to take advantage of any job
training or career programs they can get their hands on.” In other words, the impoverished sought
to improve their lot in life if possible, though all too often it was not. Those in the best position to
understand that living in poverty and slums was less-than ideal were those who lived in poverty
and slums. At the same time, the unstated premise of the booklet was that well-paying employment
required advanced education and training; what working-class employment there was was
exhausting and menial and paid poverty wages.578
Yet, in the same passage, the booklet forwarded a culture-of-poverty argument that
somewhat contradicted the above.579 The impoverished “have been beaten down by hopelessness,”
and “have been convinced too many times that they are worthless.” The result was that “they lack
confidence in themselves and in the future.” There was no foreseeable benefit to improving their
conditions. Instead of the “risky route of advanced training and education,” the poor chose “early
marriage, child bearing, and sticking to a menial, futureless, but familiar job.” This worldview, the
booklet stated, was passed down to children in poor families, “continuing the hopeless cycle of
poverty for yet another generation.” At the same time, automation was taking away exactly those
menial jobs (“ditchdigging, dishwashing, and many other rote jobs”) while rural-to-urban
migration continued, putting more pressure on the existing “rote” jobs. That the authors of the
booklet understood automation as affecting jobs like dishwashing and ditchdigging indicated their
lack of familiarity with automation or its impact on working-class employment.580
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The proposed answer to poverty, whether it be created by lack of employment and
education opportunities, or the reluctance of the poor to take risks and improve themselves, was
threefold: “job training and career development, financial assurance, and consumer protection.”581
Job training formed a cornerstone to the Model Cities’ approach to under- and unemployment, and
especially industrial employment. While industrial employment was commonly associated with
semi- and unskilled labor, or as an entry-point to learn a skilled trade, it was clear that to the Model
Cities program, those living in impoverished slums were unaware of this career path. The authors
proposed that businesses and associations sponsor urban renewal and housing projects; that labor
unions, along with industry and government, create apprenticeship programs; and that local
industries “make their machines and equipment available during non-working hours to give
residents practical experience in the jobs they are learning.”582 That industrial employment might
not be an option to impoverished city residents in 1968 due to the combination of segregation, job
discrimination, and industrial decentralization was not part of this solution.
Fundamental to this solution was the premise that jobs existed and workers in demand. The
booklet was not calling on private businesses to engage in charity; rather, “thirty million poor
represent an immense loss of markets and resources.” There was a “manpower gap,” in which
“able-bodied men and women” went unemployed while help-wanted columns were growing.
“Inadequate numbers of key workers,” the booklet asserted, “curtail business and industrial
expansion, still millions are unemployed or underemployed.” The jobs that needed to be filled,
however, were above the abilities of the poor. As the “middle-range” jobs were “too demanding
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for the undereducated,” intensive job training would be required to fill those positions and allow
businesses and industries to expand.583
Along with job training, Model Cities was to aid with career development. Here a curious
solution was proposed. As an expansion of social services was part of the three-fold solution to
poverty, it followed that there would be an increased need for people staffing social service
agencies. Essentially, it was proposed that the poor be hired to help the poor. “Renovated social
services,” the booklet continued, “will contain innumerable opportunities for permanent, satisfying
jobs at all levels of skill and responsibility.” Education and healthcare were included as areas of
employment, in addition to social services. If these positions were to be publicly funded was not
addressed, although it would be a reasonable conclusion to draw. And while the plan had the merit
of connecting the end of poverty with viable job opportunities, including expanding public
employment, it was also premised on the continued existence of poverty, not its elimination. If
poverty was adequately addressed and eliminated, these positions would no longer be necessary
or required. 584
At this moment, the booklet took a brief yet revealing detour, assuring the reader that “job
training is not a panacea.” Training was a precondition to employment, but employment still
required open positions. Thus, in a direct reference to industrial decentralization and the lack of
employment opportunities in urban areas, the booklet stated that “hundreds of firms must be
attracted into the cities.” Labor unions and professional organizations “had to open their ranks,”
which was perhaps a reference to the history of racial discrimination in employment. These
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changes would take years to achieve, meaning that something had to fill the gap between the
present moment and when avenues of employment became available to city residents.585
Yet, instead of addressing social services or welfare provisions, the booklet immediately
returned to the culture-of-poverty argument: “more important than the inevitable time lag of years
is the attitude of many of the slum residents.” All too many had “passed the point of caring” and
thus had no hope for the future. While lamenting the lack of risk-taking on the part of the poor and
their reluctance to try a new path in life, the booklet noted that many had sought job training “only
to discover that they cannot get into unions or into professions,” or that competition was too
intense, job requirements too demanding, or their new skill was already obsolete. The tension
between arguing that the poor do not care to improve themselves while acknowledging that many
try and failed due to conditions outside their control was never resolved.586
Instead, the booklet continued by arguing that “still others lack interest in working.” For
these people, “the very concept of full-time work is foreign if not fearful.” To complete the
impression that the booklet was contradicting itself, it once again changed tack and argued that
others worked for “endless years” in underpaid jobs. As their incomes are inadequate, “they
‘moonlight[ed]’ to support their families. And they never have the time or the opportunity to break
the cycle.” So while the booklet acknowledged that some impoverished city residents work year
after year in underpaying jobs and moonlighted to make ends meet, while others tried to obtain
better employment only to be knocked back down again, it still asserted that the important factor
was the attitude of the poor and their fear of full-time employment.587
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If there were those who could work, and needed employment, the planners also recognized
that there were many people who could not work for one reason or another: “the aged, the infirm,
the mothers with five or six children, very young or ill children, or even older children themselves
who should be getting further education and training.” In these cases, the booklet argued for the
need for financial assurance, which would allow a family to “feel secure enough about the future
to be interested in planning for it.” Many who could benefit from existing social provisions did not
realize that they were eligible. Furthermore, programs were split between local, state, and federal
initiatives, with “severely limited” resources, restrictive criteria, and intrusive eligibility
requirements. Regardless, they had “moved an increasing number of Americans towards
independence and a new sense of dignity and self-respect.”588
“Still,” the booklet noted, “public welfare payments are now a source of heated national
debate.” While some sought to expand the programs, others desired to abolish them altogether.
Confusion existed around the different forms welfare programs could take, such as public
assistance, in-kind programs, a negative income tax, allowances for age groups, and social
security. The challenge, the booklet continued, was that all suffered from the fault of either keeping
incomes too low, or else “destroying the incentive to work.” At root, the authors of the booklet
assumed that the challenge was the incentive to work, or the inability to find existing work, and
not the lack of jobs in which one could work. Also, one might note, proposals for a guaranteed
income surfaced and were rejected.589
Citizen Participation
That HUD and Model Cities were struggling to understand how to approach city residents
in the wake of the long hot summer of 1968 comes across in a number of speeches and reports. A
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continuation of the effort of members of the Johnson administration to understand the urban crisis,
the reports and speeches that focused on citizen participation how federal policy makers conceived
of city residents. The HUD Assistant Secretary for Model Cities and Governmental Relations, H.
Ralph Taylor, delivered a talk on “Model Cities: Progress and Problems in the First Ten Months”
to the Model Cities Midwest Regional Conference in Dayton, on September 6, 1968. Taylor was
the HUD official in charge of the Model Cities program. In the course of his long address, Taylor
sought to support the fundamental principle that “citizens have the right to participate in and
influence the development of plans that will affect their lives.” This, he argued, was no longer
debatable. The Model Cities program was, in an echo of its original name, a demonstration. For
Taylor, however, the goals of the program were “nothing less than a demonstration that this
country, its government and its people, have the capacity, faith and willingness to commit
resources needed to build an urban society that honors rather than mocks the rhetorical of
democracy and equal opportunity for all.”590
While the title of Taylor’s speech referenced “the first ten month,” it had been two years
since Model Cities had passed Congress, and only a year after it had received only 45% of its
requested funding. The first ten months Taylor meant was the first ten months since seventy-five
cities had been chosen to participate in the Model Cities program. Taylor welcomed the occasion
to review the program for “our most important and critical audience,” by which he meant “the
people of the neighborhoods” and local public officials. The support of these two groups was
integral to the support of the program passed by Congress. The Model Cities program was a new
form of planning, Taylor told his audience, “totally unprecedented in this country.” He was
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glowing in his description of its achievements to date. There had been not only an agreement on
the relationship and program between HUD and city governments, there also had been (according
to Taylor) a move towards “a joint analysis of the basic problems of their neighborhood and its
place in the total picture” by “the city and the people.”591
Of course, Taylor noted, “there are debates and disputes as to details.” Voicing his
confidence that such debates and disputes could be resolved as long as citizens and cities
remembered that they were partners, Taylor quoted Senator Edmund Muskie, whom he
characterized as having done more than any single legislator to mold “the shape, form, philosophy
and existence” of Model Cities. The program mean, Muskie argued in an acceptance speech only
weeks prior to Taylor’s remarks, “giving all citizens an equal opportunity to participate in
American life and in the policy-making processes of our society. And in all frankness, our society
has not worked in this way up to now.” Taylor, via Muskie, began by affirming the need for citizen
involvement in policy-making, even as he acknowledged that the history of governance in the
United States had not always lived up to this ideal.592
Part of the challenge was that the Model Cities program was attempting to do something
new. There had been “virtually no experience in American cities with broad-scale planning that
related planning and social and economic planning,” which made the program daunting enough as
it was. Moreover, Model Cities proposed to create a new planning process, through which “the
total urban problem as an inter-related whole” was to be the focus. That process was to include the
involvement of the government as well as citizens, “in close association.” Just as there was no
experience with broad-based planning that covered physical, social, and economic needs at once,
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so there had been no experience with “this kind of planning as a collaborative enterprise” between
city governments and neighborhood residents.593
The first ten months of Model Cities had a been a period of conceiving and developing
plans. The first thirty or so plans were to be received by January of 1969 and all plans by that June.
After they had submitted their plans, cities were expected to begin their first action year out of a
five-year plan. The first steps were expected to be uneven, “but in every city people and institutions
that have never worked together before will be working together in a common endeavor.” This
collaboration could only improve over time. As such, the planning process itself was an
accomplishment of the Model Cities program. Longer-term objectives would likely be, Taylor
reminded his audience, far more difficult to achieve. “No city in the country today,” he stated, “has
any real measure of the money needed to eliminate entirely slums and poverty, to educate all of its
children to function effectively in a technological society where there are jobs for all, and how to
create those jobs.”594
Model Cities did not just aim to research how much it would cost to expand the program
to an entire city based on empirical data from selected neighborhoods. It also sought to
“demonstrate that funds will be used more effectively than in the past.” Thus, the program was
both research- and action-oriented. The necessary funding was neither solely in the purview nor
the responsibility of the federal government. Even as Taylor championed the objectives of the
Model Cities program, he cautioned that he was “concerned about this because I see very little
evidence of enlarged State capacity or of State commitment to focus resources on the problems of
the inner cities.” Model Cities created the arena in which the Federal government and other levels

593
594

Taylor, “First Ten Months,” p. 3, Model Cities Assessment, Gaither.
Taylor, “First Ten Months,” p. 5, Model Cities Assessment, Gaither.

241
of government could experiment with “new patterns of partnership” that created a grant system
with local flexibility.595
Taylor described two other long-term objectives that were fundamental to the Model Cities
program. The first was “to increase the competence and the responsiveness of local government,”
following the recommendations of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,
popularly known as the Kerner Commission. In contrast to conservative fears that Model Cities
was a way of diminishing local power and control, Taylor argued that the program instead “rests
on the premise that the problems of the city cannot be solved without the participation and the
leadership of local government.” Further municipal fragmentation threatened local leadership and
competence. The focus on citizen participation would help, Taylor continued, with the
responsiveness of local governance. Model Cities was “an experiment in the sharing of power
between government and citizen in developing institutions that will help the individual overcome
the feeling that he has no role to play in an impersonal society, no relationship to the decisions that
determine his life.”596
In particular, this ability to participate in decision-making was important to “the black and
the Spanish-speaking citizens.” Their right to participate had been long denied. Still, Model Cities
gave such citizens the means to “learn how to master the system, how to change it and adapt it to
[their] needs.” The opportunity to do so was integral to American democracy, and “everyone else
in our society has done this.” The opportunity had to be granted to “the people on the bottom rungs
of society’s ladder – the black, the Mexican-American and the Puerto-Rican migrant to our cities,
the Indian and the Appalachian and other white citizens at the poverty level.” There was an
racialized imbalance of power, which was something that Taylor sought to address in ways that
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Haar and other did not. The imbalance was also economic and included impoverished white
Americans as well. Thus, Model Cities programs and the findings of the Kerner Commission
would both be successful through an expansion of the democratic process. Opening up decisions
about the allocation and use of resources to those at the bottom-rung of American society – the
poor, whether they be black, Latino/a, indigenous, or white – would mean more effective and equal
governance. For Taylor, the benefits of Model Cities went well beyond the quality of life in
American cities. In extended to the well-being of American democracy itself, as well as the vitality
of democratic processes in the lives of all citizens.597
The second long-term objective was to improve the relationship between the federal
government and local governments. If the goal was to have local leadership responsive to changing
conditions and willing to experiment, then local governments had to trust the support of the federal
government, including its support through robust funding. “Mayors have insisted,” Taylor
reminded his audience, “very rightly, that if they are to plan with their citizens, they must have
more certainty and more timely funding than presently provided.” Otherwise, mayors could not be
expected to make institutional changes, many of which were experimental and therefore politically
risky. Part of the problem was that federal and state funding flowed through a number of channels,
some of which were outside the control, and even the knowledge, of local governments. “As a
result,” Taylor rued, “there are very few Mayors in this country who know the full extent and
nature of the flow of Federal funds into their cities.” Taylor proposed, as “the only effective
solution to this problem,” that approval of all federal grants require recipients in Model Citydesignated areas to participate in the Model City program and planning process.598
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In contemplating the future course of the Model Cities program, three significant problems
suggested themselves to Taylor. The first was the role of states in addressing the urban crisis. The
second was the adequacy of program resources, and the third was the challenges of citizen
participation. Taylor began with the role of states as “key decisions as to who gets aid, its use, and
the level of services to be provided” were made by state governments, not the federal or local
governments. Unfortunately, state governments were often “unsympathetic to, or even unaware
of, what is happening in the central city.” Nonetheless, state governments were essential partners
for addressing urban problems. They were local enough for experimental and flexible responses
to local concerns, but they were at a level to overcome the fragmenting of metropolitan municipal
governments, “the splintering of metropolitan areas into political jurisdictions that do not relate to
the nature of the problem.” It was necessary that state governments were open to “new ideas, new
ways of doing things, new approaches” in the areas of health, welfare, education, and civil rights.599
Taylor was not unaware of the ways that states-rights politics had been used in American
history, and he was cognizant that these politics and the goals of the Johnson administration were
not compatible. In calling for the importance of state governments in the Model Cities program,
he was careful to distinguish it from this strain of conservative politics. As Taylor told his audience
in Dayton, “a state where the rhetoric of States rights is used as a substitute for hard analysis of
reality and a commitment for action serves only to continue the historic suspicion and hostility
between State and local governments.” Rather than hostility between a state and the federal
government, Taylor underscored that states-rights politics ill-served local governments and
especially urban ones. Taylor invited state governments to participate in the Model Cities program.
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He saw it as a key partnership, but “the ticket of admission is State commitment to assist in the
solution of problems of the inner city.”600
The inadequacy of resources to successfully reach “the desired quality of urban society”
was of fundamental importance to the success of the Model Cities program. In an election year,
Taylor was skeptical of those who proposed unrealistic cuts to the domestic budget, “who talk
glibly of black capitalism and private enterprise and never mention the question of the need for
public funds, Federal and State to make it happen.” It was mere dishonesty in Taylor’s mind to
talk about rebuilding urban America without providing for adequate funding to make it happen.
That funding had to be public. As he argued, “the private sector cannot be expected to, nor will it
act at the volume required, without guaranties, subsidies, training dollars or aid in a form that will
either create a market or overcome the cost handicap of the action desired.” Black
entrepreneurship, just as home ownership and good health and education, were certainly the social
objectives to be met, but they required investment in order to reach them.601
Feeling the need to make public investment palatable, Taylor reassured his audience that
“Federal dollars do not necessarily mean Federal operation, or control, or that the money has to be
spent through public channels alone.” Rather, Taylor proposed that public funds be used by private
enterprises. At the end of the day, it was a matter of priorities rather than means. “We have the
resources to build America,” Taylor said, “the issue is whether we have the will.” In perhaps an
oblique reference to the war in Vietnam, Taylor conceded that it was a “period of resource
shortage,” but that “priorities must be set.” Here Taylor joined a number of other members of the
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Johnson administration who publicly spoke of the need to set resource priorities as a way to
indicate that they considered American involvement in Vietnam to be an ill-judged venture.602
Finally, Taylor addressed the challenges presented by the principle of citizen participation
in the Model Cities program. In particular, Taylor spoke on the rhetoric of black control and black
separatism. He clarified that he “read this as rhetoric, not reality.” Exclusive control by one group
of citizens was not an option, but instead power had to be shared. Standing in the way of this
sharing of power were two related obstacles: the “suspicion and hostility” of citizens towards “the
city” (by which Taylor meant the city government), and the “suspicion and skepticism” of public
officials towards citizens. Taylor was not unsympathetic to the suspicions and hostility on the part
of citizens towards city government, as it was “based upon a long history of neglect and second
class treatment.” It was not to be overcome quickly, and certainly not by mere words. As he
remarked, “even positive actions are slow to penetrate the thick layers of hostility build up by
history.” Taylor counseled his audience of Model City officials that they had to cultivate patience
and understanding, but that they also had to contribute to an understanding that a joint effort would
lead to desired results that could not be attained “solely with resources within the neighborhood
itself.” It required that neighborhoods “participate effectively in the decisions determining the use
of these resources.” Taylor saw no other way to move past the suspicion and alienation of the city
residents that Model Cities was designed to aid.603
To reach that goal required that public officials respect and listen to participating citizens.
There were those “who resent the restraints on their power” that came with citizen input. The
resentment of public officials could take many forms. An official could prize action over
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discussion and debate, thereby ignoring input by community members, or an official could express
dismay over “the difficulty of getting citizens to agree on a plan for action.” One could rue the
“fragmentation” of neighborhood opinion, “conflict between groups,” and the inability to appoint
a single “accepted spokesman” as reasons to retain full control over the planning process. These
ruses only covered the true reason behind the resentment, that “they have the arrogance of
professionals who believe that citizens, particularly poor and black citizens, lack the necessary
credentials.” This attitude only justified the suspicion and hostility on the part of the same citizens
towards the resentful public officials.604
The pathway to partnership between these two forces was wrought with perils, but it was
not impossible or unreasonable. It would entail rights and obligations on both sides. Both city
government and city residents had to work towards the representation of all groups in the planning,
implementation, and evaluation of the program; they had to recognize that no one, “not even the
President of the United States,” has absolute power or control; and that processes had to be
established clearly and early and then only changed through joint agreement. But while citizens
should have “access to and influence on” the decision-making process, the final decisions should
be in the hands of city governments, as “elected officials accountable to the citizenry,” as well as
“administrative authority.” As will be made clear below, Taylor’s conception of the role of citizens
in the decision-making process was a proscribed one.
Even at the ten-month mark, Taylor was able to pinpoint some of the characteristics of the
cities with successful Model Cities programs to date. They were ones in which public officials and
citizens had jointly “discussed, debated, and negotiated” the process through which participation
would take place. They had ensured the “democratic selection of a group representative of the
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major groups,” in terms of ethnicity, race, religion, economic status, and political views, who lived
in the relevant neighborhood. They had determined in joint acceptable ways the roles citizens
would play in “identifying problems, formulating plans and reacting to plans.”605
Yet, again Taylor underscored that “city government is clearly the dominant partner in the
Model Cities program and that is as it should be.” A danger resided in this power dynamic, as city
government had final decision-making power and could use that power to undermine citizen
participation. Avoiding this danger would required different responses from city to city, but Taylor
advised that “strengthening the citizen partners” would be one way to address it. Specifically,
Taylor promoted what he called Independent Technical Assistance. An idea being developed in at
least twenty cities, it provided “resources to provide technical assistance and expertise they trust”
to citizens and which were under their control. This assistance was not intended to duplicate the
staff that already existed in public agencies, but rather to “develop and maintain a neighborhood
structure that is representative of and accountable to the neighborhood, with access to experts to
assist neighborhood residents with the technical aspects of the planning process.” Community
expertise could thus be tapped and community members “strengthened” as partners. The plan as
described by Taylor did not address the degree to which such community partners would then be
involved in the decision-making process.606
At stake was not just the conditions of inner cities. At the immediate level it was about
addressing the hostility of city residents towards city government and “city hall’s fear that
participation and planning are mutually inconsistent.” At another level, it was about creating
successful cities. Ultimately it was “a great experiment in participatory government and
administration,” As such, Taylor combined the largest federal program focused on urban affairs
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and with the ethos of new left urbanism. He echoed the call for participatory democracy that had
characterized the Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society. But, as Taylor
himself argued, there is a difference between rhetoric and reality.607
On another occasion, H. Ralph Taylor gave remarks on the idea of citizen participation
before the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials on September 27, 1968,
in Minneapolis. Taylor’s argument was that “the fundamental principle that citizens have a right
to participate in and influence the development of plans that will affect their lives is not longer
debatable.” The world had changed, and “the social revolution under way throughout much of the
world has made this so.” The problem for planners and other professionals was that citizens
participation could easily become “an effective barrier to action.” In a telling use of the plural first
person, Taylor described how “we are frustrated by having to deal with (what some consider) the
chaotic, undisciplined, unstructured, quarrelsome reality that is the world of the poor, particularly
the black and the Spanish-speaking poor.” Perhaps Taylor was playing up the sense of frustration
for his audience, but this would still suggest that this perception was widely shared. It also suggests
that Taylor himself shared it.608
Despite the chaos and quarrels, Taylor assured his audience that citizen participation was
a healthy and necessary process, albeit one that can be difficult. “We must recognize and
understand this,” he continued, “for the black, Puerto Rican and Mexican-American communities
because these are problem areas.” Citizen participation in these “problem areas” was only useful
insofar as it led to understanding. Taylor then addressed three aspects of citizen participation. The
first was the issue of control, “a word that permeates the rhetoric of the minority community and
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is, rarely, if ever, heard in the white community.” This was the case, Taylor suggested, because if
one has control, one does not have any need to talk about it.609
The talk about control was not going to go away, Taylor observed, “in the model cities
program and elsewhere,” because it “is an important part of the rhetoric of self-affirmation and
must be understood as such.” There was a difference, implicit in Taylor’s comments, between the
rhetoric of control and having control. “There can be no exclusive control by citizens,” Taylor
cautioned his listeners, and the responsibility for the Model Cities program rested with the political
leadership, whether the federal or the local government. The distrust of citizen participation was
not necessarily aimed at minority populations. Local control could easily lead to further racial
segregation, and “apartheid, whether voluntary or involuntary, is not a legitimate objective of the
Model Cities program. Perhaps it would be in a Wallace administration – but not under Secretary
Weaver or this Assistant Secretary.”610
Full citizen control contained the possibility of continuing old urban ills or creating new
ones, and Taylor concluded that citizen participation worked best when “citizens and city
government negotiate a sharing of power” over the use of resources in a certain neighborhood.
Citizens and city government, however, were not equal players, and “the city is clearly the
dominant partner and that is as it should be in the Model Cities program.” Taylor qualified this by
emphasizing that partnership was not paternalism, the latter of which would make citizens
“subservient” to the government. This concept of citizen-government partnership was “nothing
new, startling, or frightening,” but rather was “consistent with the historical pattern by which other
minorities have moved into the main stream.”611
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A new challenge in the late 1960s was the hostility among some members of minority
groups to the mainstream. There were some, Taylor noted, who saw all social programs a form of
pacification, or else saw “the destruction of the present social structure as an essential prerequisite
to progress.” Such people, for Taylor, presented negative opposition to all proposals, unless they
themselves could “dominate” them. They were not, however, representative of the majority of
minority communities. Taylor cited a CBS national survey in support of his argument that the
majority of minorities still maintained faith in “the system.” Even as Taylor dismissed the
politically radical fragment of minority communities, he still believed that channels of
participation should be kept open for “those who are bitter, suspicious, cynical, and even
hostile.”612
Despite the crucial place control and power played in Taylor’s remarks, he never defined
what he meant by them. He argued that “city governments must be sincere in their willingness to
share power.” Without a sincere effort, any resulting program would lack legitimacy in the targeted
community, and “chaos is the inevitable result.” In working with a neighborhood it was essential
to have “a full understanding of power relationships in the neighborhood.” This meant, on one
hand, recognizing those who are loudest with “demand and threat” are not necessarily the leaders
of the neighbor or representative of majority opinion, and on the other that those who are
representative leaders must be given the assistance they need “to bargain and negotiate
effectively.” With this assistance, neighborhoods could “analyze, criticize, and suggest alternatives
to be explored and developed, and judge whether the exploration of those alternatives has been
honest and thorough.”613
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Citizen participation was to be advisory in nature. At no point was any means through
which citizens could participate in decision-making ever addressed: The proscribed routes of
involvement were to analyze, criticize, suggest, and judge. Whether a planner or government
official had to listen to citizens’ suggestions or follow through with their judgements was left
unsaid. Moreover, spokesmen [sic] for the community who were “divided and contentious” were
deemed by Taylor to be “blocking progress.”614 By definition, those who disagreed with the plans
of the specialists and professionals were unqualified to represent their communities.
To stand in the way of progress, as represented by the power and knowledge of planners
and specialists, would be to “focus on the equivalent of cottage industries on the threshold of the
computer age.” Once again, the residents of inner-cities were characterized as outside modernity.
Taylor provides a novel coda to this argument. He added that such anti-modernity “would give the
enemies of integration the rationale and philosophy for their own special brand of apartheid.” Even
so, Taylor cautioned his listeners that one could not expect a member of an urban minority
community to take “the larger view” unless they “had reason to believe that there is hope in that
larger view.”615
On one extreme end of the spectrum of citizen participation, then, was the apartheid of an
imagined Wallace administration. The other end came from the parochial and anti-modern
community politics that Taylor equated with black separatism. Integration was the national goal
of the Johnson administration, but to “inveigh against black separatism” while denying funds for
federal programs like the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was an act of hypocrisy and mockery. Taylor’s
remarks affirmed the program of the Johnson administration, advocated for fully funding approved
legislation and moving “forward more effectively to resolve the most difficult problems we all
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face today – that of involving the citizen in a constructive process that will lead to positive
accomplishment, and significant improvement in the quality of urban life for us all.”616
Conclusion
The Great Society envisioned a revitalized American society and democracy, and healthy
urban areas was central to that vision. Members of the Johnson administration were sincere in their
commitment to civil rights, the war on poverty, and an increasingly better life for all Americans.
Johnson himself was sensitive the realities of poverty, working, and racism, even as he carried
with him lingering prejudices from growing up in rural Texas. He was known to deploy racial
epithets, but he also kept a picture of the impoverished rural Mexican-American schoolchildren he
taught as an early adult in his desk. Once, when asked who had written one of his speeches as
president, he pulled this photograph from his desk and replied, “they did.”617
Yet, the Great Society was more than just President Johnson, and other members brought
their own experiences and prejudices with them. As the memo, booklet, and speeches analyzed in
this chapter have shown, not all members of the Great Society were sensitive to the lived realities
of racial discrimination or economic deprivation. These attitudes combined to create imagined
cities, based on observed realities but colored by preconceptions, for which federal policy makers
developed remedies. Additionally, there were generational differences that shaped how policy
makers confronted the urban crisis. A main one was the difference between those, like LBJ, who
saw themselves as heirs to FDR’s New Deal, and those who considered themselves as part of John
F. Kennedy’s New Frontier.
The two halves of this divide approached economics in fundamentally different ways. For
those who considered themselves New Dealers, and who had experienced the Great Depression,
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there existed a wariness towards capitalism itself. It was necessary, therefore, to regulate the
excesses of capitalism, as proscribed by economist John Maynard Keynes. Carefully calibrated
government spending, so the idea went, would ensure economic growth. The postwar success of
the United States’ economy seemed to demonstrate the veracity of Keynesian economic thinking.
This very success, by the 1950s, led liberal thinkers to consider capitalism as stable and capable
of sustained expansion. The Kennedy administration argued over what poverty truly meant: it
could be a lack of resources, but in “the affluent society,” perhaps it was a lack of opportunity.
Counseled by JFK’s economic advisers away from his New Deal inclinations, Johnson’s first State
of the Union address thus averred that “very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of
poverty, but the symptom.” The cause was a lack of a fair chance, of access to opportunity to share
in the ever-growing American prosperity.618
It was not until the 1970s that this worldview would change, with the combined forces of
stagflation and the oil crisis. Historian Carl Abbott locates this exact shift in 1972, when a group
of economists and scientists, the Club of Rome, released their report The Limits to Growth. The
group, via computer modeling, arrived at the conclusion that population growth was leading to
unsustainable pressure on natural resources. This Malthusian prediction, however, then combined
with the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, raising fears of peak petroleum. Stagflation and
deindustrialization rounded out the picture, which strongly suggested that ever-expanding
economic prosperity was not, after all, assured.619 As the second chapter of this study explained,
however, indications of this were already present by the early 1950s. Or, rather, that the growing
economy following the Second World War developed unevenly in different regions and in

618

Galbraith, The Affluent Society; Zeitz, Building the Great Society: Inside Lyndon Johnson's White House, 42-44,
48, 54; Zelizer, The Fierce Urgency of Now: Lyndon Johnson, Congress, and the Battle for the Great Society, 138139.
619
Abbott, Imagining Urban Futures, 160.

254
different industries. The result was that entire cities were left behind. Regional urban disparities,
such as that between the rust belt and the sun belt, were not address by the Model Cities program.
The funding for Model Cities was spread too thin, from six cities to sixty-six, and did not
accomplish what it was originally intended to do. Even if it had remained focused on the original
six cities proposed by Walter Reuther, the Johnson administration and the Great Society was
devoured by the continuing war in Vietnam. Increasing consumed by the quagmire in southeast
Asia, Johnson did not seek reelection in 1968, and Richard Nixon won the presidency. Nixon and
subsequent presidents have continued key Great Society programs, from Head Start programs to
public media, and these continue to be popular with the general public. The role of cities in the
health and vitality of American society and democracy, however, never reached the same height
as it did under the Johnson administration.
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CHAPTER 7 EPILOGUE
This project began under the presidency of Barack Obama, when the United States was
supposed to have moved beyond race, into what has been termed a post-racial society. Doing
graduate studies in urban and labor history in the majority-black city of Detroit, surrounded by
largely majority-white suburbs, it was difficult to quite buy this argument.620 It was clear that
poverty and blackness correlated into living in the city proper, while wealth and whiteness
correlated with living in the suburbs. Income, ancestry, and geographic location all seemed
interrelated. Thus, even if we grant that, in interpersonal dimensions, we were post-racial, it
seemed indicated that serious structural inequalities persisted.
The murders of Trayvon Martin, Freddie Grey, Michael Brown, Eric Gardner, and too
many others occurred in rapid succession. Ferguson and Baltimore became sites of public
frustration and anger met with militarized policing – the same policing that had led to the shooting,
choking, or otherwise deadly treatment in police custody, of so many unarmed black men and
women. Subsequent police testimony demonstrated to what a degree blackness, even in children,
was connected to criminality and violence, therefore perceived as a physical threat.621 Our society
and, especially, our cities, were anything close to post-racial, and it was clear to most that there
was a logic at work in which slums and ghettoes, the inner-cities, were black and impoverished.622
Then, with the subsequent presidential election, the gates of hell seemed to burst forth. Neo
Nazis and the KKK openly marched, harming and killing anti-fascist protesters, and leading to a
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political climate that saw a rise in the harassment and assault of minorities of all sorts: racial,
ethnic, religious, sexual. In the year this dissertation was finished, a new phenomenon emerged,
chilling given the recent history of extra-legal police killing of black Americans: calling the police
on black people for simply being present in public spaces. Within two weeks in the spring of 2018,
white Americans called the police on black Americans for waiting in a coffeeshop, for taking a
nap in a dormitory common room, for shopping at an upscale clothing chain, for eating breakfast
at a popular chain restaurant, for renting a room in a white neighborhood, for having a BBQ in a
public park. Similar cases continued over the summer, including the police being called on a black
politician canvassing door-to-door, and a black landlord checking on a property he had just
purchased. Divorced from any illegal activity, this persistence calling of the police is the cruel
harassment of black Americans for simply being in spaces in which they are not welcomed by
some white Americans. This chapter in the long book of anti-black racism in the United States
earned its wearily dry rejoinder online via #existingwhileblack, through which people documented
their experiences with racism in everyday situations and tasks.
The criminalization of blackness, in and of itself, and its subsequent policing, has been
long interrogated by scholars of black experiences. As urban areas in the US become increasingly
non-white, they correspondingly become criminalized and therefore requiring more intense
policing, for not other reason than that they have become non-white. Just as white communities
feared the “invasion” of integration fifty years ago, so black presence in what is coded as white
space is perceived as an invasion of criminality, and requiring the intervention of an increasingly
militarized and violent police force, even if all that is occurring is a BBQ, a vacation, a nap, or a
cup of coffee with friends. Unfortunately, these current events show that, far from being past
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history or merely academic, the major concerns of this study continue to have present relevance
and resonance.
Detroit itself entered into a moment of cultural cachet as this study was being written. A
spate of books and articles emerged attempting to explain Detroit to the uninitiated. Those focusing
on the abandoned structures of the industrial past were roundly criticized by Detroiters as ruin porn
(titillating to its safely-ensconced observers, exploitative of its objectified subjects). The New York
Times released a series of articles on the city that sublimely missed the point altogether, when not
simply patronizing, including that authored by critically-acclaimed Norwegian author Karl Ove
Knausgaard.623 The obscurity of Detroit, the unknowability of it, is nothing but the inability to
accept what Detroit represents in reality: the potent combination of structural racism and the ability
of industrial, and now post-industrial, capitalism to abandon an entire city. Detroit, and its
residents, were and are disposable. It is easy to dismiss this statement when it is an abstract
utterance. It is another matter altogether when one is, in one’s human-sized physicality, confronted
by miles upon miles of abandoned industrial spaces and devastated residential areas throughout
the metropolitan area. But here’s yet another moment of inscrutability. The largeness of that
confrontation, in turn, leads to the obfuscation of what does remain in Detroit: resilient and strong
communities, vibrant and rich creativity in and appreciation of music and art, a thriving food
culture, wide-spread devoutness that crosses faith traditions, a continuing working-class ethos, a
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warmness and generosity of spirit on the part of those who live there which is nearly always
overlooked and ignored in favor of stories of criminality and violence.
Similar in conceit to ruin porn strand of photography is the comparison of Detroit to postSoviet urban decay or a bombed-out city, often Berlin after WWII or Sarajevo following the
brutalities in the former Yugoslavia. For instance, Detroit native Mark Lilla compared the city to
post-Communist Bucharest, where one can take a “Beautiful Decay Tour” to visit “buildings full
of rubble and broken glass, abandoned factories invaded by local grasses.” Detroit, Lilla tells his
readers, is “American’s Bucharest.” Part of the appeal, which can be traced back to Romanticism,
is that “for those who have never experienced defeat, destruction, or exile there is an undeniable
charm to loss.”624 A common story told in Detroit is that of visitors from Bosnia or Germany or
some such place that has experienced grievous destruction during a war, and asking Detroiters who
had bombed them.625
Detroit does not fare better in fiction, as related by urbanist and science fiction fan Carl
Abbott. In Imagining Urban Futures, Detroit appears as an iteration of “crabgrass chaos,” where
even the suburbs are “ghettos and slums, free-fire zones of danger and depopulation where it’s
everybody for him or herself and wilding gangs take the hindmost.” Abbott points to Tobias
Buckell’s “Stochasti-City” and Elizabeth Bear’s “The Red in the Sky is Our Blood,” both based
in metropolitan Detroit. “Bucknell’s and Bear’s Detroit,” Abbott tells his readers, “is no long
stretch from the real thing.”626 In another case, Nalo Hopkinson, author of 1998’s Brown Girl in
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the Ring, featuring a Caribbean Canadian young woman in a future inner Toronto abandoned by
government and businesses alike, has said her vision of Toronto was modeled on Detroit.627
Between the extremes of only seeing the many hardships faced by Detroiters and focusing
only on the positives, and consequently over-romanticizing, one can acknowledge the difficulties
experienced by the city and its residents while seeing that humans, through time and space, make
the best of the circumstances in which we find ourselves: we find love, joy, and creative expression
where we can.628
This study has aimed to explore the roots of present day Detroit, by examining case studies
of racial segregation, deindustrialization, and contemporary responses at different scales (by
residents, by local elites, and by the federal government). The intent is not to chide historical actors
for not making better decisions, but rather to endeavor to understand what solutions had been
proposed in the past, what their advantages and drawbacks might have been, and which were
followed and which were not. This history is more variegated than it is often presented in popular
narratives, and this study seeks to bely the notion that the present conditions of Detroit, and many
other cities and small towns that share its experiences, were inevitable. They were not. As
sociologist Daniel Bell wrote in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, “these trends become
subject to choice and the decision is a policy intervention which may create a turning point in the
history of a country or an institution.”629 Alternatives and proposals were offered by many, the
acknowledgement of which is not to argue that their implementation would have been plausible,
possible, likely, or desired.
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Even as we acknowledge that the present is the culmination of the decisions and choices
we, as a society, have made in the past, it is difficult to argue that, for instance, a racialized society
should have simply chosen to forego racism, structurally as well as interpersonally. Ideally, yes,
but structures of power did not appear over night and, putting severe ruptures of catastrophe,
revolution, and war to the side, they do not change over night. Understanding what those structures
are, and how they operate, and how they came to be, however, is the first step to moving towards
moving beyond them. Likewise, this study does not mean to argue that deindustrialization of a
region is inherently bad, which is a form of romanticizing industrial production for its own sake.
Rather, the point is, historically, deindustrialization led to a certain set of problems for workers
and for cities. On one plane is these problems and how they could have been avoided, and on
another is how they could have been quickly and efficiently addressed after coming into being.
As we live in a world that is largely urban and only becoming more so, the conditions of
life in our cities matter greatly. All too often, solutions to urban ills center around moving the
problems out of sight and out of mind – instead of addressing the roots of poverty, for instance, it
is easier to relocate impoverished city residents to the outskirts of the city or into scattered suburbs.
It is impossible to grapple with inequalities within metropolitan areas without grappling with the
history and legacy of racial inequalities or large-scale changes in economic structures, yet
frequently we do just that. It is unsurprising, then, that these questions have risen to the forefront,
yet again, of American politics and social relations. They are fundamental to our social well-being,
and we must engage with them if we are to move forwards as a democratic and urban society that
strives for well-being of all its members.

261
REFERENCES
Archival Sources
The Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.
Legislative Background and Domestic Crisis File, Model Cities, 1966, LBJ Library.
Office Files of James Gaither, LBJ Library.
Office Files of Harry McPherson, LBJ Library.
Office Files of Irving Sprague, LBJ Library.
Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, NY.
Ford Foundation records, Reports 11775-13948 (FA739E), Box 575, Reports 012158:
Philanthropy’s Adaptation to the Urban Crisis, 11 volumes, Rockefeller Archive Center.
The Walter P. Reuther Library, Detroit, MI.
Detroit Commission on Community Relations (DCCR)/Human Rights Department
Records, Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State
University.
The Developing Urban Detroit Area Research Project (Doxiadis) Records, Walter P.
Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
Grosse Pointe Civil Rights Organizations Papers, Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of
Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
The Percy Llewellyn Papers, Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban
Affairs, Wayne State University.
UAW Local 600 Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban
Affairs, Wayne State University.

262
UAW President’s Office: Walter P. Reuther Records, Walter P. Reuther Library,
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
Published Primary Sources
Bunge, William. Fitzgerald: Geography of a Revolution. University of Georgia, 2011.
Doxiadis, Constantinos. Emergence and Growth of an Urban Region, Volume 1: Analysis.
Detroit: Detroit Edison Company, 1966.
Doxiadis, Constantinos. Emergence and Growth of an Urban Region, Volume 2: Future
Alternatives. Detroit: Detroit Edison Company, 1967.
Doxiadis, Constantinos. Emergence and Growth of an Urban Region, Volume 3: A Concept for
Future Development. Detroit: Detroit Edison Company, 1970.
Haar, Charles M. Striving for the Great Society: Lyndon Johnson's Reshaping of the American
Dream. Lexington, KY: Phi Press, 2015.
Harrington, Michael. The Other America: Poverty in the United States. Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1967; originally published 1962.
Riis, Jacob A. How the Other Half Lives: Studies Among the Tenements of New York. Boston:
Bedford/St. Martin's, 2011.
Ward, Stephen M., ed. Pages From a Black Radical's Notebook: A James Boggs Reader. Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 2011.
Secondary Sources
Abbott, Carl. Imagining Urban Futures: Cities in Science Fiction and What We Might Learn
From Them. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2016.
Abbott, Philip, ed. The Many Faces of Patriotism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2007.

263
Addams, Jane. Twenty Years at Hull-House. New York: Signet Classic, 1981.
Allen, Theodore. The Invention of the White Race, Volume 1: Racial Oppression and Social
Control. 2012.
Allen, Theodore W. The Invention of the White Race, Volume 2: The Origin of Racial
Oppression in Anglo-America. London: Verso, 2012.
Andrews, Thomas G. . Killing for Coal: America's Deadliest Labor War. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2008.
Arts, The Detroit Institute of. The Legacy of Albert Kahn. Detroit: Gaylord Printing Company,
1970.
Babson, Steve, Dave Elsila, and Dave Riddle. The Color of Law: Ernie Goodman, Detroit, and
the Struggle for Labor and Civil Rights. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2010.
Barnard, John. American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers During the Reuther years, 19351970. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2004.
Bates, Beth Tompkins. The Making of Black Detroit in the Age of Henry Ford. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2012.
Baxandall, Rosalyn Fraad, Linda Gordon, and Susan M. Reverby, eds. America's Working
Women: A Documentary History, 1600 to the Present. New York: Vintage Books, 1976.
Bell, Daniel. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. New
York: Basic Books, 2010.
Biles, Roger. "Expressways Before the Interstates." Journal of Urban History 40, no. 5 (2014):
843-854.
Biles, Roger. The Fate of Cities: Urban America and the Federal Government, 1945-2000.
Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2011.

264
Bluestone, Barry, and Bennett Harrison. The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings,
Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry. New York City: Basic
Books, 1982.
Boyle, Kevin. Arc of Justice: A Saga of Race, Civil Rights, and Murder in the Jazz Age. New
York: H. Holt, 2004.
Boyle, Kevin. The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1995.
Branch, Taylor. At Canaan's Edge: America in the King Years, 1965-68. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2007.
Branch, Taylor. Parting the Waters: America in the King years, 1954-63. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2005.
Branch, Taylor. Pillar of Fire: America in the King years, 1963-65. New York, NY: Simon &
Schuster, 1999.
Buruma, Ian. Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam and the Limits of Tolerance. New
York, NY: Penguin Books, 2007.
Capeci, Dominic J. ""Never Leave Me": The Wartime Correspondence of Peg and George
Edwards, 1944 to 1945." Michigan Historical Review 27, no. 2 (2001): 90-130.
Caro, Robert A. Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2002.
Caro, Robert A. The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. New York:
Vintage Books, 1975.
Caro, Robert A. The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power. New York: Vintage Books,
1990; originally 1981.

265
Castells, Manuel. The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977.
Cialdella, Joseph Stanhope. "Landscape of Ruin and Repair: Parks, Potatoes, and Detroit's
Environmental Past, 1879-1900." Michigan Historical Review 40, no. 1 (Spring 2014
2014): 49-72.
Cohen, Lizabeth. A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar
America. New York: Knopf, 2003.
Cosseboom, Kathy. Grosse Pointe, Michigan: Race Against Race. East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 1972.
Cowie, Jefferson. Capital Moves: RCA's Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor. New York: New
Press, 2001.
Cowie, Jefferson, and Joseph Heathcott, eds. Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of
Deindustrialization. Ithaca: ILR Press, 2003.
Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998.
Du Bois, W. E. B. . Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1999, orginally 1935.
Dulles, Foster Rhea. Labor in America: A History, 3rd Ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, 1966.
Duneier, Mitchell. Ghetto: The Invention of a Place, the History of an Idea. New York: Farrar,
Strauss and Giroux, 2016.
Eugenides, Jeffrey. Middlesex. New York City: PIcador, 2002.
Faue, Elizabeth. Rethinking the American Labor Movement. New York: Routledge, 2017.

266
Fields, Karen E., and Barbara J. Fields. Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life.
London: Verso, 2012.
Fine, Sidney. Violence in the Model City: The Cavanagh Administration, Race Relations, and the
Detroit Riot of 1967. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007; originally
published 1989.
Finley, Mary Lou, Bernard LaFayette, James R. Ralph, and Pam Smith, eds. The Chicago
Freedom Movement: Martin Luther King Jr. and Civil Rights Activism in the north.
Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2016.
Frank, Dana. Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic Nationalism. Boston: Beacon Press,
2000.
Freilich, Robert H. "A Tribute to Charles M. Haar." The Urban Lawyer 44, no. 2 (2012): 291294.
Freund, David. Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2009.
Galster, George. Driving Detroit: The Quest for Respect in the Motor City. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.
Gelfand, Mark I. A Nation of Cities: The Federal Government and Urban America, 1933-1965.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Georgakas, Dan, and Marvin Surkin. Detroit: I Do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban Revolution.
Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012; originally 1975.
Gillon, Steven M. Separate and Unequal: The Kerner Commission and the Unraveling of
American Liberalism. New York: Basic Books, 2018.

267
Haar, Charles M. Striving for the Great Society: Lyndon Johnson's Reshaping of the American
Dream. Lexington, KY: Phi Press, 2015.
Haar, Charles M. Suburbs under Siege: Race, Space, and Audacious Judges. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996.
Hall, Jacob Dean. "The Myth of the Motor City: Urban Politics, Public Policy, and the
Suburbanization of Detroit's Automobile Industry, 1878-1937." University of Iowa, 2013.
Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd. "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Ues of the Past." The
Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (2005): 1233-1263.
Halpern, Martin. "Taft-Hartley and the Defeat of the Progressive Alternative in the United Auto
Workers." Labor History 27, no. 2 (Spring86 1986): 204.
Hamlin, Michael. A Black Revolutionary's Life in Labor: Black Workers Power in Detroit.
Detroit: Against the Tide Books, 2012.
Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Harvey, David. "The Right to the City." New Left Review, no. 53 (01/2008 2008): 23-40.
Harvey, David. Social Justice and the City. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
Herken, Gregg. The Georgetown Set: Friends and Rivals in Cold War Washington. New York:
Vintage Books, 2014.
Hersey, John. The Algiers Motel Incident. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
High, Steven C., and David W. Lewis. Corporate Wasteland: The Landscape and Memory of
Deindustrialization. Ithaca: ILR Press, 2007.
Hirsch, Arnold R. Making the Second Ghetto: Race & Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

268
Holli, Melvin G. "Mayoring in Detroit, 1824-1985: Is Upward Mobility the 'Impossible
Dream?'." Michigan Historical Review 13, no. 1 (1987): 1-19.
Hyde, Charles K. Arsenal of Democracy: The American Automobile Industry in World War II.
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2013.
Jackson, Kenneth T. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of America. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985.
Jackson, Kenneth T. . "Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners Loan
Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration." Journal of Urban History 6, no. 4
(1980): 419-452.
Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Vintage Books, 1992;
originally 1961.
Jones-Correa, Michael. "The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants." Political
Science Quarterly 115, no. 4 (2000): 541-568.
Katz, Michael B. The "Underclass" Debate: Views From History. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1997.
Katznelson, Ira. City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States.
New York: Pantheon Books, 1981.
Kessler-Harris, Alice. Gendering Labor History. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007.
Klemek, Christopher. The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from
New York to Berlin. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012.
Kneebone, Elizabeth, and Alan Berube. Confronting Suburban Poverty in America. Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013.

269
Korstad, Robert, and Nelson Lichtenstein. "Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and
the Early Civil Rights Movement." The Journal of American History 75, no. 3 (1988):
786-811.
Kruse, Kevin Michael, and Thomas J. Sugrue, eds. The New Suburban History. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2006.
Lauck, Jon K., Paul Murphy, Andrew Seal, Joe Hogan, and Gleaves Whitney, eds. Mapping
Midwestern Minds: Essays on the Intellectual History of the American Midwest.
Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, forthcoming.
Lefebvre, Henri. Writings on Cities. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
Lichtenstein, Nelson. "Class Politics and the State during World War Two." International Labor
and Working-Class History, no. 58 (2000): 261-274.
Lichtenstein, Nelson. The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of
American Labor. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1995.
Lilla, Mark. The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction. New York: New York Review
Books, 2016.
Linkon, Sherry Lee, and John Russo. Steeltown USA: Work & Memory in Youngstown.
Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2002.
Low, Setha M., ed. Theorizing the City: The New Urban Anthropology Reader. New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 2010.
Martelle, Scott. Detroit: A Biography. Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2014.
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of
the Underclass. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.

270
Meyer, Stephen. Manhood on the Line: Working-Class Masculinities in the American Heartland.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016.
Milkman, Ruth. Farewell to the Factory: Auto Workers in the Late Twentieth Century.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Miller, James A., Susan D. Pennybacker, and Eve Rosenhaft. "Mother Ada Wright and the
International Campaign to Free the Scottsboro Boys, 1931-1934." The American
Historical Review 106, no. 2 (2001): 387-430.
Milloy, Jeremy. Blood, Sweat, and Fear: Violence at Work in the North American Auto Industry,
1960-80. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017.
Morgan, Edmund S. American Slavery, American Freedom: the Ordeal of Colonial Virginia.
New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003.
Neumann, Tracy. Remaking the Rust Belt: The Postindustrial Transformation of North America.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.
Nightingale, Carl H. Segregation: A Global History of Divided Cities. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 2012.
O'Mara, Margaret Pugh. Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next
Silicon Valley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Paddison, Ronan, ed. Handbook of Urban Studies. London: SAGE Publications, 2009.
Pellow, David N., and Lisa Sun-Hee Park. The Silicon Valley of Dreams: Environmental
Injustice, Immigrant Workers, and the High-Tech Global Economy. New York: New
York University Press, 2003.
Peterson, Sarah Jo. Planning the Home Front: Building Bombers and Communities at Willow
Run. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013.

271
Rodgers, Daniel T. Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age. Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001.
Roediger, David R. The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working
Class. London: Verso, 2007.
Rothstein, Richard. The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated
America. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2017.
Sassen, Saskia. The Global City. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Schulman, Bruce J. , ed. Lyndon B. Johnson and American Liberalism: A Brief Biography with
Documents, 2nd ed. . Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2007.
Schumpteter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Routledge, 2005.
Self, Robert O. American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005.
Sheppard, Harold. "The Union as a Political Influence." Journal of Social Issues 9, no. 1 (1953):
45-48.
Southworth, Caleb, and Judith Stepan-Norris. "The Geography of Class in an Industrial
American City: Connections between Workplace and Neighborhood Politics." Social
Problems 50, no. 3 (2003): 319-347.
Stone, Joel, ed. Detroit 1967: Origins, Impacts, Legacies. Detroit: Wayne State University Pres,
2017.
Sugrue, Thomas. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005; originally 1996.
Sugrue, Thomas J. "Labor, Liberalism, and Racial Politics in 1950s Detroit." New Labor Forum,
no. 1 (1997): 19-25.

272
Sullivan, Patricia. Life Every Voice: The NAACP and the Making of the Civil Rights Movement.
New York: The New Press, 2009.
Theoharis, Jeanne, and Komozi Woodard, eds. Groundwork: Local Black Freedom Movements
in America. New York: New York University, 2005.
Thompson, Heather Ann. Blood in the Water: The Attica Prison Uprising of 1971 and Its
Legacy. New York: Vintage Books, 2017.
Thompson, Heather Ann. "Rethinking Working-Class Struggle through the Lens of the Carceral
State: Toward a Labor History of Inmates and Guards." Labor 8, no. 3 (2011): 15-45.
Thompson, Heather Ann. Whose Detroit?: Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American
City. Cornell University Press, 2004.
Thompson, Heather Ann, and Donna Murch. "Rethinking Urban America through the Lens of
the Carceral State." Journal of Urban History 41, no. 5 (2015): 751-755.
Thoreau, Henry David. Walden and Civil Disobedience. New York: Barnes & Noble Classics,
2005.
Wang, Frances Kai-Hwa. "Vincent Chin: A Catalyst for the Asian-American Civil Rights
Movement." Michigan History Magazine, 2017 March-April 2017, 41+.
Watson, Bruce. Bread and Roses: Mills, Migrants, and the Struggle for the American Dream.
New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
Weaver, Timothy. "Urban Crisis: The Genealogy of a Concept." Urban Studies 54, no. 9 (2017):
2039-2055.
Widick, B.J. Detroit: City of Race and Class Violence. revised ed. Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1989.

273
Wiese, Andrew. Places of Their Own: African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth
Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
Wilson, William J. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
Zeitz, Joshua. Building the Great Society: Inside Lyndon Johnson's White House. New York:
Viking, 2018.
Zelizer, Julian E. The Fierce Urgency of Now: Lyndon Johnson, Congress, and the Battle for the
Great Society. New York: Penguin Books, 2015.
Zipp, Samuel and Nathan Storring, eds. Vital Little Plans: The Short Works of Jane Jacobs.
New York: Random House, 2016.
Zunz, Olivier. The Changing Face of Inequality: Urbanization, Industrial Development, and
Immigrants in Detroit, 1880-1920. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1983.

274
ABSTRACT
ENVISIONING THE CITY OF THE FUTURE: RESPONSES TO
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, SEGREGATION, AND THE URBAN CRISIS IN
POSTWAR DETROIT, 1950-1970
by
ANDREW HNATOW
December 2018
Advisor: Dr. Elizabeth Faue
Major: History
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Following Second World War, cities in the United States appeared to be in trouble. The
urban crisis revolved around poverty, unemployment, segregation and discrimination,
suburbanization, and deindustrialization. Using metropolitan Detroit as a case-study, this
dissertation examines responses by local residents, urban planners, and federal policy-makers to
these changes. Local community and union members centered around the Ford River Rouge
complex in Dearborn rallied against industrial decentralization in the early 1950s. Community
members in Grosse Pointe practiced systematic housing segregation, while other members of the
community organized a Human Relations Council to support integration and interracial
understanding. Constantinos Doxiadis led a research project in the 1960s, which published a threevolume study on the city in the year 2000. In the Lyndon B. Johnson presidential administration,
the Model Cities program was developed to address struggling urban areas across the nation, even
as the program originated in Detroit, via Walter Reuther of the United Automobile Workers.
Through all these episodes, different people expressed how they understood the current challenges
in the city and how they imagined its future. What they included and what they left out reveal the
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state of race relations, economic inequality, and who was and was not considered to have a right
to the city.

276
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT
Andrew Hnatow received his BA from Western Michigan University in 2010, magna cum
laude, Phi Beta Kappa. He double-majored in History and French, and he studied abroad in Lyon,
France. He received in MA in History from Wayne State University in 2014. His MA essay was
on the relationship between the New Left and organized labor in the early 1960s, and is the basis
for a forthcoming chapter in an edited volume on intellectual history. Hnatow’s teaching fields
include the United States since 1865, urban history, and world history. His research interests
include postwar US history, urban studies, the Cold War, the global 1960s, and social and
intellectual history. Additionally, he has participated in a GRAINES summer academy in Vienna
on European cities; three years of the Bavarian American Academy’s summer program, in
Munich/Regensburg, Miami, and Nuremberg, respectively; and as a assistant for a program on
African democracies in Accra, Ghana. He has over five years teaching experience, as an assistant
and as an instructor of record, in world history after 1945, American labor history, and the history
of Detroit. After studying, teaching, and living in Detroit, he currently is pursuing his interest in
academic publishing by working in the acquisitions department of the University of Texas Press,
in Austin.

